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Abstract 
Base erosion refers to tax avoidance strategies involving multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) changing the order of worth of their economic activities across host 
locations. This leads to a loss in corporate tax revenues, unfair competition between 
domestic enterprises and MNEs, and a challenge to the legitimacy and power of host 
nation-states. In problematizing base erosion, theories of internationalization and 
internalization explicate the MNEs’ perspective on their processes, governance 
modes and value-creation. Host policymakers, however, take a different perspective 
on firm judgements from top management and their external advisors. Although the 
theory of social judgements explains how cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements are formed, little attention is paid in the theory to how intra-field 
cognitive legitimacy judgements may be challenged. Drawing on archival material 
and in-depth interviews, I make the following three contributions. Firstly, I develop 
a thick description for a host policymakers’ conceptual model of MNEs’ value-
alignment process across host locations. Secondly, I extend the organizing views on 
transfer pricing to explain base erosion as an MNE practice for changing the order 
of worth. Thirdly, I contribute to the social judgements literature by identifying the 
conditions and the means for bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements. These contributions are important because they shed new light on base 
erosion, providing theoretical constructs for the MNE value-alignment process, the 
organizing views on transfer pricing and the communicative means for shifting inter-
field discourse from cognitive to evaluative modes. 
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Chapter 1 – Overview 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the thesis, introduces the research question, explains the 
base erosion phenomenon, locates the organizational literature on the 
phenomenon, identifies the gap in the extant literature and provides an overview 
of the dataset and methodology, the analysis and findings, and the contribution. 
It concludes with an explanation of the limitations of the study and suggestions 
for opportunities for further research. 
The Thesis 
Host location policymakers view value creation by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) internationalizing across host locations differently from MNEs 
themselves. In this thesis, my level of analysis is from a public stakeholder 
perspective (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007)—that is, the host policymakers’ 
perspective—as distinct from an external aggregation perspective (Garcia-Castro 
& Aguilera, 2015), or an internal organizational perspective (Barney, 1991), or 
otherwise an individual orientation (Felin & Hesterly, 2007). In framing policy 
solutions on base erosion, host policymakers use commensuration techniques to 
collectively move a public deliberative process from an intra-field taken-for-
granted orthodoxy to an evaluative inter-field sociopolitical legitimacy discourse. 
This thesis focuses primarily on two policy fields or domains, the corporate 
reporting field and the international corporate taxation field. In this thesis, I use 
the term a field or domain to refer to a social arena of actors that share a common 
understanding, comprising incumbent members and challengers, and their 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 1 
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internal governance units that maintain order and stability (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012; Furnari, 2016; Spence, Carter, Husillos & Archel, 2017); where a field may 
be dominated by non-state actors whilst a domain may, more likely, be dominated 
by state actors. 
The Research Question 
The research question is ‘How do host policymakers make sense of the base 
erosion phenomenon’? By answering the question, I advance the understanding 
of: (i) the plurality of perspectives on MNE value-creation frameworks; and, (ii) 
the mobilization of social judgements to advance change in interconnected policy 
domains. The literature indicates that policy problems are not ‘social facts 
awaiting discovery’ (Coburn, 2006 p.343), but rather are the product of ‘a process 
of social collective definition’ (Blumer, 1971). Hence the research question 
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) not only addresses the how and why question about 
the social collective definition of the base erosion phenomenon (Von Krogh, 
Rossi-Lamastra & Haefliger, 2012), but also how and why host locations 
approach the framing of public policy solutions (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
The Base Erosion Phenomenon 
The empirical setting 
Following the drastic budgetary cuts or so-called ‘austerity measures’ 
announced by Parliament of the United Kingdom (UK) in late 2010 (Pimlot & 
Giles, 2010), the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) took 
evidence in 2012 and 2013 from a group of foreign-headquartered (HQ) MNEs 
operating in the UK, subsequently issuing the PAC-UK (2012) Report and the 
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PAC-UK (2013). The austerity measures attracted much public deliberative 
discourse, from the media (BBC, 2012; Houlder, 2011, 2012, 2014), from social 
movement organizations (Occupy London, 2011; Tax Justice Network, 2003; UK 
Uncut, 2010), from academics (Devereux, 2011; Dharmapala, 2014; Kleinbard, 
2013) and host policymakers using inter-governmental intermediation (March & 
Olsen, 1998; Schemeil, 2013). 
Contextual meaning of base erosion 
Host policymakers and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
Development (OECD) have avoided defining the ‘base erosion’ phenomenon. 
Von Krogh et al. (2012 p.278) define phenomena as ‘regularities that are 
unexpected, that challenge existing knowledge (including extant theory) and that 
are relevant to scientific discourse.’ The surprising regularity emerging from base 
erosion, as described by the media (Armitstead, 2012; Crerar, 2012; Houlder, 
2011), was the legal but otherwise unfair ability of foreign-HQ MNEs to operate 
across host locations and to attribute little of their value-creation efforts to those 
locations. 
For purposes of this thesis, and recognizing the features of base erosion 
observed by the OECD (2013) and academics (Arel-Bundock, 2017; Dharmapala, 
2014; Miller & Pope, 2015), I define base erosion as an organizing process 
strategically chosen by MNEs that involves not only transfer pricing, but also the 
arbitraging of differences between host nation-states, the re-characterization of 
firm transactions, the reconfiguration of firm activities, and the spillover effects 
from participating in preferential regimes offered by competing nation-states that 
unexpectedly challenges the presumed economic outcomes for host locations. But 
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giving historical background to base erosion, the Financial Times reported on 
January 14, 2013: 
 
In April 1961, a newly elected President John F. Kennedy launched an 
offensive against a phenomenon that he feared could undermine America’s 
future: aggressive tax avoidance. In a message to Congress, he railed against 
the “unjustifiable” use of tax havens by growing numbers of businesses to 
slash their tax liabilities at home and abroad. More than 50 years on, the 
political rhetoric appears to be identical… Political anger is mounting over 
the low taxes paid by multinationals such as Apple, Google and Amazon 
during an age of brutal cuts in public spending. (Houlder, 2013) 
The Literature 
The literature that explains base erosion as a public policy problem appears as 
a linear or ‘well-ordered process’ (Corley & Schinoff, 2017 p.9), as outlined in 
this thesis. In contributing to this literature, I moved iteratively between extant 
theory in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Harrison & Rouse, 2014) 
and my emerging findings in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, to ensure that the conceptual 
representation (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011) of the theoretical contribution 
(Corley & Gioia, 2011; Whetten, 1989) discussed in Chapter 9 engaged deeply 
with the extant literature chosen in chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
The literature comprises the varieties of corporate governance systems, the 
internationalization process of MNEs in the value-creation process, the public 
policy process and the theory of social judgements. I chose the extant literature, 
summarized below, in order to illuminate what theory is capable of explaining 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 1 
5 
 
and, more pertinently, what further theorizing is needed about the phenomenon—
that is, to identify the gap in the value-creation literature and in the theory of 
social judgements. 
The varieties of corporate governance systems  
In describing the varieties of corporate governance systems literature in 
Chapter 2, I show why a contract-like, stockholder-primacy governance logic 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Veldman & Willmott, 2016), as prevailing in 
the UK, fails to detect or mitigate the MNE base erosion phenomenon (Jones & 
Temouri, 2016). Stockholder-primacy governance logic emphasizes the decision-
usefulness of information (Pelger, 2016) to stockholders and prospective 
investors, as a distinct class of users (Linsley & Shrives, 2014; Young, 2006) of 
annual reports.  
Internationalization process of MNEs in the value-creation framework  
The base erosion phenomenon is implicitly bound up in the process of 
internationalization (Arregle, Miller, Hitt & Beamish, 2013; Ghemawat, 2008). 
In Chapter 3, I explain the internationalizing process that MNEs adopt when 
entering foreign markets. The traditional staged entry process of 
internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009) describes an 
experientially-informed entry gradually occurring over time (Welch, Nummela & 
Liesch, 2016), whilst the accelerated process of entry (Chetty, Martin & Martin, 
2014) or so-called born-global firms (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Oviatt & 
McDougall, 1994) emphasizes improved learning capabilities through the 
deployment of pace, time and technology. In internationalizing, value is not 
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merely created in a summative form, but also in an incrementally progressive 
form (Contractor, 2007; Lepak, Smith & Taylor, 2007).      
Public policy process and the theory of social judgements 
In Chapter 4, I outline how the three streams of problems, policies and politics 
(Kingdon, 2011) that developed from the ‘garbage can model’ of organizing 
(Cohen, 1972) are instructive in understanding how public policy solutions 
emerge. How social problems are framed, whether emerging from routine 
monitoring or from idiosyncratic transforming events (Birkland, 1998), will 
dictate which avenues of policy response are legitimated whilst others excluded.  
The theory of social judgements (Bitektine, 2011; Golant & Sillince, 2007) 
explicates how cognitive legitimacy judgements are exercised for routine tasks 
with low visibility, whilst the sociopolitical judgements are reserved for non-
routine tasks involving high economic stakes which require greater diligence and 
care. In formulating policy response to base erosion, public policymakers 
participate in influencing social judgements (Currie, Tuck & Morrell, 2015; 
Morrell & Hartley, 2006). 
The Gap in the Extant Literature 
Firstly, corporate governance is about: how an organization deploys it 
resources (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003); the structure of rights and 
responsibilities among parties with a stake in the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003); and the resolution of conflicts among those stakeholders. The stockholder-
primacy model—a dyadic contract-like corporate governance system—is an 
historical sociologically embedded national model of governance prevailing in 
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the UK (Veldman & Willmott, 2016) and the US (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; 
Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2005). 
A recognized deficiency of a national dominant stockholder-primacy model is 
that its deep-rooted assumptions prevent a critical reflection on the implications 
of restrictive ‘accountability to narrow forms of information disclosure directed 
exclusively at shareholders’ (Veldman & Willmott, 2016 p.581). Whereas 
inference is made by Jones and Temouri (2016) that the base erosion problem is 
more markedly associated with stockholder-primacy governance systems 
prevailing in the UK and US, than with stakeholder-hybrid governance systems 
prevailing in coordinated market economies of Northern Europe, there is a 
paucity of qualitative research that explains why contract-like governance 
systems are associated with the base erosion problem. A contribution of this thesis 
is to address this gap. A cultural grammar (Veldman & Willmott, 2016) that 
frames accountability to the narrow forms of information exclusively at 
shareholders (Pelger, 2016; Young, 2006) fails to balance it with the broader 
obligation to other participants having a stake in the firm (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). 
Secondly, value-creation as a concept with its roots in the resource-based view 
(Barney, 1991; Becerra, 2008), provides a firm level perspective on its value-
creation and value-capture or appropriation processes. The dominant focus on 
value creation in the literature has been on a firm level analysis; that is, on 
sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), on management of resources 
(Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007), on dynamic capabilities of the firm (Teece, 
2014), and on profits emerging from value uncertainty (Becerra, 2008). More 
recently, the focus has extended to value creation as an aggregation concept, with 
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both internal and external focus; that is, on total value appropriation (Bowman & 
Ambrosini, 2000; Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015). Yet another level of analysis 
has been in distinguishing the individual versus the collective loci of value 
creation (Felin & Hesterly, 2007). 
However, there has been little research on value creation from a public 
stakeholder level of analysis, other than the trade-off between bankruptcy 
legislative policy and entrepreneurship risk (Lee et al., 2007). The gap in the 
literature is in understanding how host policymakers make sense of value-creation 
and value-capture processes that MNEs engage in beyond the home HQs—that 
is, across overseas host locations. I contribute to the stakeholder level of analysis 
on MNE value creation, by giving a host policymakers’ perspective on the base 
erosion phenomenon. As a result of my analysis and findings in Chapter 6, I show 
that host policymakers framed the base erosion phenomenon as an issue of the 
relative degree of alignment of an MNE’s value-creation and value-capture 
processes across each of the host locations that it is economically engaged in. 
That is, there is a plurality of perspectives on MNE value-creation frameworks. 
The host policymakers’ perspective is an alternative interpretation of an MNE’s 
value creation process—contributing to the under-researched level of analysis at 
public stakeholder perspective (Lee et al., 2007). 
Thirdly, policymakers use public deliberation (Lee & Romano, 2013) as a 
political process to mobilize social judgements across interconnected public 
policy domains in order ‘to cultivate stakeholder empathy for decision-makers, 
downsize public expectations for administrative problem-solving, and produce 
behavioural alignment and positive attitudes toward austerity measures’ (Lee & 
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Romano, 2013 p.733). Social judgement is defined ‘as an evaluator’s decision or 
opinion about the social properties of an organization’ (Bitektine, 2011 p.152). 
In the context of organizational legitimacy, as one of its social properties, the 
theory of social judgements explains the typology and formation process of 
legitimacy judgement types—broadly, the pragmatic or cognitive legitimacy 
judgements and the moral or sociopolitical legitimacy judgements (Bitektine, 
2011). Extant literature also explains that social judgements expressed by way of 
intra-field rhetoric ‘reflects the legitimacy of an action or practice…and relates 
more to institutional maintenance (Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015 p.83). 
While, a ‘shift in use from intra-field rhetoric to inter-field rhetoric relates to an 
increase in the effectiveness of delegitimation efforts and a decrease in 
institutional stability’ (Harmon et al., 2015 p.87). 
There is, however, little research on the sociopolitical conditions for and the 
means of challenging inter-field taken-for-granted orthodoxy to redress the 
perceived harm caused by the MNE base erosion phenomenon. I address this gap 
in the literature. As a result of my analysis and findings in Chapters 7 and 8, I 
identify the contextual boundary conditions that resist intra-field instability and I 
explain the types of inter-field iterative rhetorical techniques used to mediate 
public policy changes that reflect upon procedural justice (Adams, 1963; 
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), but primarily, demand distributive justice (Bosse et 
al., 2009; Coff, 1999). 
Dataset and Methodology 
In Chapter 5, I present the data set that comprises a triangulation (Cresswell & 
Miller, 2000; Scandura & Williams, 2000) of the following data sources: (1) 
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transcripts of the contributions of 27 participants in the two public hearings 
conducted by the PAC into the internationalizing activities of Amazon, Google 
and Starbucks – the first hearing being held in November 2012 (PAC-UK, 2012), 
and the second hearing being held in June 2013 (PAC-UK, 2013); (2) the 25 face-
to-face interviews conducted with regulators and policymakers from government 
agencies, self-regulating authorities and inter-governmental intermediaries; (3) 
the 2013 home-HQ annual reports for Amazon, Google and Starbucks; (4) the 
2013 UK host location annual reports for Amazon, Google and Starbucks; and 
(5) a further set of 26 related documents made reference to by interviewees in the 
course of the interview process. 
The methodology I use is a qualitative inductive inquiry (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014; Yin, 2014) that is 
appropriate for phenomenon-driven research questions. Using MaxQDA 
software version 12 (Silver & Lewins, 2014), I follow the Gioia methodology 
(Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012) in laying the groundwork for the development 
of a sensory representation (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013) 
of the data by moving from first-order concepts to second-order themes (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Miles et al., 2014). Two particular features distinguish my 
qualitative inquiry. Firstly, I re-visit my literature streams (Corley & Schinoff, 
2017; Harrison & Rouse, 2014) as my data analysis reveals nuances that warrant 
revision of my approach to the literature (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011). Secondly, 
in moving from second-order themes to aggregate dimensions emerging from the 
data, I use abductive reasoning (Morgan, 2014; Paavola, 2004) to establish 
contextual authenticity in reasoning and developing abstract generalizations 
(Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). Figure 5.1 illustrates the incorporation of these two 
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features into my methodology—namely, the recursive vice-versa movement 
between data, concepts and literature and the abductive contextualized reasoning 
process. 
Analysis and Findings 
Framing a host location perspective on the MNE multinationalizing 
process  
In Chapter 6, I draw on my data to give a richly contextual account of UK host 
policymakers’ perspective on base erosion. The analysis and findings reveal a 
host policymakers’ perspective on the value-creation frameworks used by 
foreign-HQ MNEs in carrying on economic trade across host locations. This is a 
second-order interpretation of my data (Gioia et al., 2012; Herepath, 2014; 
Pozzebon, 2004). 
Three distinct aspects emerge from the analysis and findings regarding the 
social problem as perceived by host locations. First, the analysis and findings 
indicate the underlying principles that guide the process, as perceived by host 
policymakers. Second, the analysis reveals how host policymakers perceive the 
constitutive elements of the MNE value-creation process that emerge across host 
locations. Third, the analysis explicates how host policymakers perceive the 
mechanisms of value capture that underpin value creation. This conceptual 
representation of a host policymakers’ perspective on MNEs’ value-creation 
frameworks across host locations differs from that held by MNE top management 
and their board (Becerra, 2008; Lepak et al., 2007; Teece, 2014). The perspective 
differs because of the tension between the choice opportunities that are available 
to an MNE in locating the worth of their value creation across host locations and 
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the challenge that those decisions present to the legitimacy of host location 
policymakers. 
Challenging cognitive legitimacy in corporate reporting and corporate 
taxation  
In Chapter 7, I show how host policymakers challenged the cognitive 
legitimacy held by social actors in the corporate reporting field and in the 
corporate taxation field. The analysis and findings identify how the UK’s budget 
austerity measures announced in late 2010 (Callinicos, 2012; Pimlot & Giles, 
2010) were the transforming event (Birkland, 1998) that initiated the public 
deliberative discourse (Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004; Lee & Romano, 2013) on 
base erosion. This public deliberative process attracted the attention not only of 
the media and social movement organizations but also host regulators, host 
policymakers and inter-governmental intermediaries. Host policymakers used the 
public deliberative process to challenge the inequitable recognition and 
distribution of profits earned by MNEs economically operating in and across host 
locations (Dharmapala, 2014; Evers, Miller & Spengel, 2014). 
Bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy in stakeholder-oriented 
policy 
In Chapter 8, I show how host policymakers recognized that the stockholder-
primacy logic (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013) 
is resistant to the type of public policy changes contemplated, whilst the 
stakeholder-oriented (Bosse et al., 2009; Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010) 
corporate taxation policy domain  is receptive to public policy changes to redress 
base erosion. 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 1 
13 
 
I will explain how host policymakers used the technique of commensuration 
(Espeland & Lom, 2015; Espeland & Stevens, 1998) in multiple instances in order 
to move the discourse towards the exercise of sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements (Bitektine, 2011; Golant & Sillince, 2007) on public policy outcomes 
that is intended to reflect distributive fairness in the allocation of profits earned 
across host locations. 
Contribution  
In Chapter 9, I present my contribution to theory (Corley & Gioia, 2011) on 
value-creation frameworks in the resource-based view—from a public 
stakeholder level of analysis, the organizing views on transfer pricing, and the 
mobilization of social judgements in order to advance change in interconnected 
policy domains. I show how my contribution addresses the gaps I have identified 
in extant literature. For purposes of impact, I also make a contribution to the 
practice (George, 2016) of corporate governance in Chapter 2, and the 
implications for public policy framing in Chapter 9. 
My contribution to the value-creation frameworks literature is in using a 
conceptual model (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Shapira, 2011) to theorize a host 
policymakers’ perspective on base erosion that comprises three constituent 
elements in the foreign-HQ MNEs’ value-creation process as well as four 
mechanisms in their value-capture process occurring across host locations. From 
a host policymakers’ perspective, base erosion is a tax avoidance strategy—a 
problem of MNE valuation practices that shift the order of worth of MNEs’ 
economic activities—causing harm to host economies. My contribution is in 
conceptualizing the host policymakers’ perspective of base erosion as exploiting 
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the degree of divergence in the value-creation and value-capture processes of 
MNEs across host locations. My fieldwork illustrates how at the limits of 
divergence of these endogenous processes, MNEs deployed rhetorical strategies 
to maintain cohesion between these processes and their external stakeholders.  
My contribution to the theory of social judgements is in linking related 
concepts (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Shapira, 2011) to advance the theory about how 
host policymakers moved the public deliberative discourse to bridge cognitive 
and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements in the corporate taxation policy domain. 
Host policymakers challenged the taken-for-granted orthodoxy prevailing in the 
accounting and the corporate taxation policy domains—and, experienced 
resistance from those social actors seeking to maintain their intra-field stability. 
Through contextualized reasoning, I show how commensuration techniques 
enable host public policymakers to bridge cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements—explicating a mechanism for making things comparable for 
evaluative purposes that otherwise appear incomparable and beyond evaluation. 
The theory of social judgements is advanced: (i) by theorizing how categorical 
judgements are assessed contextually for their degree of rigidity or propensity for 
change; and, (ii) through identifying the mechanisms used by actors to influence 
change from one categorical judgement type to another—that is to say, from 
cognitive legitimacy to sociopolitical legitimacy judgements. 
For impact purposes, I also make a contribution to corporate governance 
practice by explaining in Chapter 2 how contract-like governance systems fail to 
mitigate the base erosion problem. Furthermore, in Chapter 9 I make a 
contribution to the practice of public policy framing by explaining: (a) that policy 
initiatives aimed singularly at either value creation or value capture fail to redress 
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organizational value framework alignment implications; and (b) that in advancing 
sociopolitical deliberation, there is likely to be greater resistance from intra-field 
members in stockholder-oriented public policy domains than from members in 
stakeholder-oriented public policy domains. 
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research Opportunities 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides a summary of this thesis, indicating its 
limitations, specifically the limitations associated with context of the empirical 
setting of the research (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Johns, 2000, 2006). The empirical 
setting is located in an advanced economy that is presently part of a regional 
politico-economic unit, the European Union (EU). Depending on the outcome of 
the Brexit negotiations (Cumming & Zahra, 2016), the association between the 
UK and the EU will in time devolve into a different economic and regional 
interdependent relationship. The chapter concludes by suggesting possible future 
research directions and explaining the utility and implications for practice. 
Whereas this thesis has applied an inductive contextualized reasoning 
methodology in order to conduct an expansive enquiry into the base erosion 
phenomenon, there is also the opportunity of using a discursive analytical lens to 
delve deeper into the related set of talk and texts. It would be interesting to 
examine: whether there has been a shift (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Nigam & 
Ocasio, 2010; Ocasio, Lowenstein & Nigam, 2015) in international taxation 
logic; and, how respondent witnesses coped with the aggressive questioning 
sessions (Campbell, Follender & Shane, 1998; Heracleous & Klaering, 2014; 
Luyckx & Janssens, 2016) at the PAC-UK (2012) and PAC-UK (2013). 
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Also, recognizing the lobbying activities of Silicon Valley and industry 
representatives on the ubiquitous technological advances of e-commerce business 
models (Amit & Zott, 2001; Beattie & Smith, 2013; Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011) 
that have diffused into all types of business processes and practices, it would also 
be of interest applying rhetorical theory (Hartelius & Browning, 2008; Hoefer & 
Green, 2016; Ocasio et al., 2015) to these nonmarket strategies (Bonardi, Hillman 
& Keim, 2005; Funk & Hirschman, 2017) to obtain a deeper insight into the 
rhetorical competencies of MNEs and their representative associations in 
maintaining domain stability. 
In the next chapter, I will describe the varieties of corporate governance 
systems. I will explain the trade-offs involved in carefully balancing the contract-
like governance model or stockholder-primacy logic and the trust-like 
governance model or stakeholder-oriented logic. What emerges from this analysis 
is that stockholder-primacy governance logic is not designed to detect or 
minimize the base erosion phenomenon. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 2 – Varieties of Corporate Governance Systems 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain how agency theory has narrowed corporate 
governance to focus entirely on two key participants, namely management and 
stockholders—a situation existing before the Berle & Means 1930s intervention 
(Stout, 2012; Wells, 2012) and re-asserting itself subsequently post the late 1970s 
following its theoretical formulation by Jensen & Meckling (1976). Underpinning 
this bilateral relationship has been the development of an inclusive framework of 
governance mechanisms (Dalton, Hitt, Certo & Dalton, 2007; Healy & Palepu, 
2001) to balance, support and where necessary, intervene. Within this inclusive 
framework of governance mechanisms (Dennis, 2001), I will examine more 
closely the asymmetry of information problem in corporate disclosure as it exists 
between management and stockholders (Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010). 
For the purpose of this analysis, I will not be delving into governance 
mechanisms on independence and board size (Dalton, Daily, Johnson & 
Ellstrand, 1999) or into board composition (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001) 
considerations. My aim is to explicate, from a macro public policy perspective, 
that a change in emphasis or assumptions underlying alternative corporate 
governance systems will deliver alternative behavioural outcomes (Thornton, 
Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
To address the shortcomings in the asymmetry of information problem (Baker 
& Hayes, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), I will discuss not only the role of 
agency theory but also two derivative perspectives of agency theory. The first 
derivative perspective is to apply the legal agency theory of the firm (Lan & 
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Heracleous, 2010; Zeitoun, Osterloh & Frey, 2014) that is institutionally more 
sensitive (Heracleous & Lan, 2012), recognizing that in corporate law the firm is 
the principal and the directors individually or the board jointly are the fiduciaries 
of the firm (Bratton, 2001). The second derivative perspective is to recognize the 
behavioural influences that arise from different ownership-holding types (Cox & 
Wicks, 2011; Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015) or from the internationalization context 
of the multinational (MNE) firm. For example, Zeitoun et al. (2014 p.8) comment 
that, ‘several multinational companies have recently faced unexpected 
reputational damage in the United Kingdom, due to their legal practice of 
avoiding taxes through transfer pricing. This damage could have been avoided if 
boards had given voice to people who pointed to this reputation problem early.’ 
Alternatively, corporate governance may be influenced by its relative portability 
within a corporate group internationally (Aguilera, Desender, Lamy & Lee, 2017; 
Cumming, Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb & Senbet, 2017).  
I will then introduce the stakeholder (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997) and 
corporate social responsibility (Matten & Moon, 2008) paradigms in order to 
bring a societal context to bear on  the analysis of the governance mechanisms 
and the asymmetry of information problem in corporate disclosure. The purpose 
of pursuing this stockholder versus stakeholder analysis is, firstly, to show the 
relative trade-offs involved in governance systems coping with the asymmetry of 
information problem (Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2017) and secondly, 
to indicate that the stockholder-logic embedded in traditional agency theory is not 
designed to detect or mitigate the base erosion phenomenon (Jones & Temouri, 
2016). 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 2 
19 
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory, as abstractly framed under the principal-agent paradigm 
(Dalton et al., 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), or as behaviourally framed under 
the positivist stream (Berle, 1965; Eisenhardt, 1989; Wiseman, Cuevas-
Rodriguez & Gomez, 2012) explicates how the asymmetry of information 
problem is capable of being remedied between an MNE’s top management and 
its stockholders. Eisenhardt (1989) observes that both the principal-agent 
paradigm and the behavioural positivist stream use the nexus of contracts as the 
common unit of analysis. Recognizing that an MNE group consists of an 
aggregated identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Clarke & Dean, 1993; Scott & 
Lane, 2000) of the parent corporation together with all its subsidiaries and 
associated holdings, it is not surprising that agency theory views the corporation 
or the MNE simply as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Talbot, 2008) or a focal point of 
contracting.  
Agency theory adopts the conceptual framework that the firm is merely a 
‘nexus of contracts’ between management—as the agent, and the stockholder—
as principal (Talbot, 2013), and by implication inferring that a multinational 
group is essentially an amalgamation of voluntarily assumed legal arrangements 
between HQ management and its stockholders (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). 
Using this conceptual framework advances the complementary association that: 
(a) contracting provides the mechanism for firms exercising hierarchical control 
over its economic activity, and (b) contracting provides the means for curbing 
individuals seeking to promote their own self-interests. Accordingly, Jensen & 
Meckling (1976), using agency theory and abstract mathematical proof, open the 
black box of the MNE, retaining the notion of individual maximizing behaviour 
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together with a broader contractarian theme that emerged from Coase’s seminal 
work on transaction costs (Coase, 1937). Thus, the focus is on the assumed 
rational actions of individual actors or groups of actors—not on fictitious entities 
or groups of fictitious entities—voluntarily exercising their proprietary rights 
under contract. 
The positivist stream of agency theory, whether performed through formal or 
informal incomplete contracting relationships, informs and shapes corporate 
disclosure (Armstrong, Guay & Weber, 2010) as a governance mechanism that 
addresses the asymmetry of information problem between these bilateral parties. 
Many transactions, due to uncertainty, contingencies, scope, cost, and practicality 
are not contractible. Formal contracts possess legitimacy in evidential compliance 
and corporate disclosure (Armstrong et al., 2010), while informal/incomplete 
contracts are supported by trust, reputation and iteration (Woolthuis, Hillebrand 
& Nooteboom, 2005; Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015). 
Governance of Information Asymmetry 
An inclusive framework of information systems has developed over time to 
redress the asymmetry problem and underpin governance mechanisms (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). The information systems comprise: voluntary disclosure enacted 
through a self-enforcing ‘nexus of contracts’ (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Leftwich, 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1981; Talbot, 2013); regulatory-mandated disclosure 
obligations imposed on MNEs (Beyer et al., 2010; Grossman & Hart, 1980) and 
interventionist action by information intermediaries (Ramnath, Rock & Shane, 
2008). The intent and the consequence of mandated disclosure obligations are to 
re-affirm the fundamental premise of traditional agency theory or stockholder-
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primacy logic (Thornton et al., 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Namely, the 
directive is to report and account exclusively to its capital providers (Barth, 2008; 
Friedman, 2007; Shleifer & Vishney, 1997). The ‘nexus of contracts’ paradigm 
does not address parties outside the bilateral relationship of management as the 
agent and of stockholder as the principal. 
Voluntary disclosures 
As originally explained by Jensen & Meckling (1976), it is the optimizing 
behaviour of the contracting parties that establishes a self-enforcing mechanism 
of voluntary disclosure between agent and principal. That is to say, the entering 
into contracts is a voluntary choice that is made by the parties ‘as a vehicle for 
voluntary exchange’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 p.310). The extent to which a 
contract is a self-enforcing mechanism is dependent on the scope of its terms and 
conditions—how complete or incomplete (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 
2005)—and reciprocity in the exchange of performance and the consideration 
(Noordehaven, 1992). 
A corporation’s constitutional documents state that management should 
provide annual reports to its stockholders and have them audited (Mueller, Carter 
& Whittle, 2015; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2004). It is a condition of top 
management appointment that, in return for remuneration and benefit 
entitlements, they faithfully represent to the board the financial position and 
performance of the corporation and all group entities under their management and 
control (Armstrong et al., 2010). Moreover, it is more cost effective for 
management to prepare a general set of annual reports than for each of its capital 
provider to request separate reports (Leftwich et al., 1981). 
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In addition, research has established that if there are no transaction costs in 
providing disclosures, then full disclosure will generally be made (Grossman & 
Hart, 1980). However, if disclosure is costly, it will complicate outcomes. Where 
the transaction costs of disclosure are high in order to support market values or to 
lower risks (Beyer et al., 2010), only favourable disclosure will be made. Where 
disclosure is withheld, it may suggest possible ‘bad news’, but the associated 
payoff to management will generally be better than if they had made the 
disclosure (Akerlof, 1970; Beyer et al., 2010). Alternatively, negative information 
may be disclosed selectively in order to reduce legal liability exposure (Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). Top management are also less likely to share information with 
the board that may detrimentally impact their personal position (Armstrong et al., 
2010). 
Mandated disclosures 
Healy & Palepu (2001) observe that surprisingly little is known about the 
motivations that lay behind capital markets’ regulation of mandated disclosures. 
What is known is that international accounting standards (IFRS) regulate 
corporate reporting choices in order to improve comparability, reduce processing 
costs and set a uniform language of communication (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Transnational standardization of accounting standards recursively develop from 
a process of standard formation through input legitimacy to a process of standard 
diffusion embedding output legitimacy (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).  Also, the 
academic literature identifies financial and real externalities as rationales for 
mandated disclosures (Beyer et al., 2010). That is, mandated disclosures seek to 
improve social welfare whereby, under financial externalities, one firm’s 
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disclosure sheds interpretative light on the financial position of other firms. And 
under real externalities, one firm’s disclosure will affect another firm’s decisions.  
With respect to domestic corporate law in the United Kingdom (UK), and 
generally in other common law countries, the board is required to prepare 
individual company accounts and, if not exempt, to prepare group accounts on an 
annual basis (Mayson, French & Ryan, 2012). A UK parent company will be 
exempt where its securities are not traded on a regulated market and if it is itself 
a subsidiary of a foreign MNE. The concept of preparing group accounts is one 
of those rare occasions where the law recognizes a corporate group as distinct 
from the individual entity (Lowry & Reisberg, 2012). In this instance, the law 
literally opens the ‘black box’ of each of the individual entities in the group to 
accommodate economic aggregation in a manner that reflects traditional agency 
theory. In most other instances, the law recognizes only the individual entity and 
not the corporate group (Lowry & Reisberg, 2012). The court decision in Adams 
v Cape Industries plc (1990) emphasizes the marginalized perspective of the 
notion of a corporate group by adjudicating that a holding company has a right to 
deliberately set up separate entities and subsidiaries for the purpose of minimizing 
the parent company’s own liability (Lowry & Reisberg, 2012).  
UK Regulation also requires that the board must not approve annual accounts 
unless it is satisfied that the individual accounts or the group accounts give a ‘true 
and fair view’ of its financial performance and its financial position (Mayson et 
al., 2012). McGee (1991) notes that the interpretative emphasis of ‘true and fair 
view’ is likely to be a more realistic representation in case of the financial 
performance statement than of the financial position statement. Notwithstanding 
the law granting jurisdiction and interpretative power, the courts and the legal 
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profession have generally been reticent in delving into concepts of ‘true and fair 
view’ (McGee, 1991), ‘faithful representation’ or of ‘substance over form’ 
(Radcliffe, 1990). In HMRC v William Grant & Sons Distillers Limited (Scotland) 
(2007), Lord Hoffman observed that in interpreting ‘true and fair view’, the court 
is guided by the expert opinion of accountants on best current accounting practice, 
whilst the accounting experts are guided by authoritative accounting standards. 
IFRS standards, in turn, institutionalize the salient role of the user (Power, 2003; 
Young, 2006)—that is to say, annual reports are prepared by the board of directors 
with the purpose of providing decision-relevant information to its stockholders 
and prospective investors (Linsley & Shrives, 2014; Pelger, 2016).  
In spite of concerns about whether mere compliance with prescribed standards 
may constitute a ‘true and fair view’, the opinions given by Martin Moore QC in 
2008 (Lowry & Reisberg, 2012) and again in 2013 re-affirm the overriding 
requirement of ‘faithful representation’. For certain publicly-listed companies the 
law also requires that they publish a business review statement with their annual 
accounts. The business review statement is intended to be a balanced and 
comprehensive narrative assessing the firm’s business, its principal risks, and 
factors likely to affect its future performance (Lowry & Reisberg, 2012). 
Other relevant mandated disclosures imposed on MNEs listed on capital 
markets include, for the UK, a requirement to ‘comply or explain’, in the event 
of deviation from the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Code of Conduct and, 
for the United States of America (US), a requirement by the Securities Exchange 
Commission to publish the MNE’s business code of conduct and ethics adopted 
by its board. But as Veldman & Willmott (2016 p.597) indicate, the FRC Code 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012, 2014c)  is caught up in a ‘single loop 
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reflexivity [that] has provided a flexible buffer…to impede or deflect more 
probing critiques…in which a neo-liberal political economy was embedded’. On 
the issue of base erosion and audited accounts presenting a true and fair view, the 
PAC concluded in their summary report: 
 
9. At the hearing we were frustrated with the representative from Amazon, 
who we found evasive and unprepared to answer legitimate questions on the 
company’s structure and true location of its economic activity… Amazon 
also provided information showing that for 2011, £3.35 billion of sales were 
from the UK, 25% of all international sales outside of the USA. Yet Amazon 
has over 15,000 staff in the UK, invoices UK customers from the UK for UK 
customers hires UK staff in the UK, has inventory physically in the UK and 
to all intents and purposes has the majority of its economic activity in the UK, 
rather than Luxembourg, but pays virtually no corporation tax in the UK 
(PAC-UK, 2012 p.9).  
 
Role of information intermediaries 
Besides the voluntary and mandated disclosure components, Healy & Palepu 
(2001) note that the third component of the information systems underpinning 
governance mechanisms is the role provided by the information intermediaries. 
Information intermediaries include both buy-side and sell-side analysts (Ramnath 
et al., 2008). Buy-side analysts value the research of the sell-side analysts and 
combine it with their own analyses (Ramnath et al., 2008). Core (2001), however, 
observes that there is far more research available for sell-side analysts than there 
is for buy-side analysts. Of particular relevance to my research are the academic 
findings that earnings forecasts made by analysts rely heavily on disaggregated 
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and qualitative information issued by MNEs (Ramnath et al., 2008), which, as 
well as reported earnings, includes management communication releases and 
operating segment reports. In addition, the complexity of disclosed information 
can affect the accuracy of earnings forecasts, particularly where there is difficulty 
in forecasting future effective tax rates (Plumlee, 2003). Analysts do incorporate 
both transitory and persistent components into their forecasts, but they are more 
concerned with forecasting persistent earnings under longer-term forecasts (Mest 
& Plummer, 1999).  
Whilst recognizing that public information is available simultaneously to both 
retail investors and information intermediaries, research has not yet established 
why retail investors tend to react more slowly to such disclosures or to the signals 
issued by analysts (Ramnath et al., 2008). In this context, it is relevant to note the 
initiative taken by the United States Congress in passing the Fair Disclosure 
Regulation in 2000. This regulation prevents selective access to corporate 
information by analysts, requiring that public disclosures are made 
simultaneously available to all parties (Beyer et al., 2010). 
Notwithstanding the positive role performed by information intermediaries in 
underpinning corporate governance mechanisms, there are instances where 
information intermediaries create new agency problems. Information 
intermediaries produce both private and public information that is supposed to 
‘uncover any manager misuse of firm resources’ (Healy & Palepu, 2001 p.410)—
yet there is ample example of failures, for example: specifically, by the rating 
agencies (Riaz, Buchanan, & Bapuji, 2011; Vaaler & McNamara, 2004); and, 
more generally, by information intermediaries due to conflict of interests arising 
from mandates (David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998). 
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Derivative Agency Approaches 
In this thesis, I use the term derivative agency approaches, as an umbrella term 
to highlight subtly different governance features of agency theory—all based on 
contract-like logic of governance. For legal agency theory, it is corporate law and 
contract that redefine the roles of top management and the board. In the contextual 
presence of blockholder ownership, it is the scope of contractual mandates that 
reveal the nature of stewardship activism. While for governance portability by 
MNEs across host locations, it is the persistence of home governance systems 
through contract that permeate firm subsidiaries and subunits overseas— 
recognizing the bargaining power of the home HQs. 
Legal agency theory 
One derivative approach to traditional agency theory is to substitute the nexus 
of agency contracts analogy with the recognition that the corporation is a separate 
legal persona (Blair & Stout, 2001; Lan & Heracleous, 2010). Lord Halsbury LC 
in the seminal case of Salomon v A. Salomon & Company Ltd (1897) observed 
that the corporation is real, not fictitious, with the law attributing to it various 
undeniable rights and liabilities, even if formed solely by one stockholder. Lord 
Herschel emphasized this legal distinction, ‘In a popular sense, a company may 
in every case be said to carry on business for and on behalf of its share-holders; 
but this certainly does not in point of law constitute the relation of principal and 
agent between them or render the shareholders liable to indemnify the company 
against the debts which it incurs.’ (Salomon v A. Salomon & Company Ltd, 1897).  
Once you recognize the corporation as a separate legal persona, as suggested 
by Lan & Heracleous (2010), the corporation is regarded as the principal, and it 
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performs the nexus of contract roles with the various stakeholders. The directors, 
in turn, are not agents of the shareholders, but are fiduciaries of the corporation.  
The directors and the board assume a rather unique form of fiduciary 
relationship (Lan & Heracleous, 2010) as distinct from mere agency as 
contemplated under traditional agency theory. Lord Russell of Killowen in Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver & Others (1942) expresses this unique form of fiduciary 
relationship as, ‘In some respects they resemble trustees, in others they do not. In 
some respects they resemble agents, in others they do not. In some respects they 
resemble managing partners, in others they do not.’  Under legal agency theory, 
directors assume a role more akin to stewards of the corporations (Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Lan & Heracleous, 2010). 
This unique form of the fiduciary role of directors is best explained by Lord 
Justice Robert Walker in Bairstow & Ors v Queen Moat Houses Plc (2001). 
Directors are not trustees in the strict legal sense, since trustees are legal owners 
of trust property. However, the directors do possess trust-like responsibilities 
because they have the power and the duty to manage the corporation’s business 
in the stockholders’ interests (Mayson et al., 2012). Another helpful distinction 
made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd & Ors 
(1994) is that the phrase ‘fiduciary duties’ does not imply a universal or identical 
scope of duties in all circumstances. The only duty which is possibly owed by 
every fiduciary is not to profit from his or her position, unless otherwise 
authorized (Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd & Ors, 1994). In all other 
circumstances, the scope of those fiduciary duties will be determined by reference 
to the contract between the director and the corporation, statute and common law. 
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The important rider is that neither a director nor the board owe a fiduciary duty 
to the corporation’s stockholders (Blair & Stout, 2001; Lan & Heracleous, 2010).  
That legal agency theory exists is unsurprising. Bratton (2001) notes that Berle 
& Means (1932) had much earlier identified the trigger as the separation of asset 
ownership and of control.  As MNEs grew, so did the dispersion of registered 
stockholders. This increased separation of ownership and control emphasized the 
vital relationship between the trust-like model (qua legal agency theory) and the 
contract-like model (qua traditional agency model). Bratton (2001) observes that 
Berle & Means (1932) had already anticipated half-century earlier that a critical 
debate would ensue over this vital relationship. Since 1980s (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013), the contract-like model has dominated all forms of corporate governance 
(Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003a) with the trust-like model losing traction. The 
remaining self-protective mechanism that is available to the dispersed minority 
stockholder is to exercise the right of exit through a market sale (Bratton, 2001).  
In light of the dominance of the contract-like model over the trust-like model, 
the question remains of how effective the mediating hierarchy of the board of 
directors as the governance mechanism is, as proposed by Blair & Stout (2001) 
and Lan & Heracleous (2010). The authors suggest that empirical testing is 
needed to identify whether boards making decisions in the interests of the 
corporation rather than solely in the interests of shareholders will result in 
stronger corporate financial performance measured in stakeholder terms. Legal 
agency theory calls for the board, in its discretion to maximize risk-adjusted 
returns not just to stockholders but to all participatory stakeholders (Lan & 
Heracleous, 2010; Mayer, 2013).  Crossland & Hambrick (2011 p.815) indicate 
that, at the national level, the board ‘can only influence the performance of their 
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companies in proportion to the amount of discretion they possess’. The latitude 
of management discretion is, in turn, associated with both informal and formal 
national institutions—with individualism and cultural looseness being strongly 
associated with nation-level managerial discretion (Crossland & Hambrick, 
2011). 
Context of blockholder ownership 
Another derivative approach, as suggested by Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & 
Jackson (2008), gives contextual meaning to governance systems associated with 
blockholder ownership. A major gap in traditional agency theory is that it 
overlooks the diverse identities of stockholders specifically and stakeholders 
more generally (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003 p.449): ‘Different types of investors 
(such as banks, institutional investors, or family groups) pursue different 
interests, particularly when investors are themselves organizations governed by 
institutionally defined rules.’ On January 2, 2013 The Daily Telegraph reported: 
  
A group of leading British investors has secured a pledge from the European 
Commission that it will intervene to deal with fears that bank accounting 
rules are “dangerously flawed”… Replying in a letter to investors, Oliver 
Guersent, the head of Mr Barnier’s cabinet, wrote that he “shared the 
concerns” of investors over IFRS. He said that warnings that the rules 
exacerbated the financial crisis were “legitimate questions”. The 
Commission’s action is the first intervention from Europe and looks set to 
leapfrog sluggish reactions from British regulators to a raft of similar 
warnings (Armitstead, 2013). 
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For the purposes of my research, I focused on the context of blockholder 
ownership (Daily, Dalton & Rajagopalan, 2003b) under the contract-like 
paradigm. I considered two aspects of blockholding; firstly, its prevalence in the 
UK and US; and secondly, its nuanced impact as a governance mechanism. 
Identification of stockholder ownership dispersion (Berle & Means, 1932) is the 
first step in acknowledging the incidence of agency loss. The next step is to 
identify the composition of the stockholder dispersion and its relative and 
absolute ownership size, as these ownership attributes influence the extent of 
agency loss. Prudential regulatory constraints prevailing in the UK and US capital 
markets will generally limit the proportionate size of blockholdings held by 
MNEs (Dalton et al., 2007). Although there is no set percentage threshold, a 
stockholding of 5 per cent or more is generally considered significant to warrant 
classification as a blockholding (Shleifer & Vishney, 1997).  
In the UK and US context, when all blockholder ownership interests are 
aggregated, they jointly hold significantly greater ownership interests than do the 
retail investors combined. Daily et al. (2003b p.152) observe that ‘At individual 
institutional fund level, institutional investor holdings are relatively modest; 
however, in aggregate they control more than 50 percent of United States 
corporate equity (Conference Board, 2000).’ In a more recent report issued by the 
The Conference Board (2009 p.26), institutional ownership in the top 50 US 
MNEs stands at 64.5 per cent and in the top 1000 US MNEs at 68.6 per cent 
respectively. Within the class of blockholders, there are a variety of financial 
institutions including commercial and merchant banks, building societies, and 
insurance firms, and a variety of investment houses, including pension funds, 
mutual funds, endowments and foundations.   
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It is appropriate here to identify the relative behavioural impact each 
blockholder type has on governance mechanisms. David, Kochhar & Levitas 
(1998), in their research, establish that pressure-sensitive and pressure-
indeterminate financial institutions and investment houses do not actively 
exercise their governance powers. These pressure-sensitive institutions and 
investment houses, such as commercial banks, merchant banks and insurance 
firms, have business relationships with investee MNEs. The pressure-
indeterminate institutions do not overtly identify their investment mandates. He 
& Wang (2009) hypothesize that the presence of proportionally large 
blockholders dampens the relationship between a firm’s innovative assets and its 
economic performance. Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel (1994) hypothesize that 
both the number and relative size of blockholdings is negatively related to an 
organization’s level of product diversification. Whereas, where block-holding has 
not impeded a firm’s product diversification, its divestiture activities are found to 
be more intense.   
At this juncture, it is important to recognize the link between blockholders and 
buy-side information intermediaries. Many blockholders use the services of one 
or more buy-side information intermediaries (Bricker & Chandler, 2000). These 
appointments are made under mandate terms that are discretionary or subject to 
specific blockholder directions. The buy-side analysts act as fiduciaries to the 
blockholders (David et al., 1998). However, as mentioned by Core (2001), there 
is a lack of research on buy-side analysts, including how mandates may influence 
the exercise of governance mechanisms on behalf of their clients.  
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Context of governance portability 
A further derivative approach to traditional agency theory is to recognize the 
power within large MNE groups to mobilize aspects of their home governance 
systems to overseas host locations, notwithstanding that governance systems are 
contextually institutionalized in each home nation-state (Cumming et al., 2017; 
Hall & Gingerich, 2009). For example, Aguilera et al. (2017) show how 
stockholder-oriented foreign investors emanating from the UK or the US have a 
significant impact on the management reporting practices of host sub-units and 
subsidiaries by imposing their own governance logics on those host entities. A 
similar aspect of governance portability is evidenced by the appointment of 
foreign directors to host sub-units and subsidiaries (Miletkov, Poulsen & Wintoki, 
2017).  
To summarize, it is a contested assertion that traditional agency theory is a 
complete theory of the firm (Jensen, 2002). It may be simple and parsimonious 
to focus the theory of firm on two key relationships to explain agency loss arising 
from separation of ownership from control. However, it is conditional on 
untenable theoretical assumptions (Agle et al., 2008) and on a closed-system 
framing (Aguilera et al., 2008) that significantly limits its application in a 
socially-situated context (Friedland & Alford, 1991). A more realistic assessment 
is that the wider the dispersion of ownership from control, the greater the trade-
off between contract-like and trust-like governance systems. That is, the more 
emphasis is placed on contract-like models to satisfy the economic objectives of 
the organization, the less emphasis is placed on the mediating role of the trust-
like models in corporate governance (Bratton, 2001). In essence, the real 
challenge is not in favouring the one model of governance over another, but in 
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balancing the contrasting responses (Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015) of contract-like 
models with the trust-like models of corporate governance.  
Stakeholder Paradigm 
In this section, I discuss the stakeholder framework literature only to the extent 
that it illuminates: who are considered to be a firm’s salient stakeholders, and the 
level of the firm’s sensitivity to public stakeholders—included in this category 
being host policymakers and regulators. The discussion also extends to the level 
of sensitivity that stakeholders—including public stakeholders—may exert in 
order to protect their own interests. 
Qualifying stakeholders 
This analysis brings us to the stakeholder paradigm. Mitchell et al. (1997) 
indicate that there are three relational attributes that all must all be present before 
management will recognize a stakeholder—these attributes being power, 
legitimacy and urgency. If any one relational attribute is missing the firm will not 
recognize a stakeholder as salient to the firm. Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones 
(1999) empirically established a strong correlation between strategic stakeholder 
management and corporate performance, identifying that, beyond agency 
relationships, employees and customers are recognized as salient stakeholders. 
However, in terms of intrinsic stakeholder commitment, there was no empirical 
evidence linking the community, diversity or natural environment as a class of 
salient stakeholders (Berman et al., 1999) to corporate performance.   
Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001) suggest that the organization’s potential to 
address the various needs of each of its stakeholders is dependent on what stage 
the MNE’s life cycle is at. Applying resource dependency theory and prospect 
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theory, the authors hypothesize that organizations in the start-up phase adopt a 
‘loss frame’ to organizational survival. As a consequence, the start-up will pursue 
a risky strategy of only addressing those issues that are immediately relevant to it 
and will ignore other stakeholder issues not presently posing a threat. In the 
emerging growth phase, the MNE is actively engaged and seeking expansion 
opportunities. Here, organizations adopt a ‘gain frame’ focal position. Under this 
position, the MNE pursues a risk-averse strategy of attempting to address all 
identifiable stakeholder issues. In this instance, Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001) 
observe that MNEs will proactively address issues with employees, customers 
and stockholders, as well as accommodating issues with creditors, trade 
associations, governments, communities and environmental groups.  
Stakeholder responses 
How do stakeholders and stakeholder groups react to their salient classification 
and temporal identification by the MNEs? Academic research on the stakeholder 
viewpoint has received less attention. Rowley & Moldoveanu (2003) adopt an 
interest-based perspective on stakeholder responses that may be related to the 
likelihood of them mobilizing in order to protect their interests. Using identity 
theory, the authors observe that group interests and group identities are the prime 
drivers of stakeholder mobilization: ‘From an interest-based perspective…a 
stakeholder group is more likely to act when the overlapping stakeholder group 
has similar interests... From an identity-based perspective, however, overlapping 
identity…diminishes the likelihood that a stakeholder group will take action.’ 
(Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003 p.215)  
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Strategic and normative framing 
Traditional agency theorists argue that stakeholder theory deflects managerial 
power in favour of the directors (Jensen, 2002), thereby increasing the possibility 
of agency loss. Recognizing the interests of stakeholders in addition to 
stockholders increases the business judgment power of directors. The 
counterargument is that directors are restrained in any event by the fiduciary 
obligations that they owe to the organization (Blair & Stout, 2001; Lan & 
Heracleous, 2010).  
Traditional agency theorists also argue that stakeholder theory is not a 
complete theory (Jensen, 2002). One strand of stakeholder theorists emphasize its 
strategic focus (Freeman, 1999; Parmar et al., 2010), while, another emphasizes 
its normative focus (Jones & Wicks, 1999). The strategic focus provides 
economic justification for recognizing the broader class of stakeholders that have 
a ‘stake’ in the firm. The normative focus sets in place longer-term monitoring of 
the organization’s sustainability and legitimacy. In stakeholder theory, it is about 
whether the two competing streams can be accommodated, remain divergent or 
accept dominance of one stream over another (Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008). 
Arguably, the issue hinges on the trade-off dilemma. That is, the more emphasis 
that is given to the strategic stream, the less accommodation is made for the 
normative stream, and vice versa. In essence, the real challenge is balancing the 
contrasting responses of the strategic stream with that of the normative stream of 
stakeholder governance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995b).  
How is the asymmetry of information problem resolved under stakeholder 
theory? Stakeholder theory retains the contract-like mechanism encompassing 
express, implied and incomplete contracts, linking the organization with persons 
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having a ‘stake’ in it (Donaldson & Preston, 1995b). That is, stakeholder theory 
not only recognizes owners and management as stakeholders, but a much broader 
class of persons having proprietary, equitable and moral interests or ‘stakes’ in 
the organization. Property and proprietary rights are recognized as a finite class 
(Jacobs & Getz, 1995), but for purposes of stakeholder theory, they are applied 
in the broader context, including equitable rights and rights in action (Smith, 
2014), and legitimate expectation of having a recognizable ‘stake’ (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995a) in the organization. For example, the process of commodification 
is yet another novel way of creating new property to broaden participation in 
financial goods and services, which is otherwise outside actors contractual 
capacity (Smith, 2014). On this basis, the inclusive framework of governance 
mechanisms incorporating voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure and 
mediation by information intermediaries (Healy & Palepu, 2001) continues to be 
equally valid and applicable under stakeholder theory.  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
In this section, I discuss the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature 
only to the extent that it illuminates the normative dimensions of corporate 
citizenship and responsibility that influence the evaluative judgements made by 
stakeholders (Bitektine, 2011). The CSR literature makes explicit those elements 
of trust (Bratton, 2001; Woolthuis et al., 2005), ethics (Dowling, 2014; Walsh, 
Weber, & Margolis, 2003) and prosocial behaviours (Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) that are absent from the discourse of contract-like 
governance systems, but that are integral to the maintenance of legitimacy, 
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reputation and status of the firm (Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011; Suchman, 
1995). 
Scope 
Academic research on corporate CSR has encouraged knowledge development 
in adjacent social science domains, such as stakeholder theory (Barnett, 2007), 
corporate citizenship (Matten & Crane, 2005), corporate social performance 
(Berman et al., 1999) and, more broadly, in a range of disclosure tools (Cooper 
& Owen, 2007; Roberts, 1992) and databases used by information intermediaries 
and investors alike (Johnson & Greening, 1999).   
Traditional agency theory addresses two of the four definitional components 
raised by Carroll (1979). According to Friedman (1970), the first and fundamental 
CSR responsibility of an organization is the carrying on of a profit-making 
enterprise, creating employment and satisfying customer needs. The second is 
complying with the applicable laws from nation-state to nation-state (Matten & 
Moon, 2008). Traditional agency theory explicitly excludes the ethical and the 
discretionary elements of CSR (Agle et al., 2008; Carroll, 1979). (Friedman, 
1970) argues that admitting responsibility for the ethical and the discretionary is 
tantamount to granting taxation rights to the board. Since the board is not 
democratically representing the electors’ wishes, they should not be granted such 
distributive powers. 
On the other hand, legal agency theory and stakeholder theory do incorporate 
responsibilities for the ethical (Donaldson & Preston, 1995b) and for the 
discretionary (Wang & Qian, 2011). The instrumental or strategic stream of 
stakeholder theory does empirically demonstrate the positive impact of corporate 
financial performance (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007; Walsh, 
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Weber & Margolis, 2003). In order to distinguish and better assess the impact of 
CSR on performance, Barnett (2007) indicates the need to re-categorize corporate 
resource allocations. Specifically, the following three non-qualifying categories 
should be excluded from CSR—the agency loss activities arising from unrelated 
corporate philanthropy; the outgoings made to ‘direct influence tactics’ on political 
lobbying and campaign endorsements; and the outgoings incurred on process 
improvement efforts, such as waste reduction or energy conservation.  
Impact of ownership types 
The composition of investor ownership types has a significant bearing on how 
MNEs engage in CSR commitments. Johnson & Greening (1999) empirically 
established a positive correlation between pension fund investment 
stockholdings—the commitment of those firms in their people and product 
quality dimensions—and the corporate social performance (CSP) of those firms. 
In contrast to the pension fund findings, Johnson & Greening (1999) identified 
no correlation between mutual funds and investment banks and the CSP of the 
firms these institutional investors had invested in. The authors inconclusive 
findings on the mutual funds and investment banks accord with earlier findings 
by David et al. (1998), identifying these institutional investors as the pressure-
indeterminate institutional class. 
Antecedent stakeholder motives on CSR 
Aguilera et al. (2007) indicate that there are three core motives for stakeholders 
pressuring organizations to engage in CSR. Instrumental motives reflect 
stakeholder self-interest, relational motives concern relationships among 
members and moral motives indicate how stakeholders should conform to ethical 
standards and moral principles. The authors argue that under the Anglo-American 
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short-termism model stockholders will have instrumental motives when 
pressurizing firms to engage in CSR to further a firm’s competitiveness and 
reputation.  
Stakeholders will have relational motives when pressurizing contract-like 
model firms to conform to industry norms, beliefs and values in order to preserve 
the firm’s social legitimacy (Aguilera et al., 2007). Stakeholders will have moral 
motives when embracing stewardship interests beyond the economic to include 
personal morality-based values. The authors hypothesize that top management 
teams prioritize their ordering of motives differently to other stakeholder classes. 
Top management teams will act from instrumental motives followed by relational 
and then moral motives, whereas, external stakeholder classes, like consumers, 
will prioritize moral motives followed by relational and instrumental motives 
(Aguilera et al., 2007).  
Governments of advanced nation-states (Grant, 1991; Makino, Isobe & Chan, 
2004) have instrumental motives for encouraging economic growth by 
establishing competitive domestic markets and by supporting international 
economic activity (Aguilera et al., 2007; Vallentin & Murillo, 2011). 
Governments also have relational motives for promoting CSR for social cohesion 
purposes (Aaronson, 2003), and moral motives to encourage CSR for collective 
nation-state responsibilities. The authors indicate that, ‘Governments will 
advance CSR policies when they see instrumental value promoting business 
competitiveness’ (Aguilera et al., 2007 p.850). The priority ordering of motives 
by governments is not as critical as their compensatory role. Governments enact 
the compensatory role in promoting CSR regulatory intervention (Steurer, 2010; 
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Vallentin & Murillo, 2011) when deficiencies emerge in economic growth, social 
cohesion or collective responsibility.  
At a transnational level, it is relevant to distinguish inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), such as the EU and OECD, business interest groups like 
GRI, IFRS and IIRC, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from other 
types of organizations. Aguilera et al. (2007) hypothesize that IGOs will push 
CSR to promote competition, social cohesion and collective responsibility. 
Conversely, NGOs will push for CSR for relational motives to secure social 
cohesion and for moral motives of altruism (Aguilera et al., 2007). 
Conclusion 
The separation of asset ownership from control is not merely an issue of 
agency loss, as convincingly measured under a ‘closed system’ economic model 
(Dalton et al., 2007). Jensen (2002) himself acknowledged some three decades 
on from his 1976 landmark paper that an enlightened value maximization 
approach requires trade-offs. Bratton (2001) indicates that those trade-offs 
involve a careful balancing of the contract-like model and trust-like model 
attributes in protecting proprietary interests (Donaldson & Preston, 1995a) and, 
more generally, extending them to participants with legitimate expectations and 
a ‘stake’ in the corporations’ activities. Where greater emphasis is given to the 
contract-like model, due weight will be given to the economic responsibility of 
the firm (Carroll, 1979) and there will be minimum compliance with legal 
responsibilities (McGee, 1991). On the other hand, where greater emphasis is 
given to the trust-like model, due weight will be given to a broader set of 
responsibilities (Freeman, 1999).  
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What emerges from this analysis of the trade-off in contract-like and trust-like 
governance systems is that stockholder-primacy governance logic is not designed 
to detect or minimize the base erosion problem. Under the stockholder-primacy 
logic accountability is framed by the deeply-embedded meaning of the user 
(Pelger, 2016; Young, 2006) of MNE corporate reports. Thus, where the cultural 
context of host location, such as the UK is inculcated in stockholder-primacy 
logic, it is more likely that the base erosion problem is prevalent. The empirical 
findings of Jones & Temouri (2016) associating varieties of capitalism in MNEs’ 
home location with the level of technology, inter-group tax haven entities and 
incidence of legal tax avoidance bears this out.  
In the next chapter, I will describe the various modes of internationalizing by 
MNEs to illuminate the firms’ view on their value-creating frameworks. I will 
explain how the base erosion phenomenon is inextricably linked with the MNEs’ 
processes of internationalization and their value-creation frameworks, drawing 
on transaction cost economics and organizational capabilities.  
_________________________________________________________________
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Chapter 3 – Internationalization Process of MNEs: Building on the 
Value-Creation Frameworks 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will identify the various modes of internationalizing 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009) by MNEs across overseas host locations to 
explicate the firms’ views on their value-creating frameworks (Forsgren, 2013b; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). The base erosion phenomenon (Biscontri, Ng & 
Yuen, 2001; Dharmapala, 2014) is inextricably linked with the MNEs’ processes 
of internationalizing across overseas host locations and their valuation practices 
(Espeland & Lom, 2015; Kornberger, 2017).  
As the research focus of my empirical data—that incorporates evidence given 
by the MNEs, Amazon, Google and Starbucks, at the PAC-UK (2012) and PAC-
UK (2013) hearings with UK host policymakers—is about a public stakeholders’ 
perspective on the distributive fairness of value-creation across host locations, my 
literature review in this chapter will concern: (a) value-creation emerging from 
internationalization; (b) the processes involved in traditional and accelerated 
modes of internationalizing; (c) the talk of business model frames by firms 
communicating their value-creation strategy to stakeholders; (d) the role of HQs 
and subsidiaries in the value-creation framework; and (e) the organizing views on 
changing the order of worth of economic transactions across borders.  
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Internationalization Modes 
Traditional incremental market entry 
There is more than one pattern and process that explains how MNEs 
internationalize. The traditional incremental market entry mode of 
internationalizing is explained by Johanson & Vahlne (1977 p.23) as ‘a process 
in which firms gradually increase their international involvement’. The reason for 
the staged entry into host markets is to provide time for the firm to assimilate 
knowledge (Welch, Nummela & Liesch, 2016) about host markets and develop 
capabilities to operate efficiently in those foreign markets. MNEs lack knowledge 
about foreign markets and foreign operations, and it takes time for firms to 
assimilate sufficient experiential knowledge to cope with the liability of 
foreignness (Leiblein, 2002; Zaheer, 1995).  There are also multiple dimensions 
of distance for MNEs from their home markets, whether it be in the form of 
cultural distance (Shenkar, 2001), geographical distance (Beugelsdijk & 
Mudambi, 2013) or psychic distance (O'Grady & Lane, 1996).  
Under the traditional incremental market entry mode of internationalizing, 
firms progress from exporting to licensing agents, appointing distributors, 
establishing sales subsidiaries and eventually committing to foreign direct 
investment. The sequence and form of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) 
is heterogeneous, depending on firm-specific advantages. The form of outward 
FDI deployed by MNEs may be to engage in research and development (Almeida 
& Phene, 2004), non-equity alliance and partnering (Reuer & Devarakonda, 
2016; Zollo, Reuer & Singh, 2002), or to commence their own production 
facilities in the host location (Andersen, 1993; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 2009; 
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Melin, 1992) or to engage in trade and provision of services from a fixed base 
situated in the host location.  
Exporting and engaging in trade with customers beyond home headquarters of 
the MNE’s nation-state is the first step in the internationalization process. 
Exporting behaviour is not homogenous. Cavusgil (1984) identifies three specific 
types of exporters, whose categorization is relevant for policymakers—they are 
the experimental exporters, the active exporters and the committed exporters. The 
experimental exporters demonstrate little commitment to developing overseas 
markets. The active exporters adapt products for overseas customers and access 
unused firm capacity to support their export initiatives. The committed exporters 
represent the final stage in the evolution of the exporting process, where the firm 
searches not only for regional but also global opportunities for exporting and 
assesses overseas opportunities for sourcing, licensing, distribution arrangements 
and, ultimately, outward foreign direct investment. More recently, Bernini, Du & 
Love (2016) have explained the phenomenon of the intermittent exporter, 
representing the exporter who opportunistically takes up exporting when the 
demand in foreign markets is relatively higher than that of their domestic markets. 
Upon the reversal of market positions, these intermittent exporters exit their 
exporting phase—but this is a phenomenon that is more commonly associated 
with small to medium enterprises. 
Foreign direct investment represents an advanced stage of commitment in the 
internationalization process of a firm. However, stockholders do not necessarily 
value all forms of foreign direct investment equally. Based on a data set of 191 
US manufacturing MNEs and their foreign investment commitments over a 20-
year period (1981–2000), Berry (2006) shows that foreign direct investment into 
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developing countries is riskier than into advanced economies. The implications 
for valuation practice is that stockholders will only approve of that path of 
internationalization once the MNE can demonstrate the experience and 
organizational capabilities to manage those higher levels of risk and uncertainty. 
This result on stockholder acceptability of new market risk is more significant for 
knowledge-intensive industries than for low-level knowledge-intensive 
industries. The exporting and foreign direct investment stages of 
internationalizing are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Lee & Makhija (2009), 
using a data set comprising Korean MNE firms, show that MNEs flexibly 
committed to both exporting and foreign direct investment have improved their 
performance stability in times of economic crisis. 
International new ventures  
Under the accelerated mode of internationalizing, otherwise referred to as 
‘born-global’ firms (Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Oviatt & McDougall, 1994), 
which is an alternative to the traditional incremental mode of market entry, the 
particular features of time and space in organizing assume prominence. Whereas 
the traditional staged mode of internationalizing posits that firms internationalize 
later in their development, Autio, Sapienza & Almeida (2000) observe that 
entrepreneurial high-technology firms both start to internationalize earlier and 
progress more rapidly in the course of internationalizing.Younger firms are more 
adaptive in the formative stages of their organizational learning (Autio et al., 
2000; Cyert & March, 1992). As younger firms internationalize earlier, they 
develop a culture that is more accepting of the challenges forced upon them 
(Autio et al., 2000; Penrose, 1980), such as coping with the liability of foreignness 
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(Leiblein, 2002; Zaheer, 1995), or with the liability of outsidership (Brouthers, 
Geisser & Rothlauf, 2015; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009).  
The data set used by Autio et al. (2000) to measure the impact of the pace and 
speed features of the accelerated mode of internationalizing was based on export 
sales or international sales as reported by Finnish public companies in the period 
1992 to 1997, relative to total firm sales and relative to annual growth as the 
dependent variables. The independent variables were the age of the firm when 
those firms commenced exporting, indicating that it took, on average, five and 
half years from firm setup to commence exporting, and the mean age of the firms, 
which, on average had been 15 years since setup. Interestingly, just over 20 
percent of the firms in the dataset had commenced exporting in the first year of 
their operations. Notwithstanding the traditional staged process mode indicating 
an incremental progression to foreign market entry, the internationalization 
literature recognizes that there is no strict sequence of stages, but rather there is a 
rationalized order to particular patterns of internationalizing, such as those that 
are distinguishable by time, speed and context (Andersen, 1993; Bernini et al., 
2016; Casillas & Acedo, 2013).  
Business model frames 
Host corporate governance regulators have been encouraging MNEs to 
communicate with their stakeholders about how they create value through the 
mode of their business model frames (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). The 
discussion that follows, addresses: the emergence of discourse on business model 
talk; and the association of business model talk with value creation within the 
ubiquity of the digitalized economy. 
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Closely allied to the mode of accelerated internationalization and the 
emergence of the born-global firms or international new ventures was the 
emergence of the cultural talk about business model frames (Ghaziani & 
Ventresca, 2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The authors’ findings showed that 
‘Nearly 70% of public talk concerning business models occurs after 1995, 
suggesting an association between a cultural change and increased public talk 
about keywords’ (Ghaziani & Ventresca, 2005 p.543). The advent of the digital 
economy and e-commerce (Castells, 2002, 2010; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) is 
embodied in the increase use of business model talk. 
E-businesses (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott et al., 2011), I-businesses (Brouthers et 
al., 2015) and, more generally, cloud computing forms of business models 
(OECD, 2014a pp.80-81; Zubeldia, 2016), such as infrastructure-as-a-service or 
software-as-a-service, are examples of entrepreneurial firms adopting accelerated 
modes of internationalization or as distinctive new international ventures. E-
business models cover a diverse range of activities, from mere electronic ordering 
and physical delivery, to complete electronic engagement between supplier and 
recipient. 
For the purposes of measuring the impact of information technology, the 
OECD defines e-commerce transactions broadly as: ‘the sale or purchase of 
goods or services, conducted over computer networks by methods specifically 
designed for the purpose of receiving or placing orders. The goods or services are 
ordered by those methods, but the payment and the ultimate delivery of the goods 
or services do not have to be conducted online. An e-commerce transaction can 
be between enterprises, households, individuals, governments, and other public 
or private organizations.’ (OECD, 2011 p.72). Amit & Zott (2001 p.494) observe 
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that e-commerce businesses create value not merely from the design of their 
supply chains, but more specifically from four interrelated value drivers of 
‘novelty, lock-in, complementarity and efficiency’.  
It is helpful to state here what business model frames are not. Business model 
frames are not: business process flowcharts, product market strategies, 
revenue/cost structures, firm corporate strategies, network structures or internal 
control and monitoring systems (Osterwalder et al., 2005; Zott et al., 2011). 
Rather it is a new unit of analysis that bridges traditional value-creation 
frameworks and offers a holistic perspective of business value-creating logics, 
without the constraints of stockholder-primacy logics, corporate group structure 
or specificity to corporate disclosure reporting requirements (De Villiers, Rinaldi 
& Unerman, 2014; Van Bommel, 2014; Zott et al., 2011). 
Firm View of its Value-Creation Frameworks 
In this section, I discuss: the concept of value generally, as considered in 
strategy literature; the correlation of firm multinationaliy with corporate 
performance; and the value-creating role of home HQs and host subsidiaries that 
may be supported by subnational insidership networks—see Table 3.1 as an 
overview of MNE value-creation frameworks. 
Table 3.1 – Table on MNE value-creation frameworks 
 
Concepts Theoretical lens Articles 
Value in strategy Value strategy as value practices Kornberger, (2017) 
 Processes, resources and dynamic 
capabilities as building blocks 
Teece, (2014) 
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 Dichotomy of use value and 
exchange value 
Bowman & Ambrosini, 
(2000) 
 Internalized and externalized 
elements 
Garcia-Castro & 
Aguilera, (2015) 
Internationalization 
and performance 
Positive correlation to 
multinationality 
Contractor et. al., 
(2003) 
 Summative versus progressive 
incremental value returns 
Contractor (2007); 
Hennart (2007) 
Headquarters and 
parenting 
Entrepreneurial versus 
administrative or loss-preventing 
roles 
Chandler, (1991) 
 Typology & capabilities in value-
creating roles 
Goold et al., (1994); 
Foss (1997) 
Internal firm 
markets 
Functional categories of internal 
firm markets 
Rugman, (2006a,b&c); 
 
 Insourcing and outsourcing 
decisions 
Leibein, (2002); 
Mayer & Salomon, 
(2006) 
Subsidiaries and 
intermediate units 
Multiplicity of FDI motives Birkinshaw & Hood, 
(1998); Rugman & 
Verbeke, (2001) 
 Resource allocation and 
distributed management mandates 
Chakravarty et. al., 
(2017) 
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Subnational 
networks 
Managing liability of foreignness Cantwell et. al., (2010); 
Monaghan et. al., 
(2014) 
 Attraction of preferential fiscal 
regimes 
Arginelli, (2015); 
Evers et. al., (2014) 
 
 
Concept of value in strategy literature 
Kornberger (2017 p.2) observes that: ‘if strategy is concerned with the creation 
of value; and if value is the correlate of valuation practices; then it follows that 
strategy has to be understood in relation to valuation practices’. In order to 
understand how organizations create value (Lepak, Smith & Taylor, 2007) and 
capture value (Becerra, 2008; Pitelis, 2009), it is necessary to examine the MNEs’ 
processes in creating and capturing value. Resource-based view theory (Barney, 
1991; Forsgren, 2013b; Wernerfelt, 1984) provides the foundation for an 
understanding of MNEs’ capabilities in creating and capturing value. 
Teece (2014) describes the core building blocks in MNEs’ value-creation 
frameworks as being its processes, its resources (position), and its ordinary and 
dynamic capabilities (path) in orchestrating its processes and resources (Sirmon, 
Hitt & Ireland, 2007). Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) use the classical economic 
dichotomy of use value and exchange value to explicate how use value is created 
and augmented within the firm’s organizing capabilities, whilst exchange value 
reflects the incremental crystallization or realization of value as goods, services 
or things moved through the subsidiaries, intermediate units and subunits of the 
MNE group. 
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Use value has both an internalized element and an externalized element of 
co-value creation. The internalized element emerges from firms working on 
acquired use value in goods, services and things, and, creating new use value, by 
using the firm’s existing resource capabilities (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). The 
externalized element emerges from customers and other stakeholders perceived 
worth in those goods or services acquired for their own particular needs (Garcia-
Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Gronroos, 2008). A particular application of value-in-
use practice occurs when firms assess the fair carrying value of their intangible 
assets, such as goodwill (Huikku, Mouritsen & Silvola, 2017). 
Internationalization and corporate performance 
Academic research has established that there is a positive correlation between 
the extent of a firm’s multinationality and the group’s financial performance 
(Contractor et al., 2003). Reconciling prior findings, Contractor et al. (2003 p.7) 
express the correlation as a ‘three-stage theory of international expansion’: early 
internationalizers experience an initial negative correlation; mid-stage 
internationalizers regain a strong positive correlation; and in certain 
circumstances some over-internationalized firms experience a degree of negative 
correlation. Although the third stage has not been identified in manufacturing 
businesses, it can appear in the case of high-technology businesses (Contractor et 
al., 2003). 
Hennart (2007) questions whether the positive correlation to a firm’s financial 
performance is attributable jointly to economies of scale, flexibility in 
reconfiguring the group and adaptability in the experiential learning process, or 
whether it is merely a summative outcome of firm growth that may also be 
achievable within the home location. Contractor (2007) explains that the 
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internationalization process captures more than mere summative outcomes; 
progressively, it also captures incremental returns. This is achieved cumulatively: 
‘(1) as an exploiter of internalized capabilities, (2) as a learning organization 
absorbing knowledge from abroad, and (3) as a coordinator and arbitrageur across 
national borders’ (Contractor, 2007 p.460) by progressively capturing 
incremental returns.  
Role of home headquarters and parenting 
The role of the home HQs of the MNE group encompasses both the 
entrepreneurial value-creating functions as well as the administrative 
coordinating or loss-preventing functions (Chandler, 1991). In its value-creating 
role, the home HQ is responsible (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993; Chandler, 1991) for 
setting and managing the MNE’s group strategy by deploying its group’s 
resources, developing its organizational capabilities and implementing processes 
to coordinate the deployment of its resources and organizational capabilities. In 
its administrative role, the home HQ is responsible for implementing information 
reporting systems, budgeting and financial control, setting processes of 
delegation and monitoring, and assuming the mediator role with government 
agencies and other public bodies (Chandler, 1991). 
The home HQ can create value, but can also destroy value (Goold, Campbell 
& Alexander, 1994). Academic research indicates that value can be more readily 
destroyed by stand-alone parenting decisions than by the costs of maintaining its 
administrative function. However, in contrast stand-alone parenting decisions can 
create value, such as in the areas of strategy reviews, capital investment decisions, 
the appointment of general management to subsidiaries, intermediate units and 
subunits of the group (Goold et al., 1994). Foss (1997) emphasizes the importance 
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of the organizational capabilities of the home headquarters in its parenting role. 
These organizational capabilities (Forsgren, 2013a, b) consist of its ability to 
create and augment its internal capital markets (Bowe, Filatotchev & Marshall, 
2010; Nguyen & Rugman, 2015), its internal know-how markets (Chen, 2005; 
Rugman, 2006a) and to exploit its economies of scope through the functions of 
knowledge-direction and flexibility.  
Developing internal firm markets  
The efficiency gains that MNE headquarters derive from developing their 
internal markets, whether for group treasury facilities (Rugman, 2006b), group 
research and development or know-how transfers (Rugman, 2006c) are explicated 
by transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Forsgren, 2013a; Williamson, 1991). 
However, the sustainable competitive advantages or firm specific advantages that 
MNE headquarters achieve through organizational capabilities in coordinating 
these internal markets are explicated by the value-creation frameworks and 
resource-based theory (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Rugman & Verbeke, 2002; Teece, 
2014). 
The MNE headquarters creates value not only from its value-creating role and 
its administrative-coordinating role, but also from the manner in which it embeds 
itself in the host location markets of its subsidiaries, intermediate units and 
subunits. Nel & Ambos (2013) indicate that MNE headquarters embed 
themselves in host locations with varying degrees of commitment. That is, instead 
of merely relying on internal information processing by the firm, MNE 
headquarters may also engage in external relationship-building in host locations 
jointly with their subsidiaries (Nel & Ambos, 2013), and, where undertaken, 
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empirical evidence supports the value-creating impact for the embedded host 
subsidiaries.  
As part of the process of developing their own internal markets, MNEs make 
decisions about the insourcing or outsourcing of constituent parts of their group 
tasks and activities motivated by both efficiency (Williamson, 1991) and level of 
their capabilities (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Besides transaction attributes, 
contractual hazards and asset specificity, Leiblein (2002) explicates that because 
of the heterogeneity of transaction attributes, the level of technological 
performance (Teece, 1996) achieved is dependent on the fit between governance 
mode choice and firm capabilities. Keeping transaction attributes constant, Mayer 
& Salomon (2006 p.955) show that firms with technological capabilities have 
easier ways ‘to monitor, contract with, and manage contractors’ and generally 
have more options, both internally and externally to deal with contractual hazards. 
That is, firms are ‘more likely to use the market in the presence of hold-up hazards 
but are more likely to internalize transactions in the presence of other 
hazards’(Mayer & Salomon, 2006 p.955). 
Role of host subsidiaries, intermediate units and subunits 
The overseas host units of MNEs take on a multiplicity of alternative structural 
forms, whether as subsidiaries, intermediate units or subunits with broad or 
narrow charters (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998) or with location-bound or non 
location-bound firm specific advantages (Rugman & Verbeke, 2001), with a 
variety of motives, such as efficiency seeking, market seeking, resources seeking, 
regulatory-capture seeking, geopolitics seeking, or even secrecy seeking. In all 
these alternative structural forms, the host unit is viewed as a ‘value-adding entity 
in the host country’ (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998 p.774), subject to varying degrees 
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of value-added that are dependent on its processes, position and path (Teece et 
al., 1997) and the valuation practices (Kornberger, 2017) deployed across the host 
locations. 
Besides the internalization of markets within MNE groups for capital and 
treasury functions, and the internalization of markets for research development 
and know-how positioning and group licensing, the internalization of regional 
management mandates to intermediate units (Chakravarty, Hsieh, Schotter & 
Beamish, 2017) is also becoming more prevalent. The authors distinguish those 
intermediate units as: regional headquarters (RHQs) that carry out coordination 
and supporting roles on behalf of the MNE headquarters; regional management 
mandate units (RMMs) that prioritize operations in the region; and regional 
holding companies that are primarily set up inter-group for corporate taxation 
purposes (the latter regional holding companies thereafter excluded from their 
analysis). Chakravarty et al. (2017) find that there is a higher proportion of RHQs 
and RMMs relative to subsidiaries within the European Union (EU) and North 
America than in Asia; that RHQs tend to be wholly-owned while RMMs because 
they are also regional operating units they are majority-owned, with a small 
equity share held by regional joint venture participants; and that RMM earnings 
tend to be more reflective of entrepreneurial risk assumed than the RHQs. 
Host subnational insidership networks 
In defence of the Uppsala model of internationalization, Johanson & Vahlne 
(2009) highlight that insidership in cross-border business networks is one of the 
common features of successful foreign market entry, whether viewed as a 
traditional or an accelerated mode of MNE internationalization (Welch et al., 
2016). Not only is insidership in business networks important to host market 
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entry, so are the host subnational-level networks (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 
2010; Monaghan, Gunnigle & Lavelle, 2014). Contextually, host institutions are 
able to reduce the extent of the uncertainties that MNEs face when entering new 
markets. 
Using the empirical setting of Ireland, Monaghan et al. (2014) showed that 
inward foreign direct investment is accelerated when subnational institutions 
develop insidership network coalitions in order to facilitate the market entry of 
foreign-headquartered MNEs. Monaghan et al. (2014 p.145) explained that 
‘subnational offices of the national inward investment agency typically act as the 
fundamental coordinator and driver of customized coalitions…responsible for 
enlisting other institutions to constitute the national consortium for inward 
investors’. Preferably, subnational insider networks should pursue a social 
corporatist collective agency perspective (Spencer, Murtha & Lenway, 2005) 
rather than a liberal pluralist perspective as a means of encouraging new industry 
creation that supports both domestic and inward foreign direct investment. 
Insidership coalition networks also promote to foreign-headquartered MNEs 
the attractiveness of host location preferential fiscal regimes (Arginelli, 2015; 
OECD, 2015c), such as intellectual patent box regimes (Evers, Miller & Spengel, 
2014), that are aimed at increasing investment in innovative activities and 
attracting mobile capital resources to host locations (Miller & Pope, 2015). The 
desired outcomes for these preferential fiscal regimes are not always as was 
originally intended. Possible harms or unintended outcomes for the host location 
include not capturing the value created from innovative activities performed in 
host locations (Evers et al., 2014), giving an inference of favouring inward 
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foreign direct investment, or not redressing the environmental impact of 
abandoned facilities on MNE exit (Killian, 2006). 
Transfer Pricing Organizing Views 
There are different organizational perspectives on internal transfer pricing 
decisions and practices (Colbert & Spicer, 1995; Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982). 
Swieringa & Waterhouse (1982 p.150) examined transfer pricing decisions 
through the lenses of, ‘the Cyert & March (1963) behavioural theory of the firm 
model, the Cohen & March (1974) garbage can model, the Weick (1969,1979) 
organizing model and the Williamson (1975a, 1975b) markets and hierarchies 
model’. The purpose of examining these internal transfer pricing decisions 
through the lens of the alternative organizing models is, as stated by the authors, 
to illuminate ‘different images [that] allow us to perceive things differently’ 
(Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982 p.152).  
In essence, Cyert & March’s behavioural model explains how pricing is used 
in the bargaining process between MNE home headquarters and its intermediate 
units and subunits, ensuring contractual commitment and thereby avoiding 
uncertainty. The garbage can model shows that transfer pricing decisions provide 
choice opportunities for solutions to particular problems, while Weick’s 
organizing model explains how transfer pricing decisions are legitimated through 
cyclical process of enactment, selection and retention. Williamson’s markets and 
hierarchies model explains how transfer pricing mediates between transactions 
that should be internalized and those that should be supplied by markets, 
acknowledging the behavioural implications of bounded rationality and 
opportunistic social actors. Other than emphasizing the constraining effects of 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 3 
59 
 
transfer pricing regulation (Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008) and possible 
alternatives to the arm’s length pricing principles (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 
2011; Martini, Nieman & Simons, 2012), there has been little further 
development of the organizational perspectives on transfer pricing. 
From an international tax policy perspective on transfer pricing, Dischinger & 
Riedel (2010) indicate that host locations are more likely to be impacted by the 
base erosion phenomenon than home-headquartered locations of MNEs. That is, 
empirical evidence indicates there is a bias in favour of the home headquarters. 
Where the corporate tax rate prevailing in the home headquarters is lower than in 
overseas host intermediate units and subunits, there is empirical evidence of 
MNEs shifting their activities, whereas where prevailing corporate tax rates in the 
home-headquartered locations are higher than in host locations there is no 
discernible evidence of MNEs shifting their activities away from the home 
headquarters (Cools et al., 2008; Dischinger & Riedel, 2010). On the other hand, 
where MNE groups include tax haven subsidiaries, intermediate units or subunits 
within the overseas host locations, there is empirical evidence of MNEs achieving 
a reduced effective corporate tax rate across its overseas host locations (Jones & 
Temouri, 2016; Maffini, 2009). 
In addition, the more bilateral tax treaties that are entered into between nation-
states for the avoidance of double taxation, the greater is there the opportunity for 
MNEs to engage in the reconfiguration their transactions and economic activities 
across multiple borders in order to engage in treaty-shopping arrangements. Arel-
Bundock (2017 p.351) observes that ‘by using bilateralism to solve a coordination 
problem, states have inadvertently created opportunities for treaty shopping by 
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multinationals… When capital is mobile and firms engage in treaty shopping, 
bilateral agreements produce spillovers and have unintended consequences’.   
There are two key concepts that guide international tax convention on transfer 
pricing (OECD, 2010): the permanent establishment concept (Vann, 2010) and 
the arm’s length principle (Eden, Dacin & Wan, 2001). The OECD model 
convention provides a precedent for nation-states to use when negotiating and 
interpreting bilateral double tax avoidance treaties. In the context of 
internalization, as firms progressively engage in international trade, from the 
initial stage of exporting through to a more engaged commitment in foreign direct 
investment, once the threshold of the permanent establishment is reached in the 
host location, the bilateral treaties grant taxing rights to the host location and grant 
relief from double taxation to the home location. Firstly, by virtue of the fictional 
nature (Vann, 2010) of the permanent establishment concept in the law, with its 
deemed inclusions and exclusions, unintended outcomes may arise, for example, 
in the configuration of boundaries for activities deemed in or outside the 
permanent establishment concept. Secondly, through the use of the arm’s length 
principle (Eden et al., 2001) in measuring the value of transactions between 
related parties, the subject of the value practices is not the holistic view of the 
firm but rather the fiction of closed market settings (Avi-Yonah, Clausing & 
Durst, 2008). On January 20, 2014 the Financial Times reported: 
High-tech companies have become the focus of political criticism over their 
aggressive tax planning, with British MPs attacking UK tax avoidance by 
Amazon and Google as “immoral”… John Lewis has warned of companies 
such as Amazon “destroying the UK tax base” by out-trading its competitors, 
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Britain collected just £54m in corporate tax in 2012 from seven US high-tech 
businesses with aggregate sales of over $15bn. (Houlder, 2014) 
Gap in the Value-Creation Literature 
Whereas extant literature provides a coherent bricolage on the related concepts that 
theorize about the MNE’s value-creation frameworks—from value in strategy, 
internationalization and performance, the role of HQs and parenting, internal firm 
markets, the role of subsidiaries and their intermediate units to the subnational 
insidership networks across host locations—there has been little research on value 
creation from a public stakeholder level of analysis. The gap in the literature is in 
understanding how host policymakers make sense of value-creation and value-capture 
processes that MNEs engage in beyond the home HQs.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I developed the firm view on value-creation frameworks by 
explicating the role of parenting by the home MNE HQs, the evolution of MNEs’ 
internal markets for deployment of their capital resources, engagement in 
research and development and in transfer of their know-how capabilities and the 
devolution of power to foreign intermediate units, subsidiaries and subunits to 
coordinate their activities regionally and globally. To give context to the 
internationalizing process, I explicated how subnational insidership networks 
provide the institutional setting that facilitates and incentivizes the entry of 
foreign-HQ MNEs into overseas host locations. Whereas Porter understated the 
importance of the role of government in international business (Carter, Clegg & 
Kornberger, 2008; Narula, 1993), institutional theorists have emphasized the 
decisive role that government has in shaping competition, international business 
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and host location economic prosperity (Cantwell et al., 2010; Monaghan et al., 
2014).  
As the base erosion phenomenon inextricably links internationalization and 
transfer pricing, this thesis brought together the literature on the organizing views 
of transfer pricing with what we know about base erosion and the international 
tax convention concepts of permanent establishment and arm’s length principle. 
The analysis of my findings in Chapter 6 will explicate a public stakeholders’ 
perspective to MNE value-creation and appropriation across host locations. 
In the next chapter, I will indicate how social problems emerge, distinguishing 
between problem emergence through routine monitoring indicators and the 
intervention of transforming or focusing events. I will explicate how host 
policymakers use a public deliberative process to inform citizens and social 
movements of the construct of less visible problems and gain legitimacy in setting 
the public policy agenda. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 4 – Legitimacy in Setting Public Policy Agenda 
Introduction 
In this Chapter 4, I will explicate how social problems emerge, how social 
problems translate into public policy problems, how focusing events have a 
transformative role and how a public deliberative process democratizes the social 
movement in social problem framing. 
As the research focus of my empirical data is about a public stakeholders’ 
perspective on the distributive fairness of MNE value-creation frameworks across 
host locations, my literature review in this chapter will concern: (a) the process 
and typology of social judgements; (b) how social judgements are mobilized by 
public stakeholders affecting organizational legitimacy; (c) distinguishing 
particular forms of fairness in judgements; and (d) giving context to the public 
policy domains of corporate reporting and taxation. 
Agenda Setting 
In this section, I discuss extant literature on the key features in the stages of 
public policy process concerning: (a) how social problems emerge; (b) what 
distinguishes routine and focusing or transforming events; (c) the use of a public 
deliberative process by public stakeholders; and (d) the unpredictability in the 
convergence of the problems, policies and politics streams. 
Problem emergence 
It was Blumer (1971) in his seminal paper who explicated the sociologically 
emergent nature of problem definition. Social problems do not exist 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 4 
64 
 
independently as objective social conditions that are waiting to be placed on a 
public policy agenda (Blumer, 1971; Coburn, 2006; Kingdon, 2011). Social 
problems become apparent through the audience giving perspective to the 
conditions, through collective evaluation giving legitimacy, and in the 
mobilization of stakeholder action (Benford & Snow, 2000; Blumer, 1971). 
Social problems become political problems once they enter the political sphere 
(Kingdon, 2011; Oberg & Uba, 2014). The most common way for these problems 
to get onto political agendas is through systemic indicators (Nistotskaya & 
Cingolani, 2016; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), such as economic indices, annual 
fiscal budgets, current account and capital account movements, rates of 
unemployment, general price indices, consumer-confidence indicators, levels of 
foreign direct investment and work performed on those indicators (Farazmand, 
2009; Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). Nation-states are concerned with the 
economic and social wellbeing of their citizens and general matters affecting 
economic growth thereby take on greater significance to nation-states (Cobb, 
2016; Moran & Ghosal, 1999; Suzuki, 2003).  
There are a number of additional vehicles for the routine monitoring of 
systemic indicators, including the role played by government bureaucracy and 
government agencies, public/private interest intermediaries (Dubnick & 
Frederickson, 2009; McCaffrey, Smith & Martinez-Moyano, 2007), the media 
(Aerts & Cormier, 2009), social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000), protest 
activism (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017), internet activism (Luo et al., 2016), or 
academic advocacy on grand societal challenges (Ferraro & Etzion, 2015) or 
matters of a more routine nature affecting individuals, organizations and society. 
The results of these reports, submissions, protests or other forms of stakeholder 
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activism may also identify problems that governments should add to the public 
policy agenda. 
An example of stakeholder activism, taking the form of a submission, is the 
George Bompass QC Opinion (2013) that was prepared on behalf of the Local 
Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF), the UK Shareholders’ Association and 
other associated investor group actors (LAPFF Associations) and lodged with the 
Financial Reporting Council (UK) in August 2014. This submission, together 
with its supporting legal opinion, questioned whether an emphasis on neutrality 
over prudence in international standards of accounting principles was 
jeopardizing the ‘true and fair’ view as perceived by the LAPFF Associations. 
More specifically, the LAPFF Associations expressed concern that mere 
compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) would give 
sufficient recognition to the capital maintenance principles and to the disclosure 
obligations on distributable reserves as implied in UK’s Company Law and 
Regulations. Notwithstanding that the international accounting principles were 
silent on this issue (Bouvier, 2015), the LAPFF Associations wanted an express 
assurance from the UK government agency that the ‘true and fair’ overriding 
disclosure principle should not be compromised by the socially-constructed 
legitimacy embodied in the IFRS standards alone.  
Social problems that enter the political sphere through the monitoring indicator 
route or, through studies or submissions, are either discarded or remedied through 
a process of incrementalism (Hill, 2009; Lindblom, 1959).  Lindblom (1979) 
describes this process that may be simple or disjointed, as a process involving 
limited comparisons exercised at successive intervals. That is to say, because of 
our bounded rationality (Simon, 1991), social actors including policymakers cope 
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cognitively by comparing a limited set of choices at a particular time exercised 
on a successive iterative basis (Hill, 2009; Lindblom, 1979). In this way changes 
can be made to laws and regulations on a test and evaluation basis, thus supporting 
the continuity of a stable environment. 
Focusing events 
A less common way for problems to get onto political agendas is through the 
sudden intervention of focusing or transforming events, such as a crisis (Kingdon, 
2011) or a disaster (Birkland, 1998). A crisis or disaster draws attention to 
preexisting conditions or features of an emergent problem. Not only is such an 
event sudden and relatively uncommon, but Birkland (1998 p.54) also observes 
that it ‘can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of 
potentially greater future harms…concentrated in particular geographical area or 
community of interest…known to policymakers and the public simultaneously’. 
Why is it that some problems remain undetected for some time before the onset 
of a crisis or a disaster? Kingdon (2011) compared problems that emerged from 
his research on health and transportation issues. He observed that a significantly 
greater proportion of transportation problems emerged from a crisis than was the 
case for health problems. He hypothesized that the reason for this outcome is that 
the transportation domain is materially less visible than the health domain. The 
implication is that focusing events are more likely to detect problems that may 
subsist in less visible sectors of the economy or society. One isolated focusing 
event is unlikely on its own to adequately frame the problem. However, when a 
crisis or disaster is followed by another crisis or disaster, then the recurrence of a 
similar type of event will assist in defining the problem (Kingdon, 2011). 
Likewise, the aggregation of disasters is also likely to have the same result. 
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Kingdon (2011) cites the DC-10 crash in Chicago in 1979 and the mid-air 
collision over San Diego as an example of the aggregation of disasters.  
A common factor that can also explain both long periods of stability followed 
by short periods of rapid change in policy is a drastic disruption to shared beliefs 
and values (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991). That is, the underlying interaction of 
shared beliefs and values is common to both long periods of stability and short 
periods of rapid change. The short periods of rapid change are associated with 
contested divergence in the interaction of those shared beliefs and values. 
Baumgartner & Jones (1991) use the economic crisis of the 1970s to show how 
many of the narrow-interest policy subsystems or communities collapsed or 
radically altered in the spheres of tobacco, pesticides, air and water pollution, 
airlines, trucking, telecommunications and nuclear power. The crisis saw the 
United States stock market lose 45 per cent of its value whilst the London Stock 
Exchange suffered a staggering 78 per cent loss of its market capitalization 
(Sentance, 2013). The key economic events triggering the 1970s crisis were the 
abandonment by the United States of its currency link to the price of gold and the 
announcement by the OPEC countries of a series of oil price rises (Sentance, 
2013).  
Baumgartner & Jones (1991) note that the preexisting problems, which were 
identified following the 1970s crisis, were the closed and limited participation 
systems for governing these particular areas of public policy. Applying this to 
nuclear power policy, Baumgartner & Jones (1991) contend that, prior to the 
1970s, the government agency the Atomic Energy Commission had been given 
tight and closed control over the development of atomic energy. But by 1969 the 
National Environmental Policy Act prescribed that any future nuclear power 
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developments would require the filing of environmental impact statements before 
a grant of any development licence was made. Henceforth, the entire development 
process became open to much broader stakeholder scrutiny and participation. In 
an age of rapid globalization and the formation of regional trade pacts and 
incentives, followed by the unexpected prompt dissolution of those arrangements, 
there were calls for governments to build administrative capabilities to cope with 
these dynamics (Cumming & Zahra, 2016; Farazmand, 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2015). 
Harm visibility is another attribute that is relevant to focusing events. Birkland 
(1998, p.67) observes that industrial accidents or disasters are ‘dramatic events 
for which blame can be assigned to corporate interests, possibly resulting in anti-
industry mobilization’. In this instance, coherent policy communities will 
attribute human negligence and causation to the adverse outcome. In the case of 
the trade in so-called conflict-minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Reinecke & Ansari (2015) show how companies are made responsible for the 
humanitarian crisis in the region. Policy entrepreneurs will argue that the adverse 
outcome is evidence of the failure of existing policy (Birkland, 1998). Blame, 
however, cannot immediately be attributed to or apportioned in incidences of 
natural disaster or acts of God. Focusing events are the less common way for 
events to get onto political agendas, but can have a profound impact on policies 
and politics. 
The base erosion phenomenon that emerged following the 2008 global 
financial crisis (Callinicos, 2012; Whittle & Mueller, 2011) and which drew the 
attention of host nation-states, such as the United Kingdom (PAC-UK, 2012, 
2013), is a social problem that has its source in a focusing event by way of a crisis 
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(Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Pimlot & Giles, 2010; Riaz, Buchanan & Bapuji, 
2011). It did not result from routine or systematic monitoring by host location 
governments. The 2008 global financial crisis attracted competing storylines with 
bankers portrayed as either the villains or the victims (Whittle & Mueller, 2011) 
in this crisis. 
Many of the post-inquiry reports issued following the 2008 global financial 
crisis sought to take the heat off the chaos, loss and suffering by simplifying the 
narrative as an event that was not foreseeable at the time (Boudes & Laroche, 
2009; Von Krogh et al., 2012), and attributed the blame to the lower-level actors 
in order to maintain the legitimacy of bureaucratic governance in public 
administration (Olsen, 2005; Rhodes, 2007). Immediately following the 
aftermath of the crisis, elite actors in the financial and banking field defended 
their dominant positions internally by providing rational guarantees and 
expressing normative responsibilities, and externally, by strengthening their 
epistemic authority by critiquing judgements and questioning motives (Riaz et 
al., 2016). 
Public deliberative process 
The way in which policymakers construct social problems has important 
consequences, such as targeting blame (Boudes & Laroche, 2009), assigning 
responsibility (Reinecke & Ansari, 2015) and legitimizing particular policy 
response avenues whilst excluding others (Benford & Snow, 2000; Coburn, 
2006). Policymakers use an open, deliberative approach (Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 
2004)  to empower citizens (Lee & Romano, 2013), and familiarize them with the 
problem construct (Boudes & Laroche, 2009). The naming and blaming logic 
supports the problem construct by attributing culpability to human agency rather 
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than to public administration and bureaucratic governance (Olsen, 2005). In turn, 
the course of problem framing is likely to determine the form of policy response 
(Coburn, 2006). 
Deliberative progress is dependent on national mood, election results, changes 
in public administration, efforts of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 
2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996) and on the capabilities of government and their 
public administration to strategically engage in public deliberation (Lee & 
Romano, 2013) . National mood, according to Gray, Purdy & Ansari (2015), is 
inherently bidirectional and structurational, consisting of both top-down polity 
deliberation and bottom-up community expectations.  
Lee & Romano (2013) show that deliberation is a strategic tool that 
organizations, both public and private, use when faced with resistance from 
institutional fields seeking to protect and maintain intra-field stability (Harmon, 
Green & Goodnight, 2015). In triangulating their multiple data sources, the 
authors observed that the common theme to situations where the deliberative 
process was availed of was in ‘contentious framings emphasizing systemic failure 
and inequality’ (Lee & Romano, 2013 p.743). 
Converging problems, policies and politics 
Although much of Kingdon’s empirical research work was undertaken in the 
United States, Hill (2009) notes that his important contribution to the agenda 
setting process is the generalization: (a) in explicating the three self-determining 
streams and, (b) indicating the unpredictable process of their convergence. The 
occurrence and temporality of convergence, is in many instances unpredictable 
and may be likened to the biological behaviour of molecules genetically 
combining (Hill, 2009).  
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The policy stream is temporally independent of the problem-defining stream, 
and is guided by existing sub-systems (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016), policy 
communities (Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996) and intermediary role 
of inter-governmental organizations (Schemeil, 2013; Tatham & Bauer, 2016). 
The policy communities may be dependent on or autonomous of the 
administrative and legislative constituencies. Baumgartner & Jones (1991) 
observe that the venue of policy communities or policy entrepreneurs can 
alternate and change over time, as can the image of policy shaping. The policy 
venue may be more specific and less inclusive when policy issues are very 
technical in nature. 
When ethical, social or political issues are involved, however, a much broader 
range of participants is more likely to become involved (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1991). Sub-systems of policy communities can shift from delegated agencies of 
government, professional or private-expert groups, state or local authorities 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016), or inter-
governmental and supra-governmental agencies (Schemeil, 2013). One policy 
initiative is also capable of dragging along a whole series of self-reinforcing 
changes in both policy image and venue. This occurred in the United States with 
the promulgation of the National Environmental Protection Act in 1969, with the 
requirement to compile environmental impact statements (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1991; Tatham & Bauer, 2016). 
Where policy communities have supportive sub-systems and coherent 
strategies, they are more likely to have greater impact. Research by Birkland 
(1998) on natural disasters and industrial accidents indicates that coherent and 
ongoing policy communities in the domain of earthquakes enabled substantive 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 4 
72 
 
changes to prevailing policy. For example, the ‘earthquake advocacy coalition’ 
was successful in pushing along the drafting and passing through Congress of the 
National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977 (Birkland, 1998). 
Conversely, where policy communities are fragmented, as in the case of the 
hurricane domain, policy entrepreneurs are less likely to impact the policy 
agenda, as Birkland (1998 p.66) observed ‘the prospects for improved hurricane 
policy are dim’. 
Besides the coherence of policy communities and the choice of venue and 
policy image, Kingdon (2011) identifies two functional attributes that support the  
survivability of policy ideas: their technical implementation feasibility and their 
value acceptability. The threshold test for technical feasibility is the likelihood 
that the new policy will actually achieve its intended outcome. The assessment 
for value acceptability is more complex. The value acceptability threshold 
incorporates an ideological or cultural element as well as a quantitative efficiency 
element. Kingdon (2011) observes that the ideological element may incorporate 
cultural views on size of government. It may also consider the likely effect on 
equity balance following implementation, whilst quantitative efficiency is 
concerned not only with absolute cost but also with cost-benefit analysis, trade-
offs or subsidy effects and effective use of public administrative resources (Lee 
& Whitford, 2012). 
The politics stream is temporally independent of the problem and policy 
streams. The politics stream depends on national mood, election results, changes 
in government and changes in public administration. In the context of national 
moods, Gray et al. (2015) observe that framing is inherently a bidirectional, 
structuration process (Poole, Seibold & McPhee, 1985), being both a top-down 
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polity framing as well as a bottom-up expression of shared understandings and 
expectations. Whilst the executive arm of government bargain and promise 
concessions to its electorate in order to secure re-election (Bryer, 2006; Killian, 
2006; Kingdon, 2011), government is also faced with complex preferences that 
are shaped by demands from domestic interest groups and foreign direct investors 
(Dowling, 2014; Henisz & Zelner, 2005). On January 14, 2013 the Financial 
Times reported:  
 
Attempts at reform will, however, face powerful headwinds. The forces of 
tax temptation to grab the most mobile profits, such as those arising from 
intellectual property—remain significant. In spite of the soaring rhetoric, 
governments must proceed with some caution, fearing any cooling off of 
investment because of a crackdown on tax avoidance.  “Member states are 
defensive” says a Brussels-based official contemplating efforts to co-ordinate 
a tougher code. (Houlder, 2013) 
 
Theory of Social Judgements 
In this section, I discuss extant literature on the mobilization of social 
judgements addressing: (a) the sociological meaning of ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘judgement’; (b) the formative and constituent features of cognitive legitimacy 
judgements and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements; and (c) the 
interconnectivity of the three forms of fairness judgements in organization 
decisions that impact stakeholder reciprocity and firm value-creation capabilities. 
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Defining legitimacy and judgement 
Extant literature (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Golant & Sillince, 2007; Hybels, 
1995) repeated reverts to Suchman’s definition of legitimacy applied in 
organizational theory as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995 p.574). 
Legitimacy is an abstract construct that performs a critical role in social systems 
in explaining social behaviour (Hybels, 1995) and individual cognition 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Legitimacy affords stability to incumbent 
organizational structures (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), resists challenges for 
change (Elsbach, 1994), raises entry barriers for new entrants (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994) and reduces share price volatility for organizations that release new 
information on the natural environment (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). 
On the other hand, legitimacy induces inertia to act when technological 
advances demand responsiveness (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) and will expedite the 
demise of organizations without institutional linkages (Baum & Oliver, 1991) or 
those that are imprinted by an earlier institutional logic (Oertel, Thommes & 
Walgenbach, 2016). Whilst Suchman (1995) describes a typology of 12 distinct 
types of legitimacy, extant literature recognizes that there are two overarching 
substantive foci of legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2008; Tost, 2011), namely, the evaluative form of sociopolitical 
legitimacy and the taken-for-granted orthodoxy of cognitive legitimacy. 
For purposes of this thesis, I use Suchman’s definition of legitimacy and the 
two overarching substantive foci of legitimacy. I also use Parsons’ (1960) 
definition of judgment as the ‘appraisal of action in terms of shared or common 
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values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system’ 
(Parsons, 1960 p.175). 
Cognitive legitimacy judgements 
Cognitive legitimacy is identifiable in community audience responses that 
manifest their ‘widely held beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions’ (Scott, 
1994 p.81). Decisions made by community actors on routines, operations and 
structures, observe Golant & Sillince (2007 p.1150), are ‘considered to form part 
of the “natural order” within their social context (Hannan and Carroll)’. 
Justification for cognitive legitimacy decisions lies beyond the scope of 
individual evaluation. It is developed over time through recursive historical 
inculcation (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bitektine, 2011), with the implication, 
according to Golant & Sillince (2007 p.1153), that ‘traces of authorship are erased 
through this translation process’. For actors within a community field, it can 
explain conditions that induce inertia to act (Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992; Tripsas 
& Gavetti, 2000), induce resistance to change in professional regulatory fields 
(Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002), or an inability to respond to 
environment changes (He & Baruch, 2010; Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller, 1989, 
2011). Under cognitive legitimacy, once the evaluator has classified the 
organization or action the process of evaluation stops (Bitektine, 2011).  
Sociopolitical legitimacy judgements 
Sociopolitical legitimacy decisions, by contrast, are analytically evaluative in 
nature (Golant & Sillince, 2007). They are ‘benchmarked against the prevailing 
social norms: the actor renders a judgement as to whether the organization, its 
form, its processes, its outcomes, or its other features are socially acceptable’ 
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(Bitektine, 2011 p.157). In situations where observed norms of firms do not 
conform to prevailing beliefs and social norms, they will be challenged, for 
example, by regulatory authorities (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; Suchman, 1995), by the media (Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Hybels, 1995; 
Pollock & Rindover, 2003), by host location barriers (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; 
Zaheer, 1995) and by incumbents challenging new entrants (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015).  
Forms of fairness in judgements 
The concept of fairness is not limited to an economic evaluation of an 
exchange between a provider and a recipient. Adams (1963 p.422) observes there 
is also ‘an element of relative justice involved that supervenes economics and 
underlies perceptions of equity and inequity’, with inequity (Skarlicki & Folger, 
1997) being perceived as a contextually relative matter of magnitude as between 
self and others. Because of the contextually relative assessment, the concept of 
fairness extends beyond the dyadic relationship between the provider and 
recipient to a broader class of affected stakeholders. 
From a stakeholder framework perspective, Bosse, Phillips & Harrison (2009) 
describe three forms of fairness in organizational decisions that impact 
stakeholder reciprocity and firm value-creation capabilities—originating from the 
early work on equity theory by Adams (1963). 
Firstly, distributive fairness refers to how an evaluative stakeholder, whether 
it is an employee, a customer, a stockholder or a regulator that engages with the 
firm, perceives the relative equity in the outcomes (Cropanzana, Bowen & 
Gilliland, 2007; Luo, 2007) of organizational decisions, such as on pay and 
promotion decisions (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), on 
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service delivery and price decisions (Homburg, Hoyer & Koschate, 2005; Seiders 
& Berry, 1998), on CEO compensation and conflict resolution decisions (Cai & 
Pan, 2011; Pepper, Gosling & Gore, 2015), or on transparency and compliance 
decisions in regulatory matters (Desai, 2016; Marti & Scherer, 2016). 
Secondly, procedural justice refers to how an evaluative stakeholder perceives 
the process implemented in the distributive outcome. Some of the core attributes 
that make processes and procedures equitable include: ‘A process…that is applied 
consistently to all, free of bias, accurate, representative of relevant stakeholders, 
correctable, and consistent with ethical norms.’ (Cropanzana et al., 2007 p.38). 
Notwithstanding that distributive justice has a dominant and substantive impact 
on perceived equity, procedural justice has an ameliorative moderating affect, 
such as being given the opportunity to challenge or rebut an evaluation in a 
performance appraisal process (Folger & Konovsky, 1989). 
Thirdly, interactional justice refers to how information is communicated 
between the provider and the recipient and the mannerisms portrayed in such 
delivery. Importantly, the three forms of fairness interact, such that unjust 
outcomes are ameliorated by acts of procedural fairness, and unjust procedures 
are ameliorated by acts of interactional fairness (Cropanzana et al., 2007; 
Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010). 
In the base erosion phenomenon, stakeholders are drawn into the process of 
making cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements. The fairness 
typology indicates how stakeholders perceive forms of inequity, whether 
affecting outcomes, processes or interactive communication and how these 
perceptions in turn influence the evaluative sociopolitical legitimacy judgements 
that are made by affected stakeholders. Understanding these alternative forms of 
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fairness judgements is important to my analysis because public stakeholders, as 
evaluators, are primarily concerned with distributive justice when dealing with 
the base erosion problem—that is, with the relative equity in attribution of profits 
across host locations. Whereas the mere compliance with the law by the MNEs— 
Amazon, Google and Starbucks—may have a moderating effect on public 
stakeholders’ evaluation, it is of secondary effect on perceived equity. 
Context in Public Policy Matters 
Relevance of context 
Extant literature provides a plurality of reasons for the relevance of context, 
including: as a means of illuminating the phenomena and the factors associated 
with the unit of analysis; the conditions that may constrain or afford opportunities 
of behaviour; and as the basis for describing research settings or conveying the 
means for applying the research findings to other settings (Johns, 2000, 2006). In 
Chapter 5, I will describe the empirical setting of the base erosion phenomenon 
in general terms and, more specifically, the research setting in the United 
Kingdom, more specifically. Whilst in this chapter, I will briefly outline the 
context of corporate disclosure reporting policies and host location corporate 
taxation policies in relation to conditions that constrain or afford opportunities of 
behaviour exhibited by foreign-headquartered MNE, as perceived by host 
policymakers. 
Perspective on corporate reporting disclosure policies 
Host location policymakers mandate transnational standardization (Botzem & 
Dobusch, 2012) of corporate reporting disclosures for firms that are listed on their 
capital markets (Alon & Dwyer, 2016; Healy & Palepu, 2001). In order to give 
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stockholders and prospective investors confidence in capital markets, host 
locations appoint government agencies, such as the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) in the United Kingdom (Linsley & Shrives, 2014; Veldman & Willmott, 
2016), and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States (Alon 
& Dwyer, 2016; Barth, 2008) to oversee the quality of both the corporate 
reporting provided by corporations and their consolidated interests that are 
publicly quoted on their capital markets. 
Features of the host location corporate reporting disclosure policies that are 
contextually relevant to this thesis are: (a) the framing of who are considered as 
‘users’ of annual corporate reports by government agencies (Durocher, Fortin & 
Cote, 2007; Pelger, 2016; Young, 2006); (b) the boundary framing aspects of 
consolidated group reporting (IFRS 10, 2011; IFRS 12, 2011); (c) how decision-
usefulness of information impacts the disclosure information relevant to segment 
reporting (IFRS 8, 2007); and (d) the function that related-party disclosure 
policies (IAS 24, 2009) perform under the conceptual framework to international 
financial reporting standards (IASB, 2010). The accounting professions and MNE 
corporate representatives, through self-governing associations, have followed 
market logic (Bengtsson, 2011) in the setting of international accounting 
standards, with cautionary intervention by host location policymakers to reduce 
capital market instability following the 2008 global financial crisis.   
 Since the 1970s, market logic has narrowed the audience for annual reports 
issued by listed corporations to so-called financial statement ‘users’ (Barth, 2008; 
Durocher et al., 2007; Young, 2006). Over time, the taken-for-granted category 
of financial statement users has become limited to stockholders and prospective 
capital market investors. The implication of this institutionally-embedded 
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assumption is that only corporate disclosure policies that satisfy the user decision-
usefulness threshold are considered eligible for inclusion in international 
accounting standards. 
From a host location base erosion phenomenon perspective, the socially-
constructed definition of the consolidated group in boundary scope, comprising: 
the parent home headquarters, local and foreign subsidiaries and intermediary and 
subunits under its control (Hsu, Duh & Cheng, 2012; Maroun & Van Zijl, 2016), 
is an important communicating instrument.  Top management teams discharge 
their ongoing duty of accountability over the management and control of their 
groups’ resources, operations and internationalizing strategy through the 
consolidated annual reports that are prepared for their users. Espeland & Hirsch 
(1990) redefine the corporation not only passively as an aggregation of diversified 
interests, but also actively ‘as a growing and shrinking bundle of self-standing 
assets’. Tensions in the interpretative scope of control and boundaries of the 
corporate groups have been exposed in earlier corporate collapses involving 
reconfigured off-balance-sheet financing arrangements (Baker & Hayes, 2004; 
Benston & Hartgraves, 2002) and reclassified revenue recognition of inter-group 
economic activities (Moerman & van der Laan, 2015). 
The balance between the value of aggregated information and segregated 
operating segment information has also been much contested over the years 
(Ahadiat, 1993; Emmanuel & Garrod, 1992; Nichols, Street & Cereola, 2012). 
With an increasing emphasis on the financial statement user, as distinct from a 
broader class of salient stakeholders, the framing of operating segment 
disclosures, applying to both line of business and geographic regions, are top 
managements’ decision-making perspectives (Leung & Verriest, 2015; Nichols 
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et al., 2012) on allocating group resources and assessing segment performance. 
Of relevance to host location policymakers and the base erosion phenomenon is 
that attempts to introduce transnational standardization of country-by-country 
disclosures has failed through not being seen as information that is decision-
relevant for users (PIR IFRS 8, 2013).  
Related-party disclosures, as mandated under IAS 24 (2009), has had the least 
amount of theoretical and academic attention. Related-party disclosures receive 
some attention in the literature on corporate failures (Baker & Hayes, 2004; 
Moerman & van der Laan, 2015) and network coordination (Hakansson & Lind, 
2004; Kastberg, 2014). From a host location policymaker’s perspective, related-
party disclosures provide the tracing links between the MNE’s host location 
operations and the other entities transnationally within the group. 
Perspective on corporate taxation policies 
Liability to host taxation is ordinarily understood by MNEs as being based on 
a strict literal interpretation (Boden, Killian, Mulligan & Oats, 2010; Freedman, 
2008; Norton, 2012) of domestic law as varied by the bilateral double taxation 
treaties. Whereas there may be some political spillover in shaping corporate 
reporting conventions (Alon & Dwyer, 2016; Bengtsson, 2011), host location tax 
rules are substantively a political process (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). James 
(2010) and Norton (2012) indicate that in recent decades nation-states have 
shifted emphasis to a purposive interpretative approach as a means of challenging 
aggressive tax planning (Freedman, Loomer & Vella, 2009) or tax avoidance 
practices (Shackleford & Shevlin, 2001). 
In this context, the organizing process of tax planning infers a stakeholder 
perspective (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax planning involves not only taking 
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into account all costs and taxes, both explicit and implicit (Mills, Erickson & 
Maydew, 1998; Scholes et al., 2016), but also recognizing the salient interests of 
all parties connected to an MNE transaction, activity or restructuring arrangement 
(Mulligan & Oats, 2016; Shackleford & Shevlin, 2001). The more contentious 
issue is how the salient interests of all parties may be accommodated (Doyle, 
Hughes & Summers, 2013; Ylonen & Laine, 2015), or should be accommodated 
(Dowling, 2014; Friedman, 2007; Lanis & Richardson, 2015).  In granting the 
judiciary a purposive approach to challenging aggressive tax planning, care needs 
to be taken that the balance of power between the state and its subjects is not 
skewed (Gracia & Oats, 2012; James, 2010). 
The base erosion phenomenon brings into focus the boundary between the host 
location regulator’s perception of MNEs acceptable and unacceptable tax 
practices (Gracia & Oats, 2012 p.308). The authors describe this boundary as ‘not 
simply a case of legality on the one side and illegality on the other’, but also as a 
conditioning over time shifting the regulator’s stance on what no longer may be 
construed as unacceptable. The base erosion phenomenon reflects this boundary 
action response by host regulatory authorities (PAC-UK, 2012, 2013) on how 
MNEs should be attributing profits to their permanent establishments situated in 
overseas host locations. 
Bilateral double taxation agreements entered into between home and host 
locations define a ‘permanent establishment’ as a fixed place of business through 
which the business of the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on (OECD, 2015h). 
Following the German Supreme Court’s so-called ‘1996 Pipeline Decision’, 
which held that remotely-controlled pipelines, permanently affixed and traversing 
a host location, would constitute a permanent establishment (Buchanan, 2001; 
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Thorpe, 1997), the view had developed that e-commerce profits could be 
attributed to host locations. That is to say, whilst websites would not constitute 
permanent physical presence, webservers could constitute a permanent 
establishment if the enterprise had dedicated access to the webservers as part of 
its FDI commitment in the host location (Buchanan, 2001; OECD, 2010). 
Gap in the Extant Literature 
Whereas the theory of social judgements describes how a type of judgement is 
guided by task characteristics, the evaluator’s social environment, the evaluator’s 
individual properties, the argumentation fit and the importance of the decision 
(Bitektine, 2011; Bouwmeester, 2013; Harmon et al., 2015), there is little research 
on how public policymakers and regulators, as public stakeholder evaluators, 
mount challenges to the taken-for-granted views held by intra-field audiences and 
shift the public deliberative discourse inter-field toward more responsive sectors 
for change. 
I address this gap in the literature—as a result of my analysis and findings in 
Chapters 7 and 8—I identify the contextual boundary conditions that resist intra-
field instability and I explain the types of inter-field iterative rhetorical techniques 
used to mediate public policy changes that reflect upon procedural justice 
(Adams, 1963; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), but primarily demand distributive 
justice (Bosse et al., 2009; Coff, 1999). 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I have explained how social problems become apparent 
(Blumer, 1971; Coburn, 2006) through audiences giving perspective to the 
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conditions, mobilizing stakeholder action and making collective evaluations that 
gave legitimacy to those socially-constructed problems. Where social problems 
emerge through focusing events, it is because they subsist in less visible sectors 
of the economy. However, once the harm is made visible, social actors seek to 
attribute blame to human agency (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Whittle & Mueller, 
2011) in order to preserve the legitimacy of incumbent systems and 
institutionalized practices. The 2008 global financial crisis is a noteworthy 
example of a focusing event. 
I also indicated how policymakers effectively use a public deliberative process 
(Carpini et al., 2004; Lee & Romano, 2013) in order to inform citizens and social 
movements of the possible construct of less visible problems. The naming and 
blaming logic reduces the surrounding chaos and uncertainty, and seeks 
containment by attributing blame to human agency (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; 
Reinecke & Ansari, 2015), rather than to failures by public administration or 
bureaucratic governance (Farazmand, 2009; Olsen, 2005).  
Whereas the intra-field evaluative process stops for cognitive legitimacy 
judgements once the evaluator has completed such an act of classification (Golant 
& Sillince, 2007), for sociopolitical legitimacy judgements the evaluative process 
is ongoing (Bitektine, 2011), occurring both intra-field and inter-field. In making 
sociopolitical evaluations, evaluators expressly or implicitly consider three form 
of fairness in organizational decisions, comprising distributive, procedural and 
interactional fairness decisions (Bosse et al., 2009; Harrison et al., 2010). In the 
base erosion phenomenon (OECD, 2013), public stakeholders make evaluative 
judgements about the distributive fairness of organizing choice decisions that are 
made by MNEs operating across host locations. 
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Finally, in order to provide context for the public policies associated with the 
base erosion phenomenon, I provide a perspective on the corporate reporting 
disclosure policies (Pelger, 2016; Veldman & Willmott, 2016; Young, 2006) and 
the corporate taxation policies (Boden et al., 2010; Gracia & Oats, 2012; Norton, 
2012) that are associated with such social problems. 
In the next chapter, I will explain the methodological inductive framework I 
have used to interrogate, analyse and theorize from the three-part triangulated 
data set. I will show how I structured the phenomenon-driven research enquiry, 
comprising three distinct stages, in order to establish contextualized authenticity 
in developing my contribution. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 5 – Methodology 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the philosophy underpinning phenomenon-driven 
research and theory building; the methodological framework I have synthesized to 
interrogate, analyze and theorize from the data; and the three-part triangulated data 
set I have collated and worked on in applying the synthesized methodological 
framework. 
I will start by discussing the difference between phenomenon-driven research 
and theory-driven research. I explain that phenomena are regularities that are 
unexpected and challenge extant literature. I indicate that, although phenomenon-
driven research is expansive in its inquiry, the data inspires the imagination of 
researchers to approach the phenomenon without any preconceived propositions 
or hypotheses. The base erosion phenomenon that emerged following the 2008 
global financial crisis displays attributes of regularities having occurred in prior 
decades and it challenges extant theories—such as, theories on corporate 
governance, varieties of capitalism, stakeholder thinking and reciprocity in 
exchange, the resource-based view of the firm and its dynamic capabilities, and 
the agenda setting process of nation-states balancing economic growth and societal 
welfare. 
Taking a pragmatist philosophical paradigm, I seek to bridge the rigidities of 
the ontological, epistemological and methodological divides and give greater 
emphasis to human experience. I will synthesize the Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) 
bidirectional inductive framework: first, by working bottom-up from the data using 
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the Gioia et al. (2012) method; second, by being informed top-down by the 
literature on a recursively iterative basis throughout the research (Corley & 
Schinoff, 2017); and, third, by using abductive reasoning to theorize about 
inferences that are consistent with context and fit (Hatch & Yanow, 2008; Martela, 
2015). I discuss each of these three distinct stages below by establishing first-order 
codes from the data, moving from codes to second-order themes, and from themes 
to aggregate conceptual dimensions. 
I will explain the composition of my data set. As an overview, my data set is 
constructed from three sources: (a) the transcript data from the 25 semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews I conducted comprising 403 pages, together with my 
fieldnotes comprising a further 57 pages; (b) the public hearings’ transcripts from 
the 27 interrogees and witnesses that attended the PAC-UK (2012) and PAC-UK 
(2013) public hearings comprising 137 pages; and, (c) the home annual reports for 
Amazon, Google and Starbucks comprising 747 pages together with their UK host 
reports comprising 98 pages and the 26 documents that were referred to by 
interviewees during the course of the conduct of the fieldwork comprising 688 
pages. 
Researching Phenomena 
Phenomenon-driven research 
Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) contrast phenomenon-driven research with 
theory-driven research in the following manner. Whereas in theory-driven 
research, the researcher ‘has to frame the research within the context of this 
theory…[that] is tightly scoped within the context of [the] existing theory’ 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007 p.26), for phenomenon-driven research the 
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researcher ‘has to frame the research in terms of the importance of the phenomenon 
and the lack of plausible existing theory’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007 p.26). The 
authors do not provide a definition for the term ‘phenomenon’ rather they provide 
examples of phenomenon-driven research, such as on the collapse of the decision-
making process in the Mann Gulch fire disaster (Weick, 1993), or the cognitive 
foundational work in organizational learning (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2006) or the 
screening of the homelessness problem at the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey through the image and identity of the organization (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). 
Von Krogh, Rossi-Lamastra & Haefliger (2012 p.278) define phenomena as 
‘regularities that are unexpected, that challenge existing knowledge (including 
extant theory) and that are relevant to scientific discourse’. The authors indicate 
that phenomenon-driven research has broadened organizational management 
research domains in ways that theory-driven research is not able to do. For 
example, in the international management domain, through a ‘process of inquiry 
by observing interesting phenomena and then identifying and describing their 
salient aspects’ (Von Krogh et al., 2012), international management has expanded 
its inquiry into the management of transnational enterprises and their interface with 
the information age, service-based economy, delegation to intermediate units 
devolving regional management mandates and, more generally the worldwide 
impact of deregulation (Bartlett & Ghosal, 2008).  
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Inspiring role of empirical data 
The reason I was drawn to study the ‘base erosion’ phenomenon is that the 
phenomenon displays attributes of regularities that have occurred in the past 
(Congress of the United States, 1961) but re-emerge unexpectedly, in this instance 
following the 2008 global financial crisis (Callinicos, 2012; Starkey, 2015) and 
challenges our understanding on extant theories—such as, theories on corporate 
governance, varieties of capitalism, stakeholder thinking and reciprocity in 
exchange, resource-based view of the firm and its dynamic capabilities, the firm’s 
value-creation frameworks and the agenda-setting process of nation-states 
balancing economic growth and societal welfare.  
It is recognized and acknowledged that schemas for expressing profit (Lukka, 
1990) and representing economic activity (Suzuki, 2003) take on distinctive 
meanings within accounting and taxation rules and practice. However, the 
interpretation of these rules and practices through the ‘base erosion’ discourse 
become polarized as either MNEs blatantly abusing host nation-states economic 
markets or policymakers and regulators expediently altering their emphasis on the 
value-capture mechanisms of MNE global activities, thereby exposing the tensions 
in seeking ‘fairness’ while encouraging the benefits of global trade and 
competition. At the end of 1999, the OECD signaled concern about whether 
international tax regulations were adequate for dealing with new business models 
(Ghaziani & Ventresca, 2005) based on new information technologies (OECD, 
2003). It concluded at that time that because of a lack of consensus on mechanisms 
for attributing profits bilaterally across borders the ‘historically’ negotiated basis 
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of profit allocation should prevail over ‘economic principles’ of attribution 
(OECD, 2003, p.15). 
Yet it took a formal public hearing held before the UK’s Committee of Public 
Accounts in the House of Commons (PAC-UK, 2012) at the end of 2012 to expose 
the serious misgivings held by various stakeholders. These serious misgivings, as 
exposed by departments within the government were then followed by vigorous 
debate and analysis in the media, by the public, self-regulatory associations and 
inter-governmental agencies. These various classes of stakeholders questioned 
how financial reporting and corporate governance systems dealt with aspects of 
transparency, accountability and congruity in meanings in MNE cross-border 
economic activities. Affected stakeholders were increasingly concerned about how 
representative or congruent in expression the disclosures in annual reports of UK 
subsidiaries of overseas MNEs were in relation to the consolidated information 
portrayed in the group reports of their overseas parent. These stakeholders were 
also increasingly reflecting on the role corporate governance systems performed 
in managing the broader information asymmetry problem in this multinational 
context.  
    Alvesson & Karreman (2007) note that empirical data provide the inspiration 
for problematizing theoretical ideas and vocabularies. In this instance, the public 
hearings before the PAC-UK (2012, 2013) provide the inspiration for 
problematizing: the faithfulness in representation of corporate information; the 
capabilities of corporate boards in mediating the multiplicity of interests of their 
salient stakeholders; and the host policymakers’ perspective on the 
internationalizing process of MNEs across host locations. From a researcher’s 
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perspective, what this translates into is ‘problematiz[ing] means to challenge the 
value of a theory and to explore its weaknesses and problems in relation to the 
phenomenon it is supposed to explicate.’ (Alvesson & Karreman, 2007, p.1266). 
Philosophical paradigm 
In applying a qualitative inductive methodology to my research question, I am 
guided by the pragmatist paradigm (Morgan, 2014). The pragmatist paradigm 
seeks to bridge the rigidities of the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological divides in social science research (Morgan, 2014). Whereas social 
science scholars (Morgan, 1980) prescribe the interrelated network of knowledge, 
theory and research to establish qualitative rigour in subjective inquiries (Cunliffe, 
2011; Morgan, 1980), the pragmatist paradigm emphasizes human experience—
based on beliefs, self-conscious decision-making and emotion (Cohen, 2007; 
Morgan, 2014)—each mode of human experience directing action and, in turn, 
each action informing human experience.  Also, human experience always occurs 
within some specific context and so context dependency in human experience 
implies that ‘our ability to use prior experience to predict the outcome of a current 
action is fallible and probablistic’ (Morgan, 2014 p.1046). Cunliffe (2011 p.648) 
observes ‘At the risk of oversimplifying the crux of the argument, there are no 
universal criteria with which to judge “good” knowledge; rather criteria are based 
on the assumptions underpinning the work within a particular paradigm.’ 
The pragmatist paradigm is appropriate for my research question because it is 
sensitive to the different ways in which host policymakers may frame a problem 
(Blumer, 1971). The possible line of action (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997) is also likely to correspond with the way that host policymakers 
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perceive the problem of base erosion. Also, recognizing that human experience 
involves emotion, the pragmatist paradigm is suited to inquiries involving social 
justice (Adams, 1963). The media discourse on the base erosion phenomenon 
exhibited emotive expressions of inequity and unfairness regarding foreign-
headquartered MNEs having an ‘unfair advantage’ over domestic enterprises 
(Houlder, 2011) and not paying their ‘fair share’ of corporate taxes (Back, 2013). 
Aim of theory building 
Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) indicate that phenomenon-driven research is 
particularly appropriate for developing theory when addressing the how and why 
questions in underexplored research areas, in contrast to the empirical 
measurement of constructs. Theory-testing research has provided ample evidence 
of the effects or unintended policy outcomes of the base erosion phenomenon. 
Dischinger & Riedel (2010) provide empirical evidence of home nation-state bias 
in the case of MNE headquarters; namely, a reluctance to shift profits away from 
headquarters even if these are located in high-tax countries, yet an active desire to 
shift profits to headquarters where these are located in lower-taxed jurisdictions. 
Outside of the home headquarters, empirical evidence establishes a correlation 
between profit-shifting between MNEs’ foreign affiliates with bias to low tax or 
no-tax locations (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008).  Karkinsky & Riedel (2009) also 
provide empirical evidence of MNEs locating economic interest in their 
intellectual property with their foreign affiliates located in low or no-tax 
jurisdictions, in stateless localities (Kleinbard, 2013), or in comparably taxed 
jurisdictions that offer competitive IP-based incentives. In turn, the transparency 
of financial payments between affiliated organizations become opaque or 
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extinguished on accounting consolidation (Hsu, Duh & Cheng, 2012; Maroun & 
Van Zijl, 2016).  
In building theory, Whetten (1989) explains the four building blocks of theory 
development as: (a) the factors (concepts, constructs, themes or variables) that are 
logically part of the explanation of the social phenomena balancing 
comprehensiveness and parsimony embodied in the what question; (b) the 
relationship that is evident between the salient factors embodied in the how 
question; (c) the rationale underlying the logic of the interaction between the 
factors and their relationship embodied in the why question; and (d) the potential 
for the contribution to remedy deficiencies or augment extant literature embedded 
in the so what enquiry. These theory building-blocks align with the definition of 
theory given by Corley & Gioia (2011 p.12), ‘theory is a statement of concepts and 
their interrelationships that shows how and/or why a phenomenon occurs’.  
In moving from theory building to theoretical contribution, Corley & Gioia 
(2011 p.26) explicate that contribution has ‘two germane dimensions, originality 
(classified as either incremental or revelatory) and utility (scientific and/or 
pragmatic usefulness), with a strong preference in the scholarly community for 
works that are revelatory/surprising and carry mainly scientific value’. In 
performing my analysis and findings on my data set using the methodological 
framework described below, I will seek to address the gap in the value-creation 
literature referred to in chapter 3 and the gap in the social judgements literature 
referred to in chapter 4. As outlined in the discussion that follows, the 
methodological framework I use to examine my data set will assist me in 
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identifying the concepts, their interrelationship and the underlying logic that 
contextually explicates the salience of the interrelationship. 
Methodological Framework 
I use the Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) bidirectional inductive top-down model 
(see Figure 5.1) to systematically guide me in answering my research question, as 
outlined in Chapter 1: ‘How do host policymakers make sense of the base erosion 
phenomenon?’ I will address the methodological framework in four stages: (a) 
overview; (b) first-order codes; (c) from codes to second-order aggregate themes; 
and (d) from themes to aggregate dimensions. 
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 5 
   
 
95 
Figure 5.1 – Bidirectional inductive theorizing model 
Bidirectional iteration between data, levels and data 
Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) observe that a theorist’s prior knowledge and the 
scholarly context they bring to a research topic can both be factors that limit the 
researcher’s creative sensory representation of the phenomenon. In my case, I 
bring a practitioner’s scholarly context to the ‘base erosion’ phenomenon, which 
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has allowed me to access salient and high-quality data (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana, 2014), and to engage in credible in-depth discussion with respondent 
interviewees (Johnson & Rowlands, 2012). Gaining access to salient and high-
quality data enables the researcher to get much closer to the data in qualitative 
research and to improve the translation ‘of other persons’ words and actions’ 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p.49). I ground my work in an empirical data set, which 
is evident from the sequence of the stages of work explained below. I use 
foundational aspects of grounded theory method to expansively examine my data 
set including applying techniques of constant comparison, theoretical or axial 
coding, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation and theoretical sensitivity 
(O'Reilly, Paper & Marx, 2012). Whilst using these techniques to support my data 
enquiry, I do not holistically apply classical ground theory method (Walsh et al., 
2015), as my framework is the Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) model. The pragmatist 
paradigm and methodological framework support the selective use (Walsh et al., 
2015) of these grounded theory method techniques.  
I approached the research enquiry without a preconceived scholarly perspective 
(Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011) on the salient literature. My initial emphasis was on 
the contextual and cultural embeddedness of the base erosion phenomenon in 
corporate governance systems (Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003; Dalton, Hitt, 
Certo & Dalton, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989) and the complementary institutions of 
liberal market economy-styled capitalism (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Jackson & Deeg, 2008) prevailing in the home and host locations 
Notwithstanding this informative contextual and cultural background, my data set 
led me to explore the MNEs’ processes of internationalizing, the resource-based 
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 5 
   
 
97 
view of firm, their dynamic capabilities and the nation-states agenda-setting 
processes. The Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) framework is appealing because it 
emphasizes the recursive nature of working with the literature and data iteratively 
at each progressive stage, from selecting first-order codes to moving to second-
order categories and, thereafter onto aggregate themes. More recently, Corley & 
Schinoff (2017 p.9), inspired by the illustrative application of this methodological 
feature (Harrison & Rouse, 2014), explicated the repeated process of moving 
between data and literature at each progressive stage as ‘we paint a picture of a 
somewhat linear, well-ordered process. However, grounded theory methods 
encourage a practice that is actually nonlinear and somewhat disordered.’ 
Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011 p.362) refer to their inductive model as ‘top-down 
in that it is informed by the literature, but it is inductive in that it begins with the 
data’. This model gives the researcher the imagination and scope to debate and 
interrogate the data (Alvesson & Karreman, 2007; Weick, 1989), yet cumulatively 
build on the existing common vocabulary, concepts and themes (Welch, 
Rumyantseva & Hewerdine, 2016). That is to say, I do not approach the research 
data set naively as may be advocated in the classical grounded theory method 
(Locke, 2015), but rather I am alert to the vocabulary, concepts and themes that 
emerge from recursively moving from data to literature and vice versa. Shepherd 
& Sutcliffe (2011) observe that there are limitations in applying a unidirectional 
approach, whether it is an inductive bottom-up approach or a deductive top-down 
approach. A consequence of solely adopting a top-down deductive approach is that 
‘resulting theories are sometimes sterile, debatable, and unable to be widely tested 
(Weick, 1996)’ (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011, p.362). However, adopting solely an 
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inductive bottom-up approach can produce ‘resulting theories that lack scope, and 
abstraction (Glaser, 2001; Sandelowksi, 1997) and sometimes generalizability’ 
(Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011, p.362) because the methodology is more concerned 
with producing thick descriptions. 
As I move through the Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) model, I link the Gioia et 
al. (2012) notes to the model in order to provide a complete tracing of the 
theoretical progress and sensitizing that is happening at each stage of the research. 
In addition, I link the Ketokivi & Mantere (2010) strategies for inductive reasoning 
to the model to explicate how abductive reasoning is used to establish 
contextualized authenticity of reasoning. 
First-order codes 
As will be outlined below, there are three core data sets: (a) the transcripts from 
the 25 semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted by me face-to-face with the 
respondent interviewees; (b) the transcripts from the 27 respondent interrogees and 
witnesses that attended the PAC-UK (2012) and PAC-UK (2013) Public Hearings; 
and a set of 26 public documents that respondent interviewees made reference to 
during the conduct of the interviews together with the US and UK annual reports 
for Amazon, Google and Starbucks. The three core data sets were triangulated 
(Yin, 2014) as I started the process of selecting first-order codes. 
In selecting first-order codes, I heed Gioia et al.’s (2012) counsel ‘ to give voice 
to the informants in the early stages of data gathering and analysis and also to 
represent their voices prominently in the reporting of research’, thereby avoiding 
the use of template codes or presumed constructs. In this first stage of data 
interrogation, I adopt in-vivo text coding (Miles et al., 2014) on a MaxQDA 
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software platform, at the broadest level of incident or occurrence, using the 
constant comparison technique (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and memo notes (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008) for guiding the code content. By virtue of the open coding basis 
in this first stage, it is natural that the codes will tend to explode. Gioia et al. (2012) 
observe that there can easily be 50 to 100 first-order codes. 
In my first-order coding exercise, I reached a total of 80 first-order codes that 
later were collapsed into 66 first-order codes following work on developing the 
second-order themes. In applying the constant comparison technique or within 
code comparison, I tag and name data fragments, and using this technique I 
compare the incident, action or emotion in the data fragment to the next data 
fragment ensuring that I have captured the same and similar incident, action or 
emotion for each named code (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; O'Reilly et al., 2012). 
From codes to second-order themes 
By moving from first-order codes to literature, and from literature back to 
codes, I started to develop a sensory representation of emerging themes and 
patterns in the data. That is to say, the nature of sensory representation is to enable 
the researcher to maintain focus on a limited subset of data or as Shepherd & 
Sutcliffe (2011 p.365) state, ‘attention constructs a limited and temporal coherence 
field to capture the nature [of a concept, structure or theme] of the phenomenon’. 
Contrary to our belief that our brains maintain picture-like representations of an 
entire event or scene, Rensink (2000 p.17) explicates that our focused attention 
only ‘provides spatiotemporal coherence for the stable representation of one object 
at a time’.  That is to say, by focusing attention on a limited set of first-order codes, 
the field is stabilized, allowing the researcher to recursively move from this limited 
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set of first-order codes to the literature and vice versa, identifying features of 
similarity and fit, but now also identifying features of dissimilarity, divergence or 
omission (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011).  
In Chapter 6, I use the Gioia et al. (2012) dataflow diagrams to show how I 
moved from first-order codes to second-order themes in developing the concepts 
and constructs of the host policymakers’ perspective on MNEs’ value-creation and 
value-capture processes in internationalizing across host locations. In Chapters 7 
and 8, I again use the Gioia et al. (2012) dataflow diagrams similarly to show how 
host policymakers moved the base erosion discourse towards an open public 
deliberative process in order to engage in a sociopolitical legitimacy evaluation 
process. The dataflow diagrams assist the researcher in communicating the 
integrity of the methodological framework that grounds the concepts and 
constructs in the data. The next stage is to develop the conceptual representations, 
and this involves moving to the aggregate conceptual dimensions. 
From themes to aggregate conceptual dimensions 
In moving from second-order themes to aggregate conceptual dimensions, 
Shepherd & Sutcliffe (2011) note that it is the sensory representation of the themes 
in the data that informs the conceptual representation of the aggregate dimensions. 
It is then the conceptual representation at the aggregate dimension level that 
supports theory building, as guided by this recursive iterative process with the 
literature (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011). Gioia et al. 
(2012 p.20) observe that from the second-order theme flow onwards the researcher 
is ‘firmly in the theoretical realm, asking whether the emerging themes suggest 
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concepts that might help us describe and explain the phenomena…[and] even 
further into 2nd-order “aggregate dimensions”’. 
In the dataflow diagrams that I develop in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, I show how the 
second-order aggregate dimensions have conceptually evolved from second-order 
themes. The iterative recursive nature of moving from first-order codes to the 
literature and again from second-order codes to the literature and back, by 
implication indicates a second-order interpretation by the researcher that is 
influenced by the literature—the problem of the double hermeneutic. Hatch & 
Yanow (2008 p.37) explain the problem as ‘researchers interpret their subject’s 
interpretations and trace processes that are themselves the traces of others’ 
sensemaking (see also Geertz 1973 on interpretations of interpretations, and 1983: 
57 on emic-etic; and Schutz 1976 on first- and second-order constructs)’.  
There are at least two legitimate responses to the problem of the double 
hermeneutic. Firstly, provided the author explains the prescriptive rules of 
reasoning applied, then as explained by Mantere & Ketokivi (2013 p.74) 
‘Methodological rigor…is achieved through prescriptive evaluation… In such 
social processes, a scholarly community evaluates methodological rigor in light of 
local rules that stem from contextual methodological considerations and 
preferences.’ In this study, I use abductive reasoning to move to the aggregate 
conceptual dimension. Abductive reasoning (Martela, 2015; Paavola, 2004) is a 
mode of inference where explanations are searched for that are consistent with the 
context and provides the best fit (Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013). 
The second legitimate response is that the scholarly community that judges 
theoretical contributions only acknowledges novelty and scientific utility of 
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contributions that fill a gap in extant literature (Bansal & Corley, 2012; Corley & 
Gioia, 2011; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997). That is to say, the scholarly 
community or specifically a journal editor acknowledges theoretical contributions 
that ‘change, challenge, or fundamentally advance theory through insights on focal 
phenomena’ (Bansal & Corley, 2012 p.509). The conclusion that we can draw 
from the second legitimate response is that it is the academic community that gives 
legitimacy to acceptable hermeneutic practices in the social construction of 
theory—by producing scientific knowledge that addresses incompleteness, 
inadequacy or incommensurability of extant literature (Alvesson & Sandberg, 
2011; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997).  
The Data Set 
My data set comprises three separate components of triangulated data (see 
Figure 5.2), consisting of 25 face-to-face interviews with supporting field notes, 
27 participants’ transcripts extracted from the PAC Public Hearings held in the last 
quarter of 2012 and second quarter of 2013, and 26 interviewee data reference 
documents together with the home and host annual reports for Amazon, Google 
and Starbucks. 
 
Table 5.2 – Data set overview 
Description Source type Participants Pages 
Part 1 
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25 face-to-face interview 
transcripts 
Interviews FRC, ICAEW, IFRS, IIRC, 
PAC, HMT, HMRC, 
OECD, ONS 
403 
25 field notes on face-to-face 
interviews 
Written notes Self 57 
Part 2    
27 interrogees and witness 
transcripts 
PAC (2012) & 
(2013) public 
hearings 
PAC & NAO as 
interrogees; HMRC and 
foreign-HQ MNEs as 
witnesses 
137 
Part 3    
2013 Home HQ annual & 
quarterly reports: Amazon, 
Google & Starbucks 
Public archival 
records 
SEC (US) Portal 747 
2013 Host UK annual reports: 
Amazon, Google & Starbucks 
Public archival 
records 
UK Company House 98 
26 Interviewee data reference 
documents 
Public archival 
records & web 
portals 
Various 688 
Total   2,130 
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Semi-structured interviews 
I will firstly discuss the transcript data from the 25 semi-structured interviews 
conducted over a period of nine months, from August 2014 to April 2015, 
comprising 403 pages together with the fieldnotes comprising a further 57 pages. 
Around July 2014 before approaching my targeted respondent interviewees 
(Marzano, 2012), I prepared a precedent project information sheet and a participant 
consent form, and soon thereafter obtained ethical clearance from Warwick 
Business School (WBS) to commence my fieldwork. WBS expressed satisfaction 
that I had met ESRC’s ethics requirements (ESRC, 2012). 
My project information sheet outlined, in broad terms, my research question 
with a brief note on its problematization, my supervisors, my practitioner and 
researcher background and the contact details for all parties involved in my 
research project. The participant consent form outlined the rights of the participant 
(Marzano, 2012) to ask any questions on the scope of the research project, 
including the process of anonymizing transcripts at the earliest possible moment, 
having the freedom to withdraw at any stage and, in turn, granting the researcher 
the right to audio record the interview and to use the primary source data gathered 
for my thesis and for use in delivering conference papers and preparing academic 
journal articles. 
All respondent interviewees who participated in my research project co-signed 
the participant consent forms at the completion of each of the interviews. I have 
retained in locked safekeeping the original hardcopies of the consent forms. I have 
also scanned a soft copy set of the consent forms into a separate folder on the 
MaxQDA platform (Silver & Lewins, 2014; Yin, 2014). But for a few participants, 
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the majority were not concerned about anonymity. Notwithstanding the openness 
of the public debate and general indifference expressed by the majority, in 
compliance with the undertakings given, I anonymized the transcripts as soon as 
these primary source materials were in a form suitable to be exported to the 
MaxQDA platform. One respondent requested that the inclusion of context in 
examples divulged be handled sensitively—namely that: ‘But if you then say 
you're a FTSE 100 company in the oil or gas industry, there's only two people it 
could apply to.’ Another respondent requested prior consent be sought should 
direct quotes be extracted from his audio transcript data. And in the third instance, 
the respondent interviewee was visibly uncomfortable with the presence and 
process of audio recording. In each instance, I have given due consideration to the 
requests and sensitivities of the respondents (Roulston, deMarrais & Lewis, 2003) 
in the course of analyzing and reporting on my empirical material. This has not 
limited in any way, my research design, analysis of the empirical material, or 
theorizing thereon.  
Immediately following the conclusion of each in-depth interview, I prepared 
my handwritten field notes, independent of my audio recordings of the interviews. 
On most occasions, I was able to occupy the interview room, otherwise I chose the 
nearest convenient coffee shop.  The purpose of my handwritten field notes post-
interview was to record those salient features (Wolfinger, 2002) that stood out in 
the interview, and to enable me to revisit and reflect on my literature streams 
(Alvesson, 2003; Van Maanen, Sorenson & Mitchell, 2007). I subsequently typed 
up my post-interview field notes and uploaded them to a separate MaxQDA folder.  
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As well as acknowledging any respondent interviewee sensitivities, this process 
allowed me to critically evaluate responses in the context of the respondents’ 
positions as holders of office, their professional appointments, their functional 
areas of expertise, and the cultural and value systems that they represent. In this 
context, I have marked and tracked for constant comparison (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011) and analytical reflexive purposes (Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2007; Roulston, 2012) the attributes relating to the individual 
respondent’s appointment, the regulator type and the functional area of expertise. 
For the appointment attribute, I distinguish respondents who hold full-time 
executive appointments from those who hold non-executive nominated 
appointments. The non-executive respondents were either career non-executives, 
holding other non-executive capital market board appointments or career 
executives in top management appointments. For the regulator-type attribute, I 
distinguish whether the institution is a government agency, an inter-governmental 
authority, or a self-regulated association. The functional areas of expertise that are 
represented in my transcript data set are the specialist domains of accounting, 
taxation and agenda-setting in public policy activities undertaken within and 
across these functional areas of expertise. 
In order to understand how policymakers and regulators perceive the ways in 
which MNEs engage in the base erosion phenomenon, I decided to concentrate on 
the institutions that formulate and implement rules and regulations that promote, 
govern and sanction MNE organizational behaviour. The institutions that perform 
a distinctive role in influencing MNE organizational behaviour include the 
regulatory agencies, inter-governmental authorities and various self-regulated 
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associations. Taking the UK as one of the advanced host nation-states affected by 
the base erosion phenomenon, I approached representatives from the following 
regulatory institutions – the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), Her Majesty’s 
Treasury (HMT), HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the Public Accounts 
Committee of the UK’s House of Commons (PAC), the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS), The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) and 
their host HMT/HMRC Tax Administration Research Centre (TARC) in the UK 
(see Figure 5.3 for legend explaining respondent attributes).  
It is important to acknowledge the interconnectedness of the policymakers and 
regulators in this field (Aram, 1989; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings, 2002). Many of the non-executive appointees on various FRC 
committees or boards are either career non-executive directors on the boards of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, or hold an executive director 
office on the boards of their organization, independent of the FRC. For example, 
respondent RP05-GXA is both an FRC representative who presently holds three 
non-executive office appointments with companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and has previously held CEO executive appointments. The same 
situation relates to the IASB, the ICAEW, the IIRC and OECD. For example, in 
the case of the OECD, it has representatives from HMT/HMRC on its working 
committees for the OECD BEPS Project (the case in point here is respondent 
RP14-GEP). Also, within the structure of a regulator like the FRC, I ensured I had 
representative voices across all levels of its policymaking process, from the 
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Accounting Council, to the Codes and Standards Committee, to the FRC Board. 
In some instances, a respondent may be on more than one committee or council 
within the FRC. For example, in my research project, respondent RP01-GEA is on 
both the Codes and Standards Committee and the FRC Board, and RP03-GXA is 
on both the Accounting Council and the FRC Board. 
Table 5.3 – Legend explaining respondent attributes 
Abbreviation Respondent types No. 
RP The interviewees face-to-face 25 
RQ The interrogees at PAC hearings 18 
RW The witnesses at PAC hearings 9 
 Sub-total 52 
 
Participant attributes   
Legend Stakeholder-type No. 
G Governmental agencies 35 
S Self-regulatory authorities 12 
I Inter-governmental agencies 2 
O Multinational, overseas business unit 3 
 Sub-total 52 
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Legend Office holder-type No. 
E Executive office holder 44 
X Non-executive office holder 8 
 Sub-total 52 
Legend Organizational field No. 
A Corporate reporting / accounting 7 
C MNE parent corporate headquarters 3 
T Taxation / international tax conventions 9 
N Information intermediaries 4 
P Public policy / agenda setting 29 
 Sub-total 52 
 
The spectrum of the FRC’s policy process covers committees identifying 
agenda-setting matters, councils for carrying out the research and drafting or so-
called ‘heavy-lifting’, and the FRC Board that has the final say in approving new 
codes and standards for implementation. My sampling and selection process has 
not been random, but has been purposive (Beitin, 2012) in order to represent rich 
knowledge about my research question. To enhance the multiple perspectives in 
my research, I have supplemented my primary source interviews with secondary-
sourced PAC transcript data.  
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Public hearings transcripts 
The public hearings transcripts, comprising 137 pages, constitute the 27 
respondent interrogees and respondent witnesses that attended the PAC-UK (2012) 
public hearing in the House of Commons at Westminster Palace on Monday, 5th 
November 2012 and Monday, 12th November 2012 and the PAC-UK (2013) held 
on Thursday, 16 May 2013. At the 5th November public hearing, the witnesses 
under examination were: Lin Homer, HMRC Chief Executive and Permanent 
Secretary and senior HMRC officers. The National Audit Office (NAO) 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Amyas Morse, and the NAO’s senior officers 
were in attendance by invitation. 
At the 12th November hearing, the witnesses under examination were: Troy 
Alstead, Starbucks Global CFO; Andrew Cecil, Director of Public Policy; and 
Matt Brittin, Google VP for Sales and Operations, Northern and Central Europe. 
At the 16th May 2013 public hearing, the witnesses were John Dixon, Head of 
Tax, Ernst & Young, Matt Britten, Lin Homer and Jim Harra, Director General, 
Business Tax, HMRC. Again, in attendance by invitation were the NAO 
Comptroller and Auditor General, together with senior NAO officers. 
By triangulating the three core sources of data (see Figure 5.4 for list of 
respondent interviewees, interrogees and witnesses by stakeholder type), I have 
been able to reach the threshold of theoretical saturation within the first-order 
codes. Although theoretical saturation may be difficult to define (Beitin, 2012), 
Corbin & Strauss (2008, p.113) provide the following guidance: ‘It means taking 
each category and spelling out in considerable detail its properties and dimensions, 
including variation. It requires a lot of memo writing and a very conscious effort 
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to fill in gaps in data.’ The result is that any further data gathering beyond 
theoretical saturation adds little to the conceptualization process, other than 
possible ‘variations [that] can always be discovered’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, 
p.263).  
For data composition purposes, I approached respondents with specialist 
knowledge (Beitin, 2012; Miles et al., 2014) in policymaking fields across 
corporate governance codes and standards, financial accounting and corporate 
disclosure as well as professional actors in the domains of international standards 
setting, financial information intermediation and corporate taxation. The emphasis 
on purposive or theoretical sampling was to select respondents not only for their 
specialist knowledge, but also for their institutional roles in policymaking, 
corporate disclosure and corporate taxation. The composition of the data set should 
persuasively represent respondents who are immersed in grappling with the 
phenomenon. Becker (1998, p.67) explains the rationale for data set composition 
as ‘it would be better to say that sampling is a kind of synecdoche, in which we 
want the part of a population or organization or system we have studied to be taken 
to represent, meaningfully the whole from which it was drawn’.  
Table 5.4 – List of respondent interviewees, interrogees and witnesses by 
stakeholder type 
RESPONDENT  Committee Position 
Government agencies (G) 
   
RP01-GEA 
 
G 
                                                           
FRC Codes & Standards, FRC Board 
Exec 
Director 
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RP02-GXA G FRC Accounting Council Member 
RP03-GXA G FRC Accounting Council Chair 
RP05-GXA G FRC Codes & Standards Chair 
RP010-GET G SA Revenue Services CFO 
RP11-GEP 
 
G 
                                                         
Public Accounts Committee 
MP, 
Member 
RP14-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
HMT Bus & International Tax 
Dep. 
Director 
RP16-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Committee member 
MP, 
Member 
RP17-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
HMT Bus & International Tax 
Sen. 
Advisor 
RP22-GET 
 
G 
                                                        
HMRC – Tax Policy BEPS 
Sen. 
Advisor 
RP23-GEP G ONS Industry Classifications Manager 
RP24-GEP G ONS Industry Classifications Statistician 
RQ26-GEP G PAC – Chair MP, Chair 
RQ27-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 5 
   
 
113 
RQ28-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ29-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ30-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ31-GEP G NAO – National Audit Comptroller 
RQ32-GEP G NAO – National Audit Director 
RQ33-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
DWP – Financial Audit 
Fin. 
Director 
RQ34-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
NAO – National Audit 
Treasury 
Officer 
RW35-GEP 
 
G 
                                                         
HMRC – Tax Admin 
Chief 
Executive 
RW36-GEP 
 
G 
                                                       
HMRC – Tax Admin 
DG, 
Benefits 
RW37-GEP 
 
G 
                                                       
HMRC – Tax Admin 
Chief Fin. 
Officer 
RW38-GEP 
 
G 
                                                         
HMRC – Tax Admin 
Tax Ass. 
Officer 
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RQ39-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ40-GEP 
G PAC – Member MP, 
Member 
RQ41-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ42-GEP 
 
G 
                                                           
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ43-GEP 
 
G 
                                                          
NAO – National Audit 
Asst. A-
Gen. 
RQ44-GEP G NAO – National Audit Alt. A-Gen. 
RQ48-GEP 
 
G 
                                                          
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RQ49-GEP 
 
G 
                                                              
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
RW51-GEP 
 
G 
                                                       
HMRC – Tax Admin 
Dir. 
General 
RW52-GEP 
 
G 
                                                            
PAC – Member 
MP, 
Member 
Inter-governmental 
agencies (I) 
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RP20-IET 
    
I 
                                                         
OECD – Centre for Tax Policy 
Head, 
Policy 
RP21-IET 
   
I 
                                                         
OECD – Centre for Tax Policy 
Head, 
Treaties 
MNE HQ Representatives 
(O) 
   
RW45-OEC O Foreign-HQ MNE, Starbucks CFO 
RW46-OEC 
O Foreign-HQ MNE, Amazon Dir. Public 
Policy 
RW47-OEC 
 
O 
                                                         
Foreign-HQ MNE, Google 
VP Sales 
EU 
Self-regulatory authorities 
(S) 
   
RP04-SEP 
   
S 
                                                              
IFS –Capital & productivity 
Sen. 
Economist 
RP06-SXT S TARC – Tax Admin Research Member 
RP07-SXT 
S TARC – Tax Admin Research Team 
Leader 
RP08-SXT S TARC – Tax Admin Research Member 
RP09-SEA S IFRS Standards Advisory Forum Manager 
RP12-SXA S ICAEW Accounting Council Chair 
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RP13-SXN S IMA/FRC Accounting Council Member 
RP15-SEN S IMA/FRC Accounting Council Member 
RP18-SEN S Investment Analyst – Sell-side Manager 
RP19-SEN S Investment Analyst – Buy-side Member 
RP25-SEA S IIRC Integrated Reporting CSO 
RW50-SET S Ernst & Young – Big 4 Accounting Head of Tax 
 
Interviewee data references 
The third core source of data comprise the MNEs’ home location annual reports, 
consisting of 747 pages, the MNEs’ host location annual reports, consisting of 98 
pages, and the 26 documents referred to by respondents during the conduct of 
interviews, comprising 688 pages (see Figure 5.5). 
I used the reporting calendar year of 2013 to re-construct and contrast how the 
US-headquartered parent of Amazon portrayed its economic engagement in the 
overseas UK market with how its UK subsidiary viewed and expressed such 
economic participation. My secondary source data for Amazon comprise the three 
10-Q quarterly reports issued by Amazon.com, Inc. (incorporated in Delaware, 
USA) for the quarters ended 31st March 2013, 30th June 2013 and 30th September 
2013, and filed with the US’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It also 
comprises the 10-K annual report filed with the SEC for Amazon.com, Inc. for the 
year ended 31st December 2013. In relation to the UK, my secondary source data 
comprise the 2013 annual report for Amazon.co.uk Ltd and its 2013 annual return 
for the year ending 31st December 2013, lodged with the UK’s Companies House.  
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 5 
   
 
117 
I used similar data sources for the 2013 reporting calendar year for Google to 
re-construct and contrast the association of US parent headquarters’ reporting from 
that made by the UK host subsidiary. That is, for Google, they comprise the three 
10-Q quarterly reports issued by Google Inc. (incorporated in Delaware, USA) for 
the quarters ended 31st March 2013, 30th June 2013 and 30th September 2013 and 
filed with the USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It also 
comprises the 10-K annual report filed with the SEC for Google Inc. for the year 
ending 31st December 2013. In relation to the UK, my secondary source data 
comprise the 2013 annual report for Google.co.uk Ltd and its 2013 annual return 
for the year ended 31st December 2013 lodged with the UK’s Companies House. 
Since Starbucks Corporation was integral to the UK public hearings and many 
of the respondents also made mention of it, I have repeated the exercise for the US 
parent headquarters’ reporting by Starbucks Corporation (incorporated in 
Washington, US) and its UK subsidiary, Starbucks Coffee Company (UK) Ltd. 
Documents that respondents made reference to during the interview sessions 
were uploaded to a separate MaxQDA folder, which included the UK’s Corporate 
Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2014c), UK’s Stewardship Code 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012), UK’s Guidance on the Strategic Report 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2014a), an extract from QC George Bompass’ 
Opinion (UK Parliamentary Commission for Banking Standards, 2013), the 
updated ‘True and Fair View’ Opinion given by Martin Moore QC (2013), the 
UK’s affirmed position on ‘True and Fair’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2014b) 
and the Myner Review (Myner, 2001). In relation to activist organizations 
mentioned by respondents, I include the descriptive web portal extracts from the 
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‘About’ pages for Occupy London (2011), UK Uncut (2010), Tax Justice Network 
(2003) and the Richard Murphy Tax Research UK (2003).  
From an international perspective, I include international reporting standards 
that were made specific reference to in the course of the interviews: namely, the 
IASB Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2010), the Related Party Disclosures (IAS 
24, 2009), the Operating Segments (IFRS 8, 2007), the Consolidated Financial 
Statements (IFRS 10, 2011), the Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities (IFRS 12, 
2011), the Revenue From Contracts With Customers (IFRS 15, 2014) and the 
International Integrated Reporting Council (2013) Framework. In relation to the 
inter-governmental agencies, I include the OECD (2013) report on addressing base 
erosion and profit shifting, the OECD (2014a) report on the tax challenges of the 
digital economy, the follow-up report giving emphasis to consensual approaches, 
the OECD (2015j) report on artificial avoidance of physical economic presence, 
the OECD (2015i) report on neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, the OECD (2015c) report on countering harmful tax practices by 
nation-states, and the OECD (2015d) report on MNE country-by-country reporting 
guidelines. 
Table 5.5 – List of the 26 interviewee data reference documents 
Doc # Description Context Pages Sum 
1 UK Budget: 2013 Base erosion 44  
2 UK Autumn Statement: 2014 Base erosion 45  
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3 John F. Kennedy: 1961 Special 
Message to Congress 
Base erosion 17 106 
     
4 Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting: 2010 
Corporate reporting 40  
5 International <IR> Framework: 
2013 
Corporate reporting 45  
6 FRC Guidance on the Strategic 
Report: 2014 
Corporate reporting 60  
7 IFRS 8 Operating Segments: 2007 Corporate reporting 9  
8 IFRS 8 Operating Segments: 2013 Corporate reporting 12  
9 IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial 
Statements: 2011 
Corporate reporting 5  
10 IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in 
other entities: 2011 
Corporate reporting 28  
11 IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts 
with Customers: 2014 
Corporate reporting 36  
12 IAS 24 Related-party Disclosures: 
2009 
Corporate reporting 7 242 
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13 FRC – The Corporate Governance 
Code: 2014 
Governance logics 36  
14 FRC – The UK Stewardship Code: 
2012 
Governance logics 14  
15 FRC – True and Fair Statement: 
2014 
Governance logics 8  
16 Martin Moore QC Opinion: 2013 Governance logics 26  
17 Parliamentary Commission for 
Banking Standards: Written 
Evidence from LAPFF 2013, 
incorporating George Bompass QC 
Opinion: 2013 
Governance logics 23  
18 LAPFF Associations respond to 
FRC’s True and Fair Statement– A 
long-term shareholder perspective: 
2014 
Governance logics 4 
 
111 
     
19 OECD (2013) Addressing Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Inter-governmental 
mediation 
44  
20 OECD (2014a) Action 1: 
Addressing the Tax Challenges of 
the Digital Economy 
Inter-governmental 
mediation 
89  
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21 OECD (2014c) Action 13: Guidance 
on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and Country-by-Country Reporting 
Inter-governmental 
mediation 
36  
22 OECD (2015a) Action 1: 
Addressing the Challenges of the 
Digital Economy 
Inter-governmental 
mediation 
48 217 
     
23 Richard Murphy Tax Research UK Social movements 3  
24 Tax Justice Network: Web portal Social movements 3  
25 Occupy London: Web portal Social movements 3  
26 UK Uncut: Web portal Social movements 3 12 
 Total   688 
     
 
Conclusion 
Significant practical progress has been made in making sense of the form, 
nature and extent of the disruption created by the base erosion phenomenon over 
the last three years, starting with the call by host nation-states in early 2013 for 
international collaboration (OECD, 2013) to measure and monitor the extent of 
this phenomenon, and finishing with a multiple set of positional statements 
(OECD, 2015f). The positional statements, as prepared by the inter-governmental 
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 5 
   
 
122 
agency OECD, recommend specific policy changes that should be implemented at 
a domestic nation-state level, at a bilateral cross-country level and at a multilateral 
level (OECD, 2015e). 
Whereas there has been much theory-testing on policy outcomes that have 
failed to meet legislative and regulatory policy aims (Dischinger & Riedel, 2010; 
Karkinsky & Riedel, 2009), there has been little or no theory-building on the base 
erosion phenomenon and how host policymakers make sense of MNEs’ processes 
of internationalization across host locations. By adopting the research 
methodological frame outlined herein, I will be to obtain a much deeper and richer 
understanding of the base erosion phenomenon as experienced by host 
policymakers. My aim is to fill the gaps in the literature that I identified in Chapter 
3, by theoretically conceptualizing the MNEs’ value-creation frameworks as 
perceived by host policymakers, and that I identified in Chapter 4, by theoretically 
conceptualizing a sociopolitical legitimation mode to challenge taken-for-granted 
orthodoxy on MNE corporate financial disclosures and their corporate tax policy 
outcomes. 
Finally, in this chapter, I have explicated a synthesized Shepherd & Sutcliffe 
(2011) framework to undertake phenomenon-driven research. The synthesized 
inductive framework comprised three distinct stages: a bottom-up grounded theory 
method to create first-order codes (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Gioia et al., 2012); a 
top-down literature-informed enquiry (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Shepherd & 
Sutcliffe, 2011); and using abductive reasoning to establish a contextualized 
authenticity in theoretical conceptualization (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010; Mantere 
& Ketokivi, 2013).  
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In the next chapter, I will discuss the analysis of my data and findings, firstly, 
on the principles of and tensions involved in internationalizing and, secondly, 
explicate the host policymakers’ perspective on the value-creation and value-
capture processes of those foreign-headquartered MNEs that are more inclined to 
engage in base erosion.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 6 – Analysis and Findings on MNE Internationalizing Process 
under Base Erosion 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss, firstly, my analysis and findings on the principles 
and tensions that underlie the governance modes implemented by MNE groups in 
internationalizing across host locations, and, secondly, the host policymakers’ 
perspective on the value-creation and value-capture processes of those foreign-HQ 
MNEs that are more inclined to engaged in base erosion practices. I use the data 
set, as more fully described in Chapter 5, to first of all examine how UK host 
policymakers problematized the multinationalizing process of foreign-HQ MNEs 
perceived as being integrally involved in the base erosion phenomenon (Ault, 
Schon & Shay, 2014; Dharmapala, 2014; Dischinger & Riedel, 2010). In this 
chapter, I work from the data to develop the first-order codes, second-order themes 
and the aggregate dimension of the host policymakers’ view on MNEs’ value-
creation frameworks in internalizing across host locations. See Figure 6.1 for an 
illustration of the second-order interpretation of the dataflow on internationalizing 
principles/tensions and value-creation process. 
It is only when we understand the principles of and tensions involved in 
internationalizing, and how host policymakers problematized this 
multinationalizing process and strategic behaviours (Avi-Yonah, 2008; Friedman, 
2007), that the researcher is able to analyze the governance logics, the dynamic 
capabilities of MNEs and how host policymakers respond to stakeholder conflict 
resolution. The research findings and an analysis of the methods used by host 
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policymakers to challenge MNEs’ base erosion practices and frame policy 
solutions will be dealt with separately in Chapters 7 and 8. 
In terms of the principles and tensions of multinationalizing, three core features 
emerge from the findings. These features are: the need for MNEs to acquire and 
maintain legitimacy in host locations (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005); and the MNE reliance on procedural legitimacy by 
adopting a rules-based expression (Baker & Hayes, 2004; Hines, 1988; Suzuki, 
2003), whilst coping with the tensions of globalized competition that demands a 
system of borderless corporate reporting (Agmon, 2003; Buckley & Ghauri, 2004; 
Healy & Palepu, 2001) by MNEs. 
As an overview to the second-order themes that emerged from the analysis and 
findings on MNE value creation across host location, see Table 6.0 below. 
 
Table 6.0 – Overview of second-order themes of MNE value-creation frameworks 
from host policymakers’ perspective 
Aggregate dimension Second-order themes Illustrations 
   
Field legitimacy Principles/tensions guiding MNE base 
erosion across host locations 
See Figure 6.1 
   
MNE Value creation Involving the processes of 
internationalizing, arbitrage and 
mobilizing 
See Figure 6.1 
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MNE Value capture Involving the processes of  
fragmenting, captive insourcing, 
valorizing and consolidating 
See Figure 6.2 
   
 
Note: Table 6.0 is a summary guide to the key concepts emerging and developed in this chapter. 
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Figure 6.1 – Dataflow on internationalizing principles/tensions and value-creation 
process  
Note: Figure 6.1 links an extract of the first-order codes to: (i) the principles guiding MNE 
base erosion; and (ii) public stakeholders’ view on MNEs’ value-creation process. 
 
As regards the host policymakers’ perspective of MNEs value-creation and 
capture framework as a researcher’s second-order interpretation (Hatch & Yanow, 
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2008; Heracleous & Hendry, 2000), seven key sub-processes (Sandberg, Loacker 
& Alvesson, 2015) emerge from the findings. The sub-processes that characterize 
elements of MNE value creation and mechanisms of MNE value capture involved 
fragmenting (Dunning, 2003; Williamson, 1991), captive insourcing and 
offshoring (Leiblein, 2002; Mayer & Salomon, 2006), internationalizing 
(Contractor, Sumit & Chin-Chun, 2003; Hennart, 2007), mobilizing (Dischinger 
& Riedel, 2010; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2009), arbitraging (Lohse & Riedel, 2013; 
Spicer, 1988), valorizing (Avi-Yonah, 2008; Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008) 
and consolidating (Clarke & Dean, 1993; Maroun & Van Zijl, 2016). See Figure 
6.2 for an illustration of the dataflow in the MNE value-capture process as a 
second-order interpretation. 
Principles and Tensions in Internationalizing 
Overview 
My fieldwork shows how UK policymakers selected for scrutiny large foreign-
HQ MNEs, took evidence, and examined the host location operations of 
Amazon.com, Google and Starbucks situated in the UK. I analyzed the interviewee 
transcript data, the interrogees and witnesses transcript data from the public 
hearings (PAC-UK, 2012, 2013) and the archival data that my interviewees made 
reference to, together with the annual and quarterly reports filed by these MNEs, 
in order to extract the principles/tensions underlying the multinationalization 
process. All three foreign-HQ MNEs vigorously defended their organizational 
structures implemented outside their home nation-state. More pertinently, all three 
MNEs vigorously defended the legitimacy of self-selecting geographically where 
and structurally how to locate their economic activities. 
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The basis of these legitimacy claims (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995) 
were that the strategic arrangement of their economic activities conformed to the 
institutionalized norms (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), values and beliefs of the host 
jurisdiction. Secondly, the symbolic approach of the foreign-HQ MNEs in 
adhering to rules-based expression (Patriotta, Gond & Schultz, 2011) has 
intentionally been applied as a safe harbour buffer (Messner, 2009) against the 
legitimacy challenges. That is, MNE legitimacy is justified through expression of 
conformity with established rules and norms.  Thirdly, as organizational 
environments become more global, with MNEs’ subunits and intermediary units 
engaging in economic activities that extend beyond multiple borders (Agmon, 
2003; Buckley & Ghauri, 2004), contradictory demands (Smith & Lewis, 2011) 
are imposed on  foreign-headquartered MNEs.  
Legitimacy 
Acquiring and maintaining legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) through 
conformity with rules is based on the principle or ‘work of justification’ (Patriotta 
et al., 2011), which is justification through procedural conformity to established 
rules and practices (Folger & Konovsky, 1989). Taking an extract from the first-
order code on acquiring and maintaining legitimacy, RW47-OEC justified 
management’s position at the PAC-UK (2012) hearings, stating: 
 
 We comply with the law in the UK. It would be very hard for us to pay more 
tax here based on the way we are required to structure by the system. Tax is 
not a matter of personal choice, but a matter of following the law and the rules, 
which is what we do. It is complicated internationally, but we follow the law 
in every country in which we operate. 
Orlando J. Fernandes                                                                                        Chapter 6 
   
 
130 
 
When pressed by the PAC chair on whether the firm’s choice of structure 
amounts to avoiding UK tax within the remit of the law, RW47-OEC again 
defended the legitimacy of the firm’s choice of structure, responding: ‘No. What I 
am saying is that we pay the tax required in every company in every country in 
which we operate... I cannot comment on the hypothetical proposal. We run the 
business in a robust way. We think we do it in a way that is appropriate. It is 
certainly legal.’ 
Suddaby & Greenwood (2005) affirm the rhetorical strategies that 
organizations engage in to acquire and maintain legitimacy through the use of 
institutional vocabularies and theorizations on justification work. Those 
vocabularies are about compliance and conformity, whilst work of justification is 
about serving customers’ needs and paying all dues and imposts wherever arising. 
As expressed by RW46-OEC, ‘We set up our business across Europe for the 
benefit of our tens of millions of customers and sellers across Europe. We pay all 
applicable taxes in all jurisdictions.’ New organizations, particularly those linked 
to emerging industries (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), have to gain 
legitimacy in order to enter and capture value from their economic activity. It is 
not only new organizations and emerging industries, but also well-established 
organizations that need to maintain their legitimacy, particularly on gaining entry 
into multiple host environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Prior research has 
recognized that foreign operating subunits of MNEs will face greater challenges 
to their legitimacy from host environments. This may be due to stereotyping or 
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liability of foreignness, MNE size and visibility, or the domino effect of being 
challenged by other host environments (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
In the case of the three MNEs that gave evidence before the PAC-UK (2012) 
public hearings, all are well-established organizations. Amazon.com was listed on 
Nasdaq on May 15, 1997, achieving sales of US$147.8m in its first year of listing 
(Amazon.com, 2013). Jeff Bezos founded the entrepreneurial internet start-up in 
July 1995 (Stone, 2013). After 20 years of commercial enterprise, Amazon.com 
had achieved global sales of US$74.4bn by end of December 31, 2013 
(Amazon.com, 2013). Google was listed on Nasdaq on August 19, 2004. Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin founded the internet search engine enterprise in 1998, 
following the breakthrough work of Berners-Lee in inventing the World Wide 
Web in 1990 (Castells, 2002; Levy, 2011). After 15 years of monetizing its search 
engine business model, Google had achieved global sales of US$59.8bn (Google 
Inc, 2013). The third organization under scrutiny was Starbucks, founded in March 
1971 with Howard Schultz joining it shortly after its start-up. Starbucks went 
public by listing on the Nasdaq in 1992 with 165 stores. By September 29, 2013 
Starbucks had 10,194 company-owned stores, 9,573 licensed stores and global 
sales of US$14.9bn (Starbucks Corporation, 2013). 
Rules-based expression 
Legitimacy and rules-based expression are related concepts. Organizations 
maintain legitimacy by complying, or more pertinently, by working on 
justifications of procedural compliance. Rules can be either elective or 
prescriptive. Where elective, organizations will make decisions and communicate 
how they have exercised their discretion. In the context of multinationalizing 
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decisions, MNEs can choose how to allocate, to configure, to integrate and to 
report on the economic activities and social processes of their domestic and foreign 
operating subunits. Citing an extract from the first-order code on rules-based 
expression, flexibility within rules, RP02-GXA commented on the process in 
applying IFRS rules: ‘They say do what the rules say and then show me the rule.’ 
For example, in applying the elective rules under IFRS 8 (2007) on operating 
segments, RP02-GXA noted: 
 
It's the question of how the management discovered and determined what is 
the most sensible way of monitoring performance and monitoring the 
performance of the individual segments of their business. If they decided that 
there is a particular parameter on which they've defined that segment, and they 
monitor it period on period, well that's what they'll report. Now, how the 
management of the consolidated entity monitors versus how the more granular 
management at an individual UK company entity monitors can be quite 
different, because at an individual entity level, my segments could be different. 
 
Pertinently, the elective rules in IFRS 8 (2007) give HQ management (Hermann 
& Thomas, 2000) the discretion to communicate how they intend to delineate their 
operating units and subunits both in home and in host environments. 
Emphasizing this relation between rules-based expression and legitimacy, 
RP25-SEA commented: ‘So much of corporate decision making today and 
corporate disclosure is about compliance. It isn't about communication; it isn't 
about managing businesses in a better way. It's about, “Do we meet the rules?” 
And actually, if you say to a lot of businesses around the world, and there are some 
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exceptions, there's some really progressive and good businesses, but if you say to 
some CEOs, “Why don't you disclose more about yourself?” They'll say, “Why 
should we disclose more than we have to? Why should we ever disclose more than 
we're told to by our regulators?’” RP05-GXA re-emphasizes the literal use of 
rules-based expression: 
 
I give you another example, just real. Is that you try and follow goodwill 
impairment testing through accounts. And you have no chance… from year to 
year, there's a value on the balance sheet, 100, let's say. They would do a 
goodwill impairment test of that asset to see if the CGU [cash generating unit] 
has got the cash generating ability to formally meet the rule. Last year, they 
got an answer, 500. So 100 was okay. This year they got around 250, so 100 
was okay. Now, to your economic value question, it's doubtful that the asset 
really halved in value because it went from 500 to 250 per the sum. 
 
As far as prescriptive rules are concerned, boundaries are set as to what is 
permissible or legitimate and what will constitute a breach of the rules (Gracia & 
Oats, 2012). RW35-GET reframed the regulator’s dilemma when administering 
prescriptive rules: ‘The second question you asked is about the application of the 
law. All that HMRC can do and all that you would want us to do is apply the laws. 
I acknowledge that in an international setting, multinational businesses can choose, 
to some extent, where some parts of their business are based and where some of 
their profits are based. As I acknowledged in front of the TSC, I think that that is 
hard for individuals to understand. It is one reason why the Chancellor and his 
colleagues want to make sure that OECD stays ahead of that game and does not 
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allow an inappropriate amount of moving-around activity that would undermine 
the good tax systems of most of the countries involved.’  
Conduct that is based on the principle of rules-based expression, whether 
bounded by prescription or by discretion, does not inhibit creativity or decision 
opportunities (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972). As Hines (1988) and Suzuki (2003) 
theorized, converting economic reality into an artefact of accounting is conditioned 
by what is sought to be expressed. RP11-GEP alludes to MNEs’ creativity in rules-
based expression: 
 
I mean, I suppose it's a truism that rules are often there to be bent, and I don't 
mean that in an illegal sense. I think you're right; they were very clever people 
looking at how you worked within the rules, but maximized your profit and 
minimized your tax responsibility. And frankly, I just think we were all 
amazed that you could pretend—as we saw it—that the contract was between 
somebody and me in Luxembourg—or some company in Luxembourg. And 
really, Amazon and Dunfermline, for example, which is a big distribution 
place was only the delivery mechanism. 
 
Where creativity in rules-based expression is procedurally justifiable, but leads 
to unintended or unreasonable outcomes, stakeholders’ evaluation of an 
organization’s legitimacy is intensified. The evaluative stance on organizational 
legitimacy moves beyond an assessment of compliance or conformity and instead 
shifts towards a contested justification of the logic and the fair-mindedness. 
However, the initial reaction of inter-field actors is to resist a justification based 
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on fair-mindedness, instead demanding certainty in rule-making, RP08-SXT 
remarking: 
 
In the context of Amazon, try to explain to somebody that a warehouse is not 
recognized for tax purposes in the UK because dozens and dozens of countries 
around the world have agreed that to be the case. When they live in a house 
that's only a mile from the biggest warehouse they've ever seen full of books 
that is shipping them out to customers, they say, “What? That's not a tax 
presence? Of course, it's a tax presence.” But they haven't understood, have 
they? They haven't understood the technicality of a warehouse is simply not 
included within the definition of PE [permanent establishment]. That's very 
different from being told that these people have cheated. 
 
But over time, the justification of procedural conformity and technical certainty 
in rules become contested by evaluative assessments of equity and fairness. An 
information intermediary, RP15-SEN, observed: ‘Because they're effectively 
gaming things to suit themselves. And I think it could come back and bite them.’ 
No borders for corporations and accounts 
Corporations have one place of incorporation, their home HQ, but have no 
borders when creating and capturing economic value globally (Guenther & Young, 
2000). This introduces the third principle of globalization and competition in 
internalizing. These three principles of internationalizing in seeking host location 
legitimacy, justifying a rules-based expression and coping with global competition 
individually draw on the dynamic capabilities of the firm. However, when viewed 
jointly, these three principles expose the paradoxical tensions that MNEs 
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dynamically cope with in delivering performance and success (Smith & Lewis, 
2011). 
Taking an extract from the first-order code on no borders to company accounts 
& corporate reporting, respondent RP02-GXA commented on the role of MNEs in 
global trade facilitation: ‘Frankly, companies these days, businesses these days, 
have no borders. Investors have no borders. Money has no borders. It's all border-
less. As an investor, I think as the company, I am very much interested in getting 
consistent separate accounting principles so that I can raise money in a border-less 
fashion, because I operate in a border-less fashion.’ The consequence of 
corporations having no borders in global value creation and value capture creates 
the problem of attributing profits to competing nation-states (Lepak, Smith & 
Taylor, 2007). 
Each nation-state has a stake in the financial accounting and corporate taxation 
conventions that direct profit attribution claims with reference to the location or to 
multiple locations where the economic activity occurs. Respondent RP04-SEP 
analyzed the challenge of directing profit attribution claims as: 
 
You can write down how many people are employed in different locations. 
You can write down where all of your factories are, where all of your 
intellectual property is held. You can have the full view of the company, full 
information—brilliant. Then you have profit and you still have to allocate that 
profit to this man versus that man, versus this woman, versus that piece of 
intellectual property, versus this building and then you have that same idea. 
Even if you know where the physical things are, you still can't attribute, 
necessarily the value, and you're still back to having to work out how much 
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value is associated with each different element. I think knowing just where 
things are physically isn't a huge help. 
 
Recognizing the challenge of tracking the location where value creation arises 
and where value capture occurs, respondent information analyst RP15-SEN 
observed: ‘Because I think, people think they're investing in the FTSE 100. You 
know, Aunt Agatha thinks she's investing in Marks and Spencer or BP—not these 
Russian mining companies, which a lot of it is.’ 
Policymakers acknowledge the limits of sovereign reach over MNEs’ 
borderless economic engagement. RP20-IET describes the conditions and nexus 
for sovereign reach: 
 
But when you move into the realm of regulation, whether it be in the area of 
tax or anywhere else, in the absence of global regulation—and there are very 
few places where that occurs in any meaningful or effective way—in the 
absence of global regulation, nation-states will rely upon their sovereign right 
to regulate the activities of all players that touch upon or have a connection 
with their jurisdiction. The difficulty, of course, with trying to ensure that the 
reach of a company that traverses so many jurisdictions might be properly and 
effectively regulated is that there are limits to the extent to which any one 
jurisdiction can legislate within its own sovereign realm. 
 
In summary, the findings highlight three core principles/tensions that support 
the internationalizing process of MNEs. These are: the corporate rhetoric involved 
in acquiring and maintaining legitimacy through vocabulary use and work of 
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justification; the justification of procedural compliance and conformity with the 
rules-based expression; and the dynamic capabilities of MNEs to cope with the 
tensions of globalization in exploiting the borderless opportunities to create and 
capture economic value whilst counterbalancing the host location demands of 
legitimacy justification. These three core principles, considered individually, 
enhance MNE performance but when assessed jointly introduce paradoxical 
tensions that challenge MNEs ordinary and dynamic capabilities.    
Host Policymakers’ View of the MNE Internationalizing Process 
My analysis and findings indicate that there are seven distinct processes that 
MNE HQs strategically engage in when inclined to engage in base erosion 
practices in the course of multinationalizing. These are: fragmenting the 
organization’s value-creating economic activities; the captive insourcing and 
offshoring of either integral or ancillary economic activities; internationalizing to 
augment firm performance; mobilizing the MNE group’s intangibles and 
fungibles; arbitraging strategically and opportunistically; valorizing economic 
activities intragroup and consolidating all earlier MNE HQ interventions. 
Internationalizing Process 
I synthesize the literature with three first-order codes to reflect on the host 
policymakers’ perspective of internationalizing as the organizational ability of 
MNEs, as conditioned by time, pace and space, to engage in economic activity 
between their home location and overseas counterparties—their foreign 
intermediate units, their foreign subsidiaries and subunits, their customers and 
other salient stakeholder classes. The three first-order codes reflecting on the 
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internationalizing process are: host units subordinating granular reporting 
expression to HQ; home HQ defines operating segments; and home HQ constructs 
holistic view. 
Host units subordinate granular reporting expression to HQ 
In the course of internationalizing, host foreign intermediate units, subsidiaries 
and subunits generally assign discretion for granular reporting decisions to the 
home HQ. And since fostering economic growth and social welfare are key 
objectives of nation-states (Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Moran & Ghosal, 1999), 
capital market regulators will, primarily, focus on the accounting expression of the 
home HQ (Nielsen & Roslender, 2015). As a consequence, granular aspects of host 
reporting expression are of lesser concern to the host regulator. This is re-affirmed 
by RP01-GEA, noting that: ‘At the subsidiary level, there'll be lesser requirements 
in terms of granular information, but only on the grounds that the relevant 
information is obtained in the consolidated financial statements.’  
When asked to interpret particular notes extracted from UK host annual reports 
for Amazon.co.uk Ltd and Google UK Ltd, RP02-GXA concluded: 
 
They're far too generic for me to understand anything. They don't tell me 
anything about revenue recognitions. They don't tell me about what the 
company does… it is frankly meaningless. What you need is a proper 
description, and that's why we describe what we now call “strategic report”...  
Now, you're required not only to describe what you do, but also link to the 
underlying data. 
 
The consequence is that host reporting expression can become less purposeful. 
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Home HQ defines operating segments 
It is senior management, or more specifically, the organization’s chief operating 
decision maker (IFRS 8, 2007; Kou & Hussain, 2007), who is given the discretion 
to define the composition of its operating segments. The rationale for delegating 
this prerogative to the organization’s chief operating decision maker is so that 
stockholders are able to make a judgment on the decision maker’s competency in 
allocating the organization’s resources and in assessing its performance (Leung & 
Verriest, 2015).  Senior management of each subunit or subsidiary within the 
corporate group technically has this prerogative. 
In reflecting on the operating segment information, RP02-GXA explained: ‘it's 
the question of how the management discovered and determined what is the most 
sensible way of monitoring performance... Now, how the management of the 
consolidated entity monitors versus how the more granular management at an 
individual UK company entity monitors can be quite different, because at an 
individual entity level, my segments could be different.’ Applying this to the host 
subsidiaries in question, RP02-GXA commented: ‘At the subsidiary level, you 
may have a very small entity focused on one activity and one jurisdiction. Very 
different business issues, very different KPIs, very different way of looking at 
performance management so they may define completely different segments.’ 
Notwithstanding the prerogative afforded to each entity’s chief operating 
decision maker, it is important to recognize the multinationalizing role of the home 
HQ (Crilly, 2011). So the home HQ chief operating decision maker sets the lead 
in identifying the most relevant interpretative lens. In the case of the home parent, 
Amazon.com, it states in Note 12 on segment information: ‘We have organized 
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our operations into two segments: North America and International. We present 
our segment information along the same lines that our Chief Executive Officer 
reviews our operating results in assessing performance and allocating resources.’ 
(Amazon.com, 2013 p.64). The International segment consists of: 
 
amounts earned from retail sales of consumer products (including from sellers) 
and subscriptions through internationally-focused websites. This segment 
includes export sales from these internationally based websites (including 
export sales from these sites to customers in the U.S. and Canada), but 
excludes export sales from our U.S. and Canadian websites.’ (Amazon.com, 
2013 p.65). 
 
Included in the disclosure of the International segment are UK-focused 
websites, which generated revenues of US$7,291bn. From the UK subsidiary host 
perspective, Amazon.co.uk does not provide operating segment disclosure. 
Instead, its Strategic Report states: ‘The principal activity of the Company is the 
provision of fulfillment and corporate support services to group undertakings… 
The key performance indicator for the company is the control of administrative 
expenses.’ (Amazon.co.uk, 2013 p.5). The turnover reported by the host UK 
subsidiary for these group services amounted to GB£449m.  
What the multinationalizing process reveals is that for Amazon.com, its 
international sales from UK-focused websites are transacted through a 
Luxembourg-based subsidiary, while the group fulfillment of its sales obligations 
are independently furnished by a UK organization, Amazon.co.uk Ltd. That is, 
Amazon.co.uk Ltd’s only customer is its fellow group subsidiary in Luxembourg. 
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In essence, not only is the related-party disclosure making invisible what otherwise 
was previously visible, so too is the disclosure on operating segments making 
invisible what otherwise was previously visible. 
A similar feature of multinationalizing is evident in the case of Google Inc. Its 
HQ home Annual Report states that:  
 
we operate two operating segments: Google—includes our advertising and 
other non-advertising businesses; and Motorola Mobile—includes our mobile 
devices businesses acquired from Motorola. Our chief operating decision 
maker does not evaluate operating segments using asset 
information…Revenues by geography are based on the billing addresses of 
our customers for the Google segment and the ship-to-addresses of our 
customers for the Motorola Mobile segment’. (Google, 2013 p.75) 
 
In the HQ accounts, Google Inc. disclosed its derived revenues from customers 
with UK billing addresses amounted to US$4,057bn. From the UK host subsidiary 
perspective, Google.co.uk Ltd does not provide operating segment disclosure. 
Instead, in its Strategic Report, it discloses the business activities it provides to the 
group as ‘the provision of marketing services to Google Ireland Ltd and the 
provision of research and development services to Google Inc.’ (Google UK Ltd, 
2013 p.3). The turnover reported by the host UK subsidiary for these group 
services amounted to GB£642m. 
On closer scrutiny of Google Inc., its UK operations are limited to providing 
marketing and promotion as well as research and development functions solely to 
-parties within Google Inc. A Google senior executive, RW47-OEC, explained the 
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UK host operational aspects as: ‘I have tried to describe very clearly what people 
actually do, because as I understand it, it is what people actually do and what 
actually happens that is important here. What actually happens is that when people 
spend money with Google, they spend it on a technology platform that is built 
globally and that is owned in Ireland. The transactions are closed with Ireland, the 
billing is with Ireland and the technology is owned there, so the people in the UK 
cannot sell, because they do not own the property.’ 
Host policymakers have a different perspective on the internationalizing 
process and operating segments of MNEs. RP10-GET frames the prejudicial 
effects on host environment as: ‘So basically, I think you have to look at the 
multinational (as a whole)—this is what I think—rather than what necessarily the 
OECD thinks. You’ve got to find a way to actually capture the data points, if you 
like, and then apply a reasonable assessment to whether what is actually being 
done is reasonable in all the circumstances.’ The tension between the global and 
local features arising from the process of MNEs creating structural boundaries 
around discrete operating segments in host locations is evident in the problem of 
how to attribute value among subunits or subsidiaries that are taken to be operating 
independently but in reality are not (Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, 2008; Lohse 
& Riedel, 2013). 
The OECD head of treaties, RP21-IET, clarified this tension between local and 
global features of the MNE:  
 
For example, if the facts of the case show that, in fact, there is some form of 
collaborative relationship between the two parts of the same entity, you should 
also price the transaction as being on a collaborative basis. You shouldn't try 
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to say, “Well, you should be kind of competing with each other,” because you 
can also see in third party situations, situations where such collaboration 
exists. For example, when you're talking about joint ventures. So what we say 
is when you're establishing the facts and circumstances of the transaction, 
when you're defining what the actual transaction is, you should very carefully 
look at also the way that being part of the global firm determines the facts.  
Constructing a holistic group view 
With the home HQ creating a holistic group view, the multi-nationalizing 
process obfuscates reconciliation of the intermediary units, subsidiaries and 
subunits—comprising the home and host operating segments—to the whole. At 
the PAC-UK (2012), the PAC chair RQ26-GEP, asked Starbucks senior 
management:  
 
How do you explain the difference? I am sorry to interrupt you. As I 
understand it there are transcripts of the conference calls—right? … and you 
then promote the guy responsible for the UK business to run your US business, 
it just doesn’t match. It doesn’t ring true… I can take you to 2011: losses of 
£33 million, and John Culver, president of the international division, told 
investors, “we are very pleased with the performance in the UK.” Yet you filed 
£33 million losses.  
 
RW45-OEC’s responded: 
 
No. I assure you we are not making money and the investors we are speaking 
to are all of the investors in the company. We have never targeted just to the 
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UK, although we understand that audience. In all earnings releases and 
conference calls, our primary message has to be under the SEC rules for the 
US, which are addressing primarily US-based accounting rules and reporting 
rules. 
 
With the home HQ creating a holistic group view, the multi-nationalizing 
process obfuscates reconciliation of the intermediary units, subsidiaries and 
subunits—comprising the home and host operating segments—to the whole. 
Where parts of the organization are not adequately reconciled to the whole 
under accounting expression, UK host regulators impose an overriding principle 
that corporate disclosure be fair, balanced and understandable. RP01-GEA alluded 
to this principle by observing: ‘[that] went into the 2012 version of the 
code…basically, boards have got to make a statement that the annual report and 
the accounts is fair balanced and understandable and we have changed the audit 
standards so that the auditor has to speak up, if he doesn't agree… Part of fair is 
you can't leave things out if it's necessary for a balanced view.’  The fair, balanced 
and understandable override is a UK accounting principle. The home HQs for 
Amazon.com, Google Inc. and Starbucks are, however, subject to the US SEC 
code. 
Mobilizing Process 
Emerging from the data, I use the second-order theme of mobilizing to indicate 
the policymakers’ view on the degree of relative ease with which a particular class 
or category of a firm’s resources can be relocated from one nation-state to another. 
Two first-order codes that inform the policymakers’ view on the mobilizing 
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process are: dealing with intangibles and financial assets; and, host location 
incentives influencing choices in mobility.  
Dealing with intangibles and financial assets 
Intangibles and financial asset classes are inherently more mobile than physical 
assets (Arginelli, 2015; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2009). Respondent RP07-SXT 
observed that: ‘Mobility is much greater now I think and also the speed at which 
things happen is much quicker—everything is much quicker now, I think. So I 
guess the risk of base erosion is possibly greater now than it was then, and it's 
probably right that we have a look at it again.’ 
Provided international transfer pricing rules are complied with (Cools et al., 
2008; OECD, 2015b), it is legitimately possible to shift profits to the new locations 
of the mobilized intangibles and financial assets. In the context of financial assets, 
a director of UK HMT, RP14-GEP, observed: 
 
Yes. But this isn't just a factor of technology; it's also a factor of capital 
becoming more globally mobile, and more countries becoming economic 
actors. In the past you had a much, much smaller number of countries that 
were significant capital providers. Now if you look at investment float into 
countries like China, huge volumes of these are accounted for by funds, 
companies, entities of other sorts based in Bermuda, Cayman Islands, 
Mauritius. 
 
Intangibles cover both formal intellectual property, like trademarks and patents, 
and informal intellectual property like brands and exclusive marketing distribution 
rights. Chief executive of the HMRC, RW35-GET, stressed that: ‘Intellectual 
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property is a real thing. It is important to say that it has a market value: if it did 
not, there would not be many franchises prepared to pay a sum to some of the 
intellectual property owners in order to have the intellectual property.’ The 
dilemma is that complexity increases as intangible assets and intellectual property 
devolve into multiple forms of proprietary rights, such as: entering into cost-
sharing arrangements over research & development (Heriford, Keats, Lamoureux 
& Wright, 2013); handling of buy-in payments; acquiring or foregoing rights under 
collaborative research & development arrangements; and subsequent licensing 
arrangements.  
Host location incentives influence choices in mobility 
Nation-states recognize the value of intellectual property and compete in 
encouraging entrepreneurial firms to relocate their innovation (Evers, Miller & 
Spengel, 2014). RW35-GET indicated the UK’s competitive stance as: 
 
We have, for a number of years, heavily encouraged scientific entrepreneurs. 
We have tax approaches that are designed to allow quite significant 
recognition of the investment costs up front for stonkingly good new 
developments. We then developed some very successful businesses that make 
a global impact. 
 
This concern over the complexity and opportunism in the unbundling of 
proprietary rights and know-how was expressed by PAC member RQ28-GEP: 
‘But surely there is a difference…between brand value, which we are talking about 
with this company, and intellectual property, which involves masses of research 
and investment over many years, and which is a different issue… You use this 
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caveat of intellectual property as a catch-all term to give carte blanche, it seems, 
to admittedly legal and, for the moment, legitimate tax avoidance. But surely it 
must have crossed your mind that we need to establish some kind of legal 
precedent to distinguish between brand value and intellectual property.’ 
All three MNEs that gave evidence at the PAC hearings engaged in multiple 
forms of mobilizing, for example: Starbucks licensed trademark rights to its UK 
host subsidiary; Amazon granted warehousing rights to its UK host subsidiary but 
denied it the commercial right to sell books and literary works; and Google paid 
the UK host subsidiary for their local intelligence gathering, but denied the UK 
host subsidiary the commercial rights to sell advertising. 
Arbitraging Process 
Two first-order codes comprise the second-order theme of the arbitrage process: 
cost control in transfer pricing, and strategic avoidance through opacity. 
Cost control in transfer pricing 
Arbitrage, at its most basic, involves taking advantage of differing prices for 
the same goods or services. Arbitrage has multiple guises. In my fieldwork, 
respondents consciously categorized arbitrage either as good, grey or bad practice. 
Controlling costs is a core competency of efficient management (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1991). For management, taxes, imposts and duties are like any other 
business expense that should be competently managed and controlled (Mulligan & 
Oats, 2016). The greater the scale of operations, the greater is the opportunity for 
economizing (Badertscher, Katz & Rego, 2013). RP07-SXT expressed the 
pragmatic, benign view of economizing as:  
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I don't subscribe to this fair share sort of argument. I think it is a cost and it 
needs to be managed and I don't think the really big multinationals 
are…money-laundering and stuff or evading taxes or doing highly artificial 
things through tax havens and things because you've got these regulatory 
constraints on them. 
 
This pragmatic view of economizing, notes HMT deputy director, RP14-GEP, 
will also involve: ‘the manipulation of internal transactions, primarily through the 
transfer pricing rules and … engaging in transactions or creating structures or 
doing other activities that enable them to maximize their access to legitimate reliefs 
in the tax system’. When the PAC chair, RQ26-GEP, asked Starbucks senior 
management: ‘So there is a tax advantage to you from paying the royalties in the 
Netherlands?’ RW45-OEC replied: ‘It is a favourable tax rate that we have in the 
Netherlands on all income that comes in from all over.’ In relation to the 
internalized purchasing of coffee supplies, RQ41-GEP asked: ‘And then you 
charge 20% for selling it on to everybody else?’ Starbucks senior management, 
RW45-OEC, replied: ‘We must require to get cost and generate a profit whenever 
activities happen wherever they happen around the world.’ and ‘Yes. The Swiss 
tax rate has been approximately 12% over history [on the coffee supplies markup].’  
Strategic avoidance using opacity 
Then there are the grey practices of arbitrage. The activities performed may 
have sufficient scale to indicate normality but on closer scrutiny may have 
questionable internalized substance. The OECD head of treaties, RP21-IET, noted: 
‘the real risk in transfer pricing is, or in tax, is in minimum functional entities that 
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have a lot of capital allocated … and that are located in low tax jurisdictions’. 
When PAC committee member, RQ39-GEP, asked: 
 
What I am interested in is how you are stripping out the profits in 
Luxembourg… If it is €9.1 billion going to €20 million, that suggests that you 
are stripping out the profit in Luxembourg. Who owns the holding company?  
 
Amazon senior management, RW46-OEC, responded: ‘I will need to come 
back to the Committee on that.’ 
Alternatively, the MNE group may incorporate opaque structures that 
opportunistically exploit cross-border statelessness (Kleinbard, 2013). A director 
of UK HMT, RP14-GEP, commented: ‘The problems arise where you have 
companies that have sufficient capital and scale to be able to invest, to put 
substance, in different jurisdictions and to create complicated structures which 
have an underlying commercial purpose, no denying that at all. The entities 
concerned can clearly assume their contractual responsibilities, but these 
arrangements lead to a very advantageous tax outcome for the company.’ The 
OECD head of tax policy, RP20-IET, is more explicit on these grey practices: ‘But 
what's not legitimate is where companies are able to take advantage of interactions 
and mismatches between tax systems in order to, in some cases, effectively pay no 
tax on transactions, or arrangements, or activities that were not intended to be tax-
free, and would otherwise not be arrangements that would go tax-free. So I think 
that's the crucial point.’  The dilemma for public policymakers, notes RP14-GEP, 
is that: ‘it's quite hard to challenge these arrangements effectively, particularly 
when they're made by large corporations that don't engage in transactions that are 
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wholly artificial. The wholly artificial stuff you can pick up, it's the stuff that falls 
into the grey area, where they don't need to do this, but they can, and they benefit 
a great deal from doing it.’ 
Finally, there are those practices of arbitrage that go beyond strategic 
exploitation to being explicitly illegal. The UK’s HMRC senior advisor, RP22-
GEP, demarcates the boundary between grey and bad as: ‘they've got different 
functions. GAAR [general anti-abuse rule]—and I see this maybe sort of ties in 
with the difference between where domestic legislation operates and where you're 
looking at the international tax rules, which is where BEPS project comes in—but 
GAAR was always and is always intended to be a measure that bit at the very 
extreme end of abusive transactions.’ 
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Figure 6.2 – Dataflow on value-capture process 
  
Note: Figure 6.2 links an extract of first-order codes to illustrate a public stakeholders’ view 
of the value-capture mechanisms.  
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Fragmenting Process 
I use the term fragmenting in this thesis as a second-order theme to represent 
host policymakers’ views on the choice opportunities that MNEs have to flexibly 
reconfigure their internal operations across national boundaries in order to direct 
value to firm preferred locations. Three first-order codes explicate the fragmenting 
process: freedom of contract; configure integral, ancillary or incomplete tasks; and 
nexus of contracts linkage. 
Freedom of contract 
As the frame of reference affecting host locations is base erosion (Contractor, 
2016; Dharmapala, 2014), my focus is on within-group fragmenting as distinct 
from decisions about externalizing part of the group’s activities. By within-group 
fragmenting (Nebus, 2016), I mean that the HQ configures multiple subunits or 
subsidiaries to perform distinct activities it considers may be optimally undertaken 
within group. Transaction cost economics explains the rationale for firms to 
internalize transactions due to market failure or inefficiencies (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1991), but not necessarily the need for further within-group 
fragmentation. Whereas externalizing a part of the firm’s activities through 
outsourcing, external contracting or by entering into alliances or joint venture 
arrangements (Reuer & Devarakonda, 2016) is motivated by the efficiency of 
markets or geographical clustering (McCann, Reuer & Lahiri, 2016). 
Freedom of contract is the enabling feature for initiating the process of within-
group fragmenting as well as external contracting. That is to say, by structurally 
fragmenting the firm, the incidence of contracting is salient for both within-group 
conduct as well as external engagement. Subject to statutory intervention, 
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individuals and groups possess this universal freedom to negotiate contract terms 
and conditions. RW35-GET expressed the UK regulatory agency’s views on the 
freedom of contract as: ‘And multinationals have choices. Multinational 
companies are companies that can choose where to put their headquarters and 
where to put their outlets, and they are taxed in the country where they carry on 
economic activity, not where their customers are. That is an international 
arrangement.’ RP08-SXT restated this universal right more forcibly as: 
  
‘But more fundamentally than that—haven't thought about this in any great 
detail - but giving contract law the substance is human rights law, because 
human rights law contains the provision that every person, whether natural or 
legal as a company, has the right to the enjoyment of his possessions, and that 
right cannot be interfered with by the state except for the benefit of all.’ 
 
Decisions on within-group fragmentation have consequences. When RW45-
OEC suggested that: ‘Respectfully, those jurisdictions require us to report profit 
where the activity happens. We have no choice but to do that’, PAC indicated that 
the purported determinism, as recounted by the respondent witness, arose because 
of the choices they made in fragmenting their operations within group. PAC 
interrogant, RQ42-GEP, remarked: ‘But that is partly because you make it so… It 
does not need to be that complicated.’ 
Configuring integral, ancillary or incomplete tasks 
Contrary to popular understanding, at aggregate level, MNE groups are not 
affected by within-group fragmentation. For example, labour or human capital can 
now be reconfigured quite flexibility across the organization (Hirst & Humphreys, 
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2015). However, when within group fragmentation occurs across multiple 
jurisdictions, then the sovereign interests of affected nation-states are invoked 
(Contractor, 2016). The complexity and ambiguity that pervades the process of 
within-group fragmentation is explained by a senior economist, RP04-SEP, as: ‘Of 
course, then, if you've got a profit that's being created by some workers, a factory, 
and a patent, you have to allocate those profits to those three sections… They're 
complementary. So it makes no sense to think of the value of the patent completely 
independently of the value of all the other inputs that went into it, but the tax 
system makes you separate them out.’ 
On the other hand, the process of fragmenting within-group tasks considered as 
integral, ancillary or incomplete does opportunistically take advantage of the 
principle of justification, applying procedural rules-based expression in 
international tax conventions. UK senior HMT representative, RP14-GEP, 
explains the opportunism as: 
 
I think our view would be that what you have to do is focus on whether the 
activities that a company is undertaking constitute essential and significant 
functions. And rather than having some of the exemptions that are currently 
provided for in the permanent establishment [PE] definition, things like 
warehousing, or marketing activities, you actually qualify those by saying, 
“but in the case where this activity is essential and significant, it creates a 
taxable presence”. Where it isn't, then it doesn't.  
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Nexus of contracts linkage 
What then attaches the integral or ancillary economic activities of host 
subsidiaries and subunits to overseas locations? It is the nexus of contracts that 
performs this link. The FRC respondent, RP02-GXA, explained how this nexus of 
contracts linkage operates in practice by reference to the European operations of 
Amazon.com: ‘Who is the principal in the transaction? So, if a Luxembourg 
company is the principal in the transaction, it's their revenues, it's their loss if 
something doesn't go right. That is where the customer has ultimate recourse to for 
the service provision and everything else. So it's quite conceivable, as I say, that 
the UK company, despite the fact that it's a UK website address, but those 
companies that are actually providing the goods and services could be registered 
anywhere. It doesn't bother me.’ 
The nexus of contracts provides the link not only for integral tasks but also for 
ancillary tasks. The tracing of links to host subunits and subsidiaries requires the 
contracting capacity of all parties engaged in performing those tasks to be clearly 
delineated. For ancillary economic activities, RP02-GXA explained: ‘It's internal 
subcontracting to other companies. What really matters here is who is the principal 
in the transaction and who is an agent. So here is this company that is doing 
something at the request and on behalf of someone else. So it's acting on behalf of 
the Luxembourg company who is acting as a principal in the transaction.’ Google 
respondent, RW47-OEC, distinguished between integral and ancillary task 
providers as: ‘I have “Sales” in my title, and so do other people… However, any 
customer who spends with us has to buy from Ireland, because that is where the 
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intellectual property sits. The Google people do not have the right to sell. You 
cannot sell what you do not own.’ 
The FRC Accounting Council member, RP03-GXA, explained the 
deterministic nature of the nexus of contracts link to host subunits and subsidiaries: 
 
But I'm not sure what alternative they've got because, presumably, the legal 
contract as we see [it is] in Google Ireland and … So if I was the auditor of 
Google Ireland, which is invoicing all these things out of Google Ireland, I'm 
not sure I'd say, “No, no, you're not allowed to invoice. I'm not going to record 
those as sales.”  
 
IFRS representative, RP09-SEA, re-stated this nexus of contract link as: ‘But 
that's a legal concept, I think you'll find. I don't know but I think IFRS 15 will tell 
you how to recognize revenue… Well, it'll also tell you what to recognize. But 
that's a legal concept, it's not an accounting concept – as to who's undertaken a 
transaction.’ 
The nexus of contracts not only links economic activities to host subunits and 
subsidiaries but also indicates geographically where part or whole of the economic 
activity has taken place. Google respondent, RW47-OEC, indicated that: ‘people 
in Google UK Ltd, are promoting our properties and encouraging people to spend 
money with Google. Clients may well feel that they are selling: we hire people 
with sales skills and they are encouraging people to spend money and showing 
them the business case, but what is very clear is that no one in the UK team can 
execute a transaction… The people here can only encourage that to happen’. 
Reverting to Amazon.com UK’s situation, notwithstanding that deliveries may be 
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dispatched from UK fulfillment centres with UK postage stamps, its senior 
management, RW46-OEC, remarked that: ‘No, I think you will see that 
Amazon.co.uk is a trading name for a Luxembourg company, Amazon EU Sarl…I 
can assure you, Chair, that you will be billed by a Luxembourg company.’ 
These findings are congruent with contract law convention, the privity of 
contract doctrine (McKendrick, 2011), and international accounting standard IFRS 
15 (2014) on the recognition of revenue from contracts with customers. Under the 
privity of contract doctrine, ‘a third party cannot be subjected to a burden by a 
contract to which he is not a party’ (McKendrick, 2011 p.112). Under IFRS 15 
(2014), the first step in the revenue recognition process is to identify ‘an agreement 
between two or more parties that creates enforceable rights and obligations. The 
requirements of IFRS 15 apply to each contract that has been agreed upon with a 
customer and meets specified criteria.’ (IFRS 15, 2014 para IN.7(a)). These 
specified criteria are: ‘(a) the parties to the contract approved the contract…and 
are committed to perform their respective obligations; (b) the entity can identify 
each party’s rights regarding the goods or services to be transferred; (c) the entity 
can identify the payment terms for the goods or services to be transferred; (d) the 
contract has commercial substance…; and it is probable that the entity will collect 
the consideration to which it will be entitled in exchange for the goods or services 
that will be transferred to the customer’ (IFRS 15, 2014 para 9). 
Captive Insourcing Process 
I use the term captive insourcing as a second-order theme to refer to decisions 
made by the firm to internalize transactions, not only because of contractual 
hazards and technological capabilities, but also to direct value capture to specific 
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entities within an MNE group. The three first-order codes comprising the captive 
insourcing theme are: magnitude of related-party transactions; insensitivity to 
insourced pricing; and vaporization of subunit visibility on consolidation. 
Magnitude of related-party transactions 
A distinctive feature of captive insourcing is that not only is the host subunit or 
subsidiary closely held and controlled by the parent firm, but all or a major part of 
its economic activities are conducted with related parties (Nebus, 2016). For 
example, in the case of the host subsidiary, Amazon.co.uk Ltd, according to its 
Annual Return lodged with the UK’s Company House, all its issued ordinary share 
capital of 10,366,036 is held by Amazon EU SARL, being its ‘immediate parent 
company…incorporated in Luxembourg (Amazon.co.uk, 2013), which is 
ultimately controlled and held by the home parent, Amazon.com Inc. The host 
subsidiary has not provided related-party disclosures, as is ordinarily required by 
IFRS, on the basis that it is eligible for and has elected to have exemption from 
related-party disclosures under UK GAAP.’ 
Notwithstanding the fact that no related-party disclosures were made in 
Amazon.co.uk Ltd’s 2013 Annual Report, it can be inferred that the whole or major 
part of its GB£449m turnover is derived from sales and services to group 
companies. Its Strategic Report states that: 
 
The principal activity of the Company is the provision of fulfillment and 
corporate support services to other Amazon group undertakings…Turnover 
and headcount has increased as the Company continues to support the growth 
of the Amazon group…The Company is dependent on the continued success 
of the Amazon group companies.’ (Amazon.co.uk, 2013 p.5) 
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At the PAC hearings, Amazon’s representative, RPW46-OEC, affirmed its 
related-party transactional activity as: ‘That is essentially for providing services in 
the UK for the Amazon Europe companies—services such as operating the 
fulfillment centres, which is going to be receiving inventory, picking, packing and 
then passing on those products to our…[interruption by RQ39-GEP]’. 
Google UK Ltd’s 2013 Annual Report discloses that its entire 50,001,000 
issued ordinary share capital is held by its immediate parent, Google International 
LLC, which is ultimately held and controlled by Google Inc. Again, the UK host 
subsidiary availed itself of the exemption to not provide related-party disclosures. 
However, in this instance the host subsidiary has been more explicit. In its 2013 
Strategic Report, it states: ‘The Company is engaged in the provision of marketing 
services to Google Ireland Limited and the provision of research and development 
services to Google Inc.’ (Google UK Ltd, 2013 p.3). Then, in its Turnover Note, 
it discloses that GB£100m is attributable to research and development services 
provided to the USA (Google UK Ltd, 2013 p.14), which accords with the 
Directors’ Report disclosure that the research and development services were 
performed for its ultimate parent company, Google Inc. The remaining component 
of the 2013 turnover of GB£542m is related to marketing and services fees earned 
from Ireland.   
Google UK Ltd’s related-party transactions can be inferred from disclosures in 
the Strategic Report on marketing and services fees that were earned wholly or in 
substantial part from another group host entity, Google Ireland Ltd. The captive 
insourcing of transactions can also be inferred from evidence given by Google’s 
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management at the PAC hearings. RW47-OEC stated: ‘What the people in the UK 
do is provide services that are charged to Google Ireland. Those services are 
principally around promoting our products and making sure they work in the UK 
for UK consumers. What is different about Google versus the other businesses you 
have been talking about, is that we are not selling books or making coffee’. 
In the case of Starbucks Corporation, the manner in which it has fragmented its 
value supply chain and incorporated its captive insourcing subunits differs from 
Amazon.com and Google Inc. as it affects the host UK. Whereas Amazon.com and 
Google Inc avoided establishing their integral operating segments in the UK, the 
Starbucks business model required the physical presence of its integral operating 
segment in the UK. This UK host presence is through Starbucks Coffee Company 
(UK) Ltd. Starbucks Coffee Company (UK) Ltd has as its immediate parent 
Starbucks Coffee Holdings (UK) Ltd, and its ultimate parent is Starbucks 
Corporation. Its 2013 Annual Report discloses that of its 10,194 company-owned 
stores, 549 operate in the UK; and of its 9,593 licensed stores, 215 operate in the 
UK (Starbucks Corporation, 2013 p.6). Note 16 in the Annual Report on Segment 
Reporting discloses that: ‘Segment information is prepared on the same basis that 
our ceo, who is our chief operating decision maker, manages the segments…to 
align with the three-region leadership and organization structure of our retail 
business…includes: 1) Americas, inclusive of the US, Canada, and Latin America; 
2) Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA); and 3) China/Asia Pacific (CAP)’ 
(Starbucks Corporation, 2013 p.73). 
Whereas the Starbucks Corporation did not establish a captive insourcing entity 
in the UK, it nevertheless established a captive insourcing entity in another host 
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location. In this instance, a Swiss subunit or subsidiary was established as the 
captive insourcing entity, functioning as the international procurer of all the MNE 
group’s coffee bean supplies. Starbucks management representative, RW45-OEC, 
described the captive insourcing activities of its Swiss operations as:  
 
They run all our global buying operations, they run our sustainability 
programmes, and they have all the agronomy offices that we operate around 
the world in the growing regions, where we work with farmers around 
sustainability, transparency and social programmes… All the coffee that we 
buy globally, including what goes to the US, runs through that central buying 
operation.  
 
Not unexpectedly, Starbucks Coffee Company (UK) Ltd also availed itself of 
the exemption to not report related-party transactions arising from purchasing its 
coffee supplies intergroup. 
Starbucks’ UK 2013 Annual Report reported turnover of GB£399mil 
comprising revenues from company-owned stores; licensing fees from the UK 
licensed stores and related channel products. The UK’s turnover is, in turn, 
consolidated and reported in the EMEA region revenues for the Starbucks 
Corporation. However, all MNE related party transactions are eliminated on 
consolidation. Thus, in the case of Starbucks all intergroup cost markups on coffee 
supplies are eliminated. Starbucks management representative, RW45-OEC, 
described more generally the disclosure effects of related-party transactions as: 
‘We are required to report our accounts in the UK under one standard. We are also 
required under US accounting to speak to our profitability in a different way, to 
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eliminate all inter-company transactions that are involved. So those are 
requirements that we have to meet both in the UK and the US. There is a difference 
between those two.’ That difference, in essence, makes related-party transactions 
in the home location invisible on consolidation, although they were clearly visible 
in the host location. 
Previous empirical research has indicated that insourcing, as a governance 
mode, may be preferred over outsourcing contingent on particular attributes 
(Leiblein, 2002) affecting exchange and organizational boundaries. Those 
particular attributes may include: the degree of contractual hazards (Leiblein, 
2002); an MNE’s technological and governance capabilities (Mayer & Salomon, 
2006); the parent’s competencies in implementing the alternative governance 
modes (Foss, 1997; Parmigiani & Holloway, 2011); and the use of ownership and 
location to internally leverage the parent’s competitive advantage (Dunning, 
2000). Depending on the individual circumstances, each of these attributes is 
capable of influencing the performance and returns from insourcing and 
internalization. However, extant theory does not adequately explain the captive 
insourcing arrangements that many MNEs have implemented under base erosion. 
For example, the captive insourcing arrangements implemented by Amazon and 
Google are not simply leveraging superior technological capabilities or contracting 
hazards but, in a more complex manner, are also embedding their 
internationalizing value-capture strategies. 
Insensitivity to insourced pricing 
From an agency theory perspective, captive insourcing is insensitive to pricing 
between MNE group related parties (Avi-Yonah et al., 2008). The UK accounting 
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regulatory agency, RP01-GEA, succinctly observed: ‘Yeah. So why does it 
matter? Because actually, from an investor's point of view, you just want to know 
what's the aggregated value.’ The UK ICAEW respondent, RP12-SXA, also 
affirmed this indifference to insourced pricing as: 
 
So at group level, it's just irrelevant, all you're looking at is the group as if it 
was one entity and all its transactions with external parties. So each group 
entity’s transactions are not treated as seriously in that sense, and also, there's 
cost issues surrounding it as well…from the group perspective, there's an 
additional cost by imposing a fair value transaction cost on that, in terms of 
recording it in the books of each of the companies, when actually at group 
level it is going to be irrelevant. 
 
Organizational behavioural characteristics (Eccles, 1983), hierarchical decision 
models (Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982), volume and degree of asset specificity 
(Spicer, 1988), and legal or international tax constraints (Al-Eryani, Alam & 
Akhter, 1990; Lohse & Riedel, 2013) are all factors that affect insourced pricing 
methods. However, there is little or no sensitivity to alternative insourced pricing 
methodologies, as group accounting, in any event, extinguishes related-party 
transactions on consolidation (Maroun & Van Zijl, 2016). Recognizing on the one 
hand, these contextual organizational constraints and on the other, the insensitivity 
in accounting expression, there remains a constrained space for flexible accounting 
expression (Avi-Yonah et al., 2008; Cools et al., 2008; Freedman, 2008). 
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Vaporization of subunit visibility on consolidation 
The findings on captive insourcing indicate that related-party transactions that 
were otherwise visible at subunit or subsidiary level become invisible on group 
consolidation, and that insourced pricing retains accounting expression flexibility, 
albeit within an organizational and legally-constrained space. It has also been 
established in the findings that traditional agency logics (Armstrong, Guay & 
Weber, 2010; Barth, 2008) support the captive insourcing outcome. On the 
premise that the information about captive insourcing transactions is not viewed 
as decision-relevant information for stockholders or prospective investors, then 
such invisibility is deemed acceptable. The FRC respondent, RP01-GEA, 
succinctly frames accounting expression under traditional agency logics as: ‘but I 
think you need to start from what's the objective of the reporting, and then 
undoubtedly…So if you were starting with an objective other than information for 
investors, you probably would arrive at a different way of presenting the 
information. We've had exactly the same debate with the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards, which basically said IFRS is fundamentally 
flawed because it doesn't give prudential regulators the information that they need. 
Well, it's not designed to give prudential information to prudential regulators, it's 
designed to give information to investors.’ 
Valorizing Process 
In this thesis, I use the second-order theme of valorizing to refer to the process 
whereby the firm incrementally captures value within the transfer pricing 
constraints that are guided by organizational decisions, institutional values and the 
regulatory dictate of the home and host locations.  
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Public policy intent in valorizing 
Public policy seeks guidance from economics in the valorization process. 
Google management representative, RP47-OEC, summarized the MNE 
perspective as: ‘Tax law suggests that you need to pay tax where the economic 
value is created, and we believe that that is there. In the case of the economic 
activity in the UK, which is about helping people to understand how to use the 
Internet and products and services, we have looked at how best to establish what 
we should pay for the services that are provided by people in the UK. The way we 
come to a conclusion on that is, if we went outside and hired other firms to do 
those kinds of things, what would we pay there? That is how we have set up our 
cost structure.’ 
Economics is, however, challenged in providing guidance on valorizing within 
group activities that occur cross-border because of the complementary nature of 
group resources. Restating the position as a general principle, RP004-SEP, adds:  
‘But as economists, we know that's a bad principle in some ways too because when 
you have things that are complementary, you can't value one separately from the 
other—it makes no sense.’ 
Prioritizing value-creating tasks 
Kornberger (2017) explains that value and the order of worth are best 
understood by examining the practices of valorization. It is management’s 
prerogative to prioritize those value-creating activities that should be internalized 
and the order of worth that should be attributed to specific tasks. As part of their 
stewardship, management will allocate labour resources, employ capital and 
assume levels of risk in an appropriate and optimal manner to create and capture 
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value. Google’s senior management views technology and innovation as one of the 
group’s key value-creating resource. Google’s respondent, RW47-OEC, 
explained: ‘What creates economic value for Google is the technology and the 
computer science. Hopefully, people understand that, because it is pretty magical 
to be able to search the entire web in seconds and get answers fast. That is what 
we continue to invest in.’ 
Emphasizing management’s discretion in valuation practices, the chair of the 
FRC Codes & Standards committee, RP05-GXA, noted: 
 
Most people give too little value to the sales process … But you say, “What's 
the margin in a jewellery store?” The answer is, they double whatever they 
paid for it, or something like that. Isn't it? Right? So the value that's been paid 
by the purchaser of the piece of jewellery, at least half of it, is just to pay for 
the selling of it. It pays for the rent, the salesperson, and all other sales-related 
tasks. I don't think people understand that at all as a value… That's particularly 
true as well for anything—any brand business, like a Google or Amazon. 
They're not manufacturers of anything, so they are really sellers, so the value 
is all about the sales process. 
 
Valuation practices and ordering of worth (Aspers & Beckert, 2011; 
Kornberger, 2017) are not only relevant to firm resources, capabilities and 
activities but also to the integral nature of their business models. Information 
intermediary and FRC respondent RP13-SXN explained the integral nature of the 
Google business models: ‘And it completely ignored the aspect that people didn't 
understand that Google was really an advertising company and it wasn't a search 
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engine company. Well, you could have been a really busy fool, becoming the 
biggest expert on the analysis and valuation of search engine companies, and 
missed that … was Google saying, “In another five to ten years we're going to have 
our own phones, we're going to have our own phone infrastructure in Android, 
huge amounts of our income are going to come through licensing revenues related 
to that. We're going to be engaging in all kinds of crazy stuff. If you simply value 
us as a search engine company right now, you're going to miss the visionary 
aspects of what our business will really be. We're going to replace the Times of 
London and the New York Times, and all classified advertising, and we're going 
to put Nielsen out of business, because we're going to know every click rather than 
trying to estimate it through audience surveys.”’  
Risk–return paradigm in valorization 
In the context of aligning return to the level of risk assumption, RP10-GET 
observed: ‘So in my head, it's a case of, “Okay, if it's just pure invoicing in Ireland 
and that's it, then it doesn't use that much capital and you shouldn't get 
remunerated.” If there is big risk-taking and marketing spend where the sales 
occur, then obviously allocate out the return to the various places where the sales 
occur ... You take on risks to actually earn rewards ... Now, that's not a precise 
science, but it is the common sense test to where the profits are actually being 
booked.’ 
More generally, OECD Head of Tax Treaty, RP21-IET, explains the role of risk 
assumption relative to returns: ‘You should first identify with specificity what kind 
of risks a company has taken on. There are many, many—because if they don't 
take on risks, they don't make the premium returns. The premium returns come 
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from them being able to manage their risks better than others. But what we then 
also say is—companies don't just take on risks, they do something with it. They 
perform activities in order to make sure that they are the ones that can mitigate that 
risk optimally compared to other competitors.’ The organizational discourse on the 
risk–return paradigm refers to the concept of profit as a social construct of value 
assuming temporal (Hardy & Maquire, 2016) and interdisciplinary dimensions 
(Lukka, 1990) and comprising of both functional return elements as well as non-
functional return elements (Knight, 1921; Weston, 1954). Respondents are seeking 
to distinguish between the types of risks that MNEs manage, because host 
policymakers identify the risk–return relationship as an appropriate means of 
evaluating the existing social construct of profit.   
Accounting for insourced pricing 
Whereas there may be behavioural, solvency or tax constraints in valorizing 
insourced transactions, account recording and general contract principles are not 
sensitive to quantification. At its most simple, a contract is binding provided 
consideration is given under any agreed bargain. All things being equal, the law 
will not set aside contracts for lack of adequate consideration (Atiyah, Adams & 
MacQueen, 2010; McKendrick, 2011). As explained by the ICAEW respondent, 
RP12-SXA: ‘From a stewardship perspective, it's irrelevant to the shareholder 
because they [the group] own both the subsidiaries. The transfer has been done, 
they have a bit more value sitting here and now it's sitting there. It doesn't matter 
because it's all owned by them …But true and fair is very much in the context, 
what the accounting rules are—and what they require you to record. So in a 
situation where you have a contract, which both sides have entered into freely, to 
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sell something at less than its full value or more than its full value, if it comes to 
that…then the profit gets shifted, and as long as that contract was a proper one on 
both sides, that's what will get recorded.’ 
Consolidating Process 
In this thesis, I use the second-order theme of consolidating to infer the host 
policymakers’ view on MNEs’ actions to combine their fragmented parts and 
communicate their value-creating business model to salient stakeholders. The first-
order codes that comprise the consolidating theme are: distinguishing between 
individual and integrated group narratives; whole picture is a home HQ concern; 
and home HQ accountable to investors. 
Distinguishing between individual and integrated group narratives 
Depending on whose perspective you take, the reporting narrative will change 
(Hines, 1988; Stanton & Stanton, 2002). My research sheds light on these 
distinctive, alternative audience perspectives. Whereas the home HQ’s narrative 
takes an integrated view of the MNE’s internationalized operations and activities, 
the host subsidiary or subunit is only concerned in reporting on the fragmented 
activities assigned to it. FRC respondent RP01-GEA commented:  
 
I think we just have to be careful again between the difference of a set of group 
financial statements—consolidated annual report and accounts—and the 
individual companies [statements]… The FRC was asked by the government 
to write some guidance to help [group] companies in implementing the 
strategic report, where we've taken that integrated thinking further. They're 
really encouraging companies to communicate fully the nature of their 
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business model. And by business model, we mean how do you create value 
over the longer term. 
 
Aggregating the fragmented group operations improves coherence and 
comprehension of the firm’s business narrative to both stockholders and 
stakeholders (Cooper & Ezzamel, 2013; Eccles & Krzus, 2010). The business 
narrative is not merely accounting for group financial stewardship, but also 
accounting for other capital forms that are managed by the firm. The director of 
the IIRC, RP25-SEA, commented: ‘And I think what one of the challenges is, that 
over the last 20 or 30 years, a lot of organizations have been established to look at 
environmental capital or social capital in isolation. And what we're saying is, you 
can no longer manage value in isolation. You have to bring all the capitals together 
and recognize the interconnectedness of them… Because if you don't make that 
link, then you're never going to make the change to the way management and the 
board operates.’ 
Whole picture is a home HQ concern  
The home HQ not only makes the decisions about how individual operating 
segments should be fragmented, but also how the diverse individual operating 
segments should be re-configured for consolidated reporting purposes. The UK 
code provides that: ‘The board should present a fair, balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position and prospects.’ Not unexpectedly, the PAC 
chair, RQ26-GEP, asked the HMRC: ‘But how many of the large businesses have 
a head office outside this country?’ And the interrogant pursued this enquiry 
further: ‘But do you look, for example, with the company we are not allowed to 
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mention, at what they have been telling their shareholders about the profit rate in 
the UK? I think one of the things they told their shareholders about was the 15% 
profit rate in the UK, yet they pay not tax.’ 
The ICAEW respondent, RP12-SXA, explained the thinking of international 
accounting setters: ‘So most of the standard setters’ viewpoint is they are creating 
accounting rules for groups because it’s the ultimate external investor that needs 
the information because they are outside parties… They don’t actually tend to 
think very much about individual companies within the group because everything 
nets-out on consolidation.’ 
Home HQ accountable to investors  
From a capital-raising perspective, home capital markets take the leadership in 
setting standards to protect investor interests and their reputation (Healy & Palepu, 
2001; Kothari, 2001). Those standards devolve from governance logics embedded 
in the home nation-state’s laws, regulations and codes of conduct (Armstrong et 
al., 2010; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin & Very, 2005). Recognizing the lead assumed by 
the home nation-state, host environments generally provide relief or exemption 
from comprehensive disclosure obligations.  The relief or exemption is given on 
the understanding that the home HQ parent, through their consolidated reporting 
regime, coordinates the full, fair and balanced disclosure. FRC respondent, RP01-
GEA, explained: 
 
It's about determining that the parent has reported a consolidated group view. 
As to the “where”, the FRC is agnostic as to where the intermediate parent 
might be. Now other regulators will be less agnostic. 
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Emphasizing the governance logics in home HQ accountability, respondent 
RP01-GEA concluded: ‘it gets back to reporting for investors. So the investors 
have chosen to invest in companies that are listed wherever, and are subject to that 
regime.  Much as we get in the UK, with close to 50% of UK equities, now being 
owned by overseas investors. But those investors have chosen to invest in UK 
listed companies. I don't see it as being as any sort of deferral. It's the investors' 
choice, that they've placed their money in that way.’ That is, in the final analysis, 
a full, fair and balanced reporting for worldwide activities of an MNE, like 
Amazon, Google or Starbucks, is dictated by the home regulator, which in this 
instance is the US SEC that regulates US capital markets, such as Nasdaq and the 
New York Stock Exchange.  
Conclusion 
The findings provide fieldwork evidence of three core principles/tensions that 
guide internationalizing by MNEs inclined to engage in base erosion practices. 
These core principles/tensions are: (i) corporate rhetoric involved in acquiring and 
maintaining legitimacy through vocabulary use and work of justification; (ii) the 
justification of procedural compliance and conformity with the rules-based 
expression; and (iii) the dynamic capabilities of MNEs to cope with the tensions 
of globalization in exploiting the borderless opportunities to create and capture 
economic value yet counterbalancing this with the host location demands of 
legitimacy justification. 
Building on first-order codes, I developed seven second-order themes. Working 
recursively between first-order codes, second-order themes and extant literature, I 
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developed a sensory representation of the themes being associated with the means 
of value creation and the mechanisms of value capture. The dataflow for the 
aggregate dimension of value creation is illustrated in Figure 6.1 and the aggregate 
dimension of value capture is illustrated in Figure 6.2. From a host policymakers’ 
perspective, the elements of value creation starts with the internationalizing 
process across host locations and are augmented by the mobilizing of intangible 
and financial assets and the structural decision choices made by MNEs in engaging 
in arbitraging the plurality of differences across host locations. 
Also, in recursively working from first-order codes to second-order themes to 
extant literature and back again, I identified the four second-order themes that 
comprise the host policymakers’ perspective on the MNEs mechanisms for value 
capture. These value capture mechanisms comprise the processes of fragmenting, 
captive insourcing, valorizing and consolidating.  The processes of fragmenting 
and captive insourcing provide MNE decision-makers with the mechanisms to 
direct the extent and location of value capture. The process of valorizing provides 
MNE decision-makers with the mechanism to influence the extent of value shifting 
and capture, whilst the process of consolidation enables MNE decision-makers to 
deliver integrative group narratives to their stockholders and prospective investors. 
The implications of this analysis and findings and its implications for theory and 
practice will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the analysis of my data and findings on how 
the UK austerity cuts announcement in late 2010 became the sudden intervening 
event that placed the base erosion on the host public policy agenda and how host 
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policymakers opened the public deliberative discourse in order to make the 
problem more readily understood by the broader stakeholder class.                                     
_________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 7 – Host Policymakers Communicate, Mobilize and 
Challenge MNEs’ Conventions and Practices 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will provide an analysis of my data and findings on the events 
leading to host policymakers challenging MNEs corporate reporting and taxation 
conventions and practices. As an overview to the second-order themes that 
emerged from the analysis and findings on moving the sociopolitical deliberative 
discourse for change, see Table 7.0 below. 
Table 7.0 – Overview to second-order themes on moving the sociopolitical 
deliberative discourse for change 
Aggregate dimension Second-order themes Illustrations 
   
Opening the public 
deliberative process 
Identifying the focusing event and 
making the problem visible 
Figure 7.1, 
Chapter 7 
   
Challenging intra-field 
legitimacy 
Mobilizing stakeholders collectively 
and reappraising accounting and tax 
conventions 
Figure 7.1, 
Chapter 7 
   
Public policymaking 
dexterity 
Public policymaking deliberative 
approach, maintain stockholder-
primacy logic and redress equity 
through distributive justice 
Figure 8.1, 
Chapter 8 
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Note: Table 7.0 is a summary guide to the key concepts emerging and developed in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Dataflow of focusing event and public policy deliberative process 
Note: Figure 7.1 links an extract of the first-order codes for opening the public deliberative 
process and challenging intra-field legitimacy. 
 
I will explain how an open deliberative process evolved to address the MNE 
base erosion problem in the UK. I will do this by identifying the focusing event 
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as being the announcement of the austerity measures that triggered stakeholder 
action. I will discuss how the imposition of the austerity cuts, as a means of coping 
with unsustainable UK budgetary deficits, created the impetus for public  
deliberation around substantive institutional reform. I will show how the 
vocabulary changed in order to make this complex problem apparent and 
understandable to the host location electorate.  
I will also explain how host policymakers became mobilized to challenge the 
legitimacy of taken-for-granted conventions firmly adhered to by actors within 
each of the corporate reporting and taxation policy domains. I will also reveal the 
rationale deployed by host policymakers to collectively mobilize stakeholders by: 
naming and blaming foreign-owned MNEs; suggesting that new business models 
are ahead of host regulatory rules; and inferring that large corporations abuse their 
power. Finally, I will explore the critical elements of the problem that host 
policymakers brought to the attention of stakeholders for their deliberation and 
appraisal. 
Focusing Event 
Three first-order codes comprise the second-order theme of focusing event. 
The three codes are: identifying the focusing event as the austerity measures; why 
problem of base erosion is perceived differently now; and, the reason for the 
public disquiet. 
Identifying the focusing event as the austerity measures 
My initial conjecture was that the global financial crisis (GFC) that unfolded 
from mid-2008 was the focusing event prompting host policymakers to examine 
the base erosion phenomenon. Commentators (Bengtsson, 2011; Laux & Leuz, 
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2009) have suggested that international accounting standards and reporting on 
fair-value measurement in annual reports contributed to the onset of the GFC. 
Accountants have not only been criticized for reporting on fair-value 
measurement, but have also been discredited for failing to identify at what point 
in time a corporation ceases to be a going concern (Alzola, 2017; Kauser, Taffler 
& Tan, 2017). It has always been the role of corporate reporting to disclose risks 
that organizations face (Sikka, 2009; Whittle, Carter & Mueller, 2014). But as 
FRC respondent, RP01-GEA, observed: ‘the administrator has got to be on his 
way in a cab before an accountant will conclude that you can't use a going-
concern basis of accounting. So actually the accounting basis isn't providing very 
much of a nuanced signal about the health of the company.’  
However, the GFC was provoked by more than a group of corporations falling 
upon bad economic times (Kerr & Robinson, 2012; Starkey, 2015). It resulted 
from banks lending money at levels that exceeded any adequate security obtained 
from their borrowers; from financial institutions creating new forms of financial 
assets by batch securitizing their mortgages beyond the levels of the underlying 
collateral; and from individuals living beyond their means. Respondent RP22-
GEP commented on the failure of bank auditors (Humphrey, Loft & Woods, 
2009) to provide adequate warning signals of the pending collapse of financial 
institutions: ‘the Permanent Secretary …said, “There was a point beyond which 
even the Treasury auditors couldn't track. And for me that raised the question, 
‘What the hell were the accountants doing that were auditing these banks?”’ FRC 
respondent, RP01-GEA, observed: ‘actually I think the financial crisis showed us 
that we didn't, in financial services necessarily know where the money was.’ 
Respondent RP07-SXT added: ‘I think you need to probe a little bit more deeply 
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into the demand for this. A lot of the problems came from people wanting to live 
beyond their means and borrow too much money.’  
But for the intervention of nation-states ‘in the form of bank bailouts and fiscal 
stimuli’ (Callinicos, 2012 p.65), the global financial crisis of 2008-09 could have 
been much worse. Paradoxically, the success of the initial stimulatory 
intervention undertaken by each of the nation-states was, in time, followed by 
harsh austerity cuts (Callinicos, 2012). Significantly, the respondent findings 
indicate that it was the onset of the harsh austerity cuts that become the focusing 
event for highlighting the base erosion problem, not the earlier GFC, as 
commonly understood by commentators. PAC respondent, RP11-GEP, 
commented: 
 
It was a period in time with austerity cuts and with the real pressure that 
people were feeling in terms of their own incomes and obviously we were 
still getting the backlash…against the bankers for the way in which they had 
managed or not managed their business to the detriment of the taxpayer. 
 
In identifying the announcement of the austerity measures and austerity cuts 
as the focusing event in public policy, HMRC respondent, RP22-GET, 
commented: ‘But I think there was a time delay in that, but it is probably 
explained by when austerity started to bite in the UK. When you started getting 
things like that bedroom tax through, those sorts of things, you started to see the 
cuts in public spending.’ As a result, my fieldwork supports the austerity 
measures announcement as the focusing event that put the base erosion problem 
on the public policy agenda. The austerity measures announced in late-2010 
Orlando J. Fernandes    Chapter 7 
 
181 
(Pimlot & Giles, 2010) were paradoxically the consequence of the failure of the 
government’s earlier intervention (Callinicos, 2012). 
Why the problem is perceived differently now 
Respondent RP07-SXT explained why the problem is perceived differently 
now: ‘Academics, policymakers and think tanks have all been thinking about 
these things for a long time. I think what’s different now is that suddenly other 
people have become aware that these things are being looked at.’ Boudes & 
Laroche (2009) explain that meaning is created following a crisis by simplifying 
the story. The post-crisis narrative to base erosion is that this problem reduces 
host corporate revenue collections. Respondent RP16-GEP explained: ‘I think 
now the warning signals are going to be flashing even louder that expected tax 
takes have not been realized and that's because of more and more borrowing.’ 
Respondent RP19-SEN remarked: 
 
if something is in the public eye and it's being discussed publicly…[and] if 
you've got several competing issues, there's going to be a high probability 
that this one is going to be zoned in upon. 
 
Reason for public disquiet  
The focusing event of the austerity measures announcement started the public 
discourse on base erosion. Respondent RP04-SEP explained: ‘The reason the 
public is upset about this [is]…we might not believe what Amazon is doing. One 
is that we think that we're not getting a share of the profit that's high enough. They 
are paying the workers and the distributors, but we think that companies make a 
profit over and above wages and costs to factories as an extra bit.’ Respondent 
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RP11-GEP expressed the public disquiet as: ‘I think the public find it quite 
difficult to understand how a company that operates in a country and gleans or 
makes significant profits from their business in that country doesn't pay their—
what is seen as—fair share of tax.’ 
The FRC respondent, RP01-GEA, remarked that: ‘In quite extreme cases you 
can see that as an investor, if those distortions in the value chain are really very, 
very marked…the group you're investing in is…acting other than in the public 
interest…that's clearly something that's going to inform your view as an investor 
because that potentially is going to have reputational damage.’ The Chairperson 
for FRC’s Accounting Council, RP05-GXA, rhetorically expressed: ‘and you 
paid £4 million of tax in the UK, is that right? That has got to be wrong [laughter]. 
It just doesn't pass the smell test. It's rubbish…economic value creation is heavily 
selling, and people in the smell test will or won't give much credit to that, I think. 
My guess.’Not only was there public doubt about the evidence given before the 
PAC hearings, or the implicit objectives of the international conventions, but also 
there was widespread concern about the fairness of the actual outcomes. A 
member of the Taxation Administration Research Committee (TARC), RP06-
SXT, observed: 
 
and if we don't get it from the likes of Google and Starbucks, then the little 
tea shop down the road is going to have to pay rather more, which I think, 
intuitively, people would say, “That isn't fair”. 
 
 In addition, new business models were seen as benefiting MNEs unfairly by 
affording them host market access and protection without obliging them to make 
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a reciprocal contribution to host fiscal revenue collection. Respondent RP11-GEP 
observed: ‘Once it was exposed…it's a business model that is quite alien to our 
experience, and…if I put myself in the footsteps of a member of the public, it was 
just beyond our imagination that that's how a company would operate.’  
There is also a more sceptical view on the public disquiet deliberation, as 
expressed by respondent RP07-SXT: ‘So it's a huge, messy, complex thing. I 
think that's been one of the problems with the public debate, is this assumption 
that somehow you can hurt companies or make them pay this tax as if they're 
coming out of the company's pockets somehow, and it's not. It's just dissipated 
across society.’ 
Making the Problem Apparent 
The second-order theme of making the problem apparent comprises three first-
order codes. These first-order codes are: the role of the public, media and social 
movements; changing vocabulary in the public deliberative discourse; and the 
tensions in host nation-states between balancing growth and welfare. 
The role of the public, media and social movements 
In order to stimulate stakeholder exchanges in situations where complex 
problems have been identified by society (Blumer, 1971), it is necessary to 
broaden the participation of the public (Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004; Lee & 
Romano, 2013), the SMOs (Benford & Snow, 2000), the media, and 
policymakers in the public deliberation. Notably, the public, social movement 
organizations (SMOs), such as Occupy London (2011) and UK Uncut (2010), the 
media (Armitstead, 2012; BBC, 2012; Houlder, 2011), policymakers and inter-
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governmental organizations (IGOs) entered this public discourse (Carpini et al., 
2004). On the SMOs’ role, HMRC respondent, RP022-GET, commented that: 
 
there was obviously the group that were camped out in the city, around St 
Paul's, setting lasers up in New York…May Day Rallies and Occupy London 
protests against corporate greed. 
 
On the media role, RP22-GET noted: ‘in 2011 and 2012, there were two major 
press campaigns, The Guardian and The Times. The Guardian's one now very 
much still carrying on through their relationship with the ICIJ [International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists—a US-based non-profit group funded by 
the Centre for Public Integrity].’ Also, RP07-SXT said: ‘we've had the Daily Mail 
and Margaret Hodge and everybody stirring up ideas and tapping into that anti-
capitalist sentiment. So I don't think it will ever go back [to] quite the way it was.’ 
On the host policymakers’ role, a committee member of the PAC pertinently 
remarked: ‘But we hadn't caught up with that sort of model, and I think that 
sometimes, it is not just politicians, but even prestigious and really very skilled 
organizations, like the National Audit Office, are always having to almost try to 
play catch up. I mean it was astonishing that it took so long for that model to be 
exposed in the way that it was.’ 
With the momentum on visibility having been established at the nation-state 
level, UK policymakers also recognized the need for international visibility and 
intervention. HMRC respondent, RP22-GET, stated: ‘but once it got onto a 
political agenda I think it was at the Mexico summit—the Los Cabos Summit, 
[18-19 June 2012 Global Forum on Transparency & Exchange of Information]—
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that the G20 actually put down that they were going to watch with interest. I think 
they said something in their final statements along those lines…work [for] the 
OECD was doing in that area. That kind of got it onto the political agenda.’ The 
OECD Head of Treaties, RP21-IET, also explained how host nation-states’ 
growth initiatives had been exploited: ‘And then you can say, “Well, but we do 
hire lots of people.” Apparently that story didn't work anymore at a certain stage.’ 
As international visibility increased, so did the pressure that was exerted on host 
policymakers. As the narrative became more evocative (Boje, Rosile, Durrant & 
Luhman, 2004) and more multi-vocal (Boje, 1995), as did the urgency to expedite 
the agenda for reform (Abolafia, 2010). RP21-IET recounted the impact of this 
rapidly unfolding drama: ‘So it's very difficult to explain to the public that, for 
example, you have this picture of a woman having this kind of small soft drink 
stall next to the big factory somewhere in Africa paying more taxes, and that 
doesn't leave a lot of room for nuances anymore, because the picture is so vivid.’ 
Changing the vocabulary in the public deliberative discourse 
It is also necessary to communicate in ways that are understandable to different 
classes of stakeholders (Fisher, 1984; Weick & Browning, 1986). The motivation 
for participation by each class of stakeholder, however, may vary (Aguilera, 
Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007), but the momentum is maintained through 
the convergence of stakeholder harmony in recognizing the legitimacy of the 
sociopolitical discourse.  
The changing vocabulary highlights the plurality of viewpoints on the 
problem, from searching for fairness over procedural compliance, comparing 
corporate citizenship behaviours at home to opportunistic behaviours overseas, 
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and exposing jargon used by professionals. In highlighting the plurality of 
viewpoints, respondent RP19-SEN explained: 
 
The public debate is obviously a term which incorporates a whole range of 
public sources, very informed commentators and very uninformed 
commentators. So what I wouldn't say is the conclusion reached at in a public 
debate would necessarily have an influence on what's decided. It may, but it 
may not. What it would do is…throw into sharp relief the fact that is an issue 
which…needs to be sorted out. 
 
Clearly, there is also the plurality of motives among the different stakeholders 
in promoting the sociopolitical discourse, including those of host policymakers, 
the media and SMOs. RP07-SXT observed: ‘I think it was some quite deliberate 
stirring up of debate going on with a few individuals who had vested interests in 
creating debate.’  
In searching for fairness, whistleblowers (Near & Miceli, 1995) were 
encouraged to come forward with information on the base erosion activities of 
MNEs operating in host environments, and were granted protection by the law. 
The chair of the PAC, RQ026-GEP, observed: ‘We will continue having 
whistleblowers until we get to the bottom of the truth about all this.’ As regards 
the plurality of viewpoints, respondents continually referred to the broader class 
of affected persons as the ‘public’ (Contandriopoulos, Denis & Langley, 2004),  
intending to emphasize the legitimate concerns held by multiple actors. HMRC 
chief executive, RW035-GET, explained: ‘The idea that tax is a topic that is more 
frequently talked about in the pages of the newspaper, in the pub and around the 
dinner table is welcomed by staff, and I am encouraging them to continue that 
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debate...Generally, I think people feel good about the fact that the importance of 
paying tax is now more recognized and more talked about.’ 
Regarding the debate on opportunistic behaviour in host locations, RQ26-GEP 
remarked: ‘I use Google, and all of us round the table use Google. They [the UK 
customers] contribute to your profits but see no proper, fair contribution from you 
to corporation tax. That is the thing that bugs us all.’ With increasing competition 
from social media, the media has moved on from merely reporting the news to 
discussing and appraising its implications. TARC member, RP06-SXT, 
commented: ‘the press used to report the news, but they don't do that anymore 
because 24 hour Internet news does that for them… So, they've got to comment 
on the news, or possibly make it up.’ 
Maintaining momentum in the public deliberative discourse involves its own 
hazards. PAC member, RP11-GEP, observed: ‘it's all right for the OECD to put 
out a report that is then lost in Australia. Next week, the G20 or whenever it is, 
and if it is lost in of all the conversations around the G20 [agenda], it will take the 
journalist, and indeed the Public Accounts Committee, the politicians, to say, 
“Hey, wait a minute, what's going on here” to expose it, to bring it to public 
attention.’ RP17-GEP re-affirmed PAC’s communicative initiatives: ‘PAC 
provide a useful parliamentary function in terms of sort of bringing some of these 
issues to the forefront of people's minds and I think it's obviously captured the 
imagination of the public and the media.’ 
In exposing the jargon used by professionals, RP06-SXT observed: ‘We did 
struggle with the “true and fair”. What does it really mean? I think you would 
possibly get the response that it is in accordance with the interpretation of the 
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law.’ By changing the vocabulary used, host policymakers were opening a 
window into the problem that previously was only visible to the professionals. 
Tensions in host nation-states between balancing growth and welfare 
Making the problem visible not only involved the active participation of the 
multiple stakeholders in the sociopolitical deliberative discourse and changing the 
vocabulary to simplify the narrative, it also exposed the tensions experienced by 
host governments in balancing the demands for growth and welfare. 
Post the liberalization ideology of the 1980s (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lazonick 
& O'Sullivan, 2000), governments from advanced economies, such as the United 
States and UK, moved regulatory emphasis away from interventionism and 
instead towards deregulation (Contractor, 1990; Sentance, 2013). The primary 
motive for liberalization was to encourage economic growth and improve 
employment opportunities. Academic scholarship recognized this change in 
regulatory emphasis, particularly for nation-states close to the technological 
frontier. Mahmood & Rufin (2005 p.339) hypothesize that ‘government can 
maximize innovation by playing a merely facilitating role that allows innovation 
networks to thrive without restraint’. 
As part of host public policy in promoting economic growth, the chief 
executive of the HMRC, RW35-GET, noted: ‘It has been a policy of successive 
governments to make the UK an attractive place for business, so there are policy 
choices that have led to the reduction [in corporate tax rates].’ During my field 
interviews, the deputy director of HMT, RP14-GEP, commented on the 
competition between nation-states: ‘Oh, I like to think it's a fact. Countries 
certainly compete to be competitive in terms of tax. There are various ways in 
which they do this. The UK and a number of other countries, and so say, Ireland, 
Orlando J. Fernandes    Chapter 7 
 
189 
is an example of this, but the Dutch are also taking steps in this direction, do so 
primarily by setting a low main rate of tax.’ The ICAEW respondent, RP12-SXA, 
also remarked: ‘countries are competing on tax…but they're also competing on 
mechanisms for encouraging certain activities within their countries, which 
means it's encouraging people to move offshore from where they're originally 
based’.   
Google’s representative, RW47-OEC, indicated how his firm’s choice for 
locating FDI is influenced by host policies: ‘The challenge for governments like 
the UK Government is to think about what the right set of policies are to 
encourage competition, innovation and investment in your country, when every 
country in the world can set the tax rates and regimes that they want… Any 
international company has to make those kinds of choices on how to operate, but 
it is complicated.’ 
Not only do host nation-states invite foreign MNEs to relocate their technology 
and innovation activities, but home nation-states also encourage their domestic 
firms to internationalize, but impose protective measures to secure their own 
home tax base. RP04-SEP explained: 
 
What I'm thinking here is that the US Government has a rule in place, the 
check-the-box rule, that it knows allows some companies to avoid tax on 
foreign operations. It knows that because this rule exists, a US multinational 
can arrange its foreign activities in such a way that income that might 
otherwise have been taxed in the US isn't taxed in the US. Now that's a choice 
of the government…allowing some of these companies—the Googles’ and 
Starbucks’ types of companies to get away with some of this activity. 
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Competition between nation-states can, however, become harmful. PAC 
member, RP16-GEP, gave an example of when competition is considered to be 
harmful: ‘clearly, the deal reached by Luxembourg…individual deals with 
individual firms, which we don't know about…[is] clearly an invidious form of 
tax competition.’ However, host locations are responding to perceived harmful 
competitive policies and practices by foreign nation-states by mounting collective 
action through IGOs, such as the OECD. RP14-GEP also explained the retaliatory 
approach that may be unilaterally taken: ‘the risk from their perspective is that 
they find people [host locations] taking countermeasures. We'll say, “Fine but 
we'll just abrogate our tax treaty with you.” And actually, if you're a country that 
wants to be competitive and wants to…attract investment and be an economic 
actor, if you're cut out from the tax treaty network, you just can't do that… And 
not to be on the various OECD lists means you're not participating effectively in 
information exchange, and supporting other jurisdictions—increasingly, you risk 
blacklisting yourself.’  
When asked why the UK, as host nation-state, did not respond earlier to the 
opportunistic behaviours of foreign-owned MNEs, PAC member, RP11-GEP, 
responded: ‘I think even that's a question for government frankly…they have all 
sorts of reasons why, but actually it is an issue for government… But there doesn't 
appear to be any willingness behind it at the moment, and it may well be that 
some of those calculations that you identified have already been made.’ In 
assessing whether host locations undertake compensatory calculations by way of 
benefits derived from increased employment, payroll withholdings, and national 
insurance collections in the place of corporation tax forgone, HMT respondent, 
RP14-GEP, replied: ‘Yeah, the closest we've got to doing this is some of the work 
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that we did on the dynamic modelling of the effects of corporation tax rate cuts 
on business investment—why we think there is a causal link… It still comes down 
to this being a pretty crude piece of guesswork. Even with modern economic 
modelling, behavioural science, and other techniques being employed and the 
computing power that we can use to make these models work, still it's educated 
guess work, and no more than that.’ 
I also asked an information intermediary, RP18-SEN, whether they mark down 
(Plumlee, 2003) their forward projections on fair-carrying stock values to 
recognize a possible retaliatory response from host locations. RP18-SEN replied: 
‘The view from the investment community is that this doesn't come in 
until…really 2020…It's just not close enough…even that [EU break-up demands] 
doesn't really seem to be impacting stock market sentiments…because a lot of the 
investors, 90 percent of Google, is owned by US investors. They're very US 
focused.’ That is to say, information intermediaries view any possible adjustment 
to profit projections arising from base erosion problem as being too remote or 
uncertain to affect equity valuations. Notwithstanding the neutral position taken 
by information intermediaries, the OECD report (OECD, 2013 p.30) highlighted 
the mandatory disclosure obligations that are imposed on MNEs to provide 
disclosure on uncertain tax positions ‘if it is more likely than not that the tax 
administration would not accept the position taken, assuming that it was in 
possession of all the facts’.  
The Starbucks Corporation’s annual report (Starbucks Corporation, 2013 p.37) 
stated: ‘Income tax liabilities for uncertain tax positions were excluded, as we are 
not able to make a reliable estimate of the amount and period of related future 
payments.’ Amazon.com (2013 p.12) reported: ‘many countries in the European 
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Union, and a number of other countries are actively considering changes in this 
regard…the final outcome of tax audits and any related litigation could be 
materially different from our historical income tax provisions and accruals’. 
Google Inc (2013 p.40) reported: ‘Significant judgment is required in evaluating 
our uncertain tax positions… Although we believe we have adequately reserved 
for our uncertain tax positions, no assurance can be given that the final tax 
outcome of these matters will not be different.’  
Collective Mobilization of Stakeholders 
The second-order theme of mobilizing stakeholders collectively comprises 
four first-order codes. These first-order codes are: blaming the foreign-owned 
MNEs; business models ahead of the rules; collectively challenging intra-field 
taken-for-granted views; the power of large corporates; and the competency of 
host regulators in coping with opportunism from the foreign-owned MNEs. 
Blaming the foreign-owned MNEs 
The feature of US policy of encouraging their US-headquartered MNEs to 
invest abroad is not new. More than five decades earlier, on 20 April 1961, John 
F. Kennedy made a special address to Congress explaining the potential outcomes 
of such a focus on external FDI. The US President then stated: ‘the strains which 
have developed in our balance of payments position in the last few years, compel 
us to examine critically certain features of our tax system which, in conjunction 
with the tax system of other countries, consistently favor United States private 
investment abroad compared with investment in our own economy’ (Congress of 
the United States, 1961). The President outlined how the home location was being 
impacted by such policy bias: ‘Profits earned abroad by American firms operating 
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through foreign subsidiaries are, under present tax laws, subject to United States 
tax only when they are returned to the parent company in the form of dividends. 
In some cases, this tax deferral has made possible indefinite postponement of the 
United States tax; and, in those countries where income taxes are lower than in 
the United States, the ability to defer the payment of US tax by retaining income 
in the subsidiary companies provides a tax advantage for companies operating 
through overseas subsidiaries that is not available to companies operating solely 
in the United States’ (Congress of the United States, 1961). 
At the public hearings, the PAC chair, RQ26-GEP, in questioning the HMRC 
respondent, RW35-GET, indicated that the blame should rest with the US MNEs 
operating in the UK: ‘I am not sure we would say you are on top of them; that is 
the problem. If you look at all of them—don’t only take one, but look at all of 
them in there—and look at their turnover and profits, as reported quite often in 
the States, on their UK business, their tax in relation to either the turnover or the 
profits reported in the stock exchange commission in the United States does not 
bear any relationship whatever to the corporation tax they pay here.’ The PAC 
chair continued: 
 
You look at these big businesses doing big business in the UK and your 
corporation tax take varies from zero, 2 percent, 3 percent or 4 percent. It’s 
all down in the nothings… Without taking any individual case, you can look 
across the whole range of them and you cannot then tell us that that reflects 
a fair corporation tax credit to the UK Treasury from the business they 
transact here and the profits they make, as shown in their American accounts. 
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In questioning that was directed at the US MNE, the PAC chair, RQ35-GEP, 
reiterated: ‘All three of you are American-based companies, which is also of 
particular interest. Can I start with Starbucks? My understanding is that you filed, 
in Companies House, losses for most of the years that you have been running 
coffee houses in the UK… But can you name me one company—one 
multinational company, one US-based company—that has a 31 percent market 
share by turnover and has been making losses for 15 years?’ The PAC respondent, 
RP16–GEP, addressing the representative of Amzon.com: ‘I love the service you 
provide when you write to me and say, “Having bought this biography of John 
Major, you may also be interested in ‘Fifty Shades of Grey’”. But like the Chair, 
I am interested in why you pay so little tax—particularly corporation tax—in this 
country. If you paid more, we could pay some kind of benefit to all the booksellers 
you have put out of business.’ 
Reasons given for naming and blaming US MNEs included: adopting secretive 
and deceptive organizational practices; engaging in unfair competition in host 
locations; and applying laws in ways unintended by the host legislature. PAC 
member, RP11-GEP, explained the deception argument: ‘And everybody just 
thought we were buying from Amazon…fair enough… You can get your books 
downloaded to Kindle and all the rest of it, but people think that they're buying 
from somewhere local. If I'm in Scotland, and if I buy from Amazon, I think it's 
coming from Dunfermline, which is just up the road. I'm sure other people think 
that.’ PAC member, RP16-GEP, explained the unfair competition argument: 
‘And this is compounded by the takeover of British firms by American firms, 
which brings them into a new tax relationship whereby they can side-track profits 
through the British firm into another jurisdiction.’ FRC respondent, RP05-GXA, 
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explained how foreign-owned MNEs were manipulating the laws cross-
jurisdictionally: ‘I think what has happened in the cases like Amazon and Google, 
is they've been able to structure within the law quite properly—such that their 
economic activity appears in a different place to that arrangement. And so that 
leads to this lack of trust that accounting doesn't work, and tax doesn't work, and 
probably it should be fixed.’ 
Business models ahead of the rules 
Throughout history, there have always been new ways to monetize commercial 
opportunities. Presently, it is the speed and ubiquity of digital innovation that 
pervades all forms of organizing and organization which is most noticeable 
(Castells, 2010; Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011).  The expression ‘business model’ 
(Ghaziani & Ventresca, 2005) entered our vocabulary in the mid-1970s, but only 
took off from the early 1990s as digital innovation became more extensively used 
and thereafter commercialized on a global scale. 
Many of the respondents remarked on the manner in which these new business 
models (Chetty, Martin & Martin, 2014; Jones & Coviello, 2005) began to 
outpace established rules, norms and conventions. PAC member, RP11-GEP, 
noted: 
 
But we hadn’t caught up with that sort of model, and I think that sometimes 
this is where, not just politicians, but even prestigious and really very skilled 
organizations, like the National Audit Office, are always having to almost try 
to play catch up. I mean, it was astonishing that it took so long for that model 
to be exposed in the way that it was.  
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Not only is the technology now widely applied, but it has also diffused globally 
at a rapid pace in comparison to prior innovation eras (Autio, Sapienza & 
Almeida, 2000; Casillas & Acedo, 2013). RP11-GEP continued: ‘It used to be by 
a wave your hands and things like that. Now it's a button pressed, and you can 
either have a surge in the markets worldwide or come to a complete collapse.’ 
ICAEW respondent, RP12-SXA, explained how these new business models 
challenged assumptions held on location-specific advantages: ‘So I think there 
was a bit of the fact that e-commerce is running ahead of the rules that expected 
that you had to have a bit of plant here and you couldn't move it, and also you'd 
want to contract under English law wouldn't you?’ For international convention 
on attributing economic activity to source nation-states, RP14-GEP explained: 
‘What has really caused the definition to start creaking a little bit, is the difficulty 
of applying this in the context of the digital economy, where you have a situation 
where a lot of the functions that are not considered to create a PE, so things like 
advertising, market research, can be done electronically, and you can gather very 
significant quantities of data, and conduct a very high level and a very 
sophisticated level of activity without the need to create a taxable presence, and 
that's just a result of the development of technology.’ 
Collectively challenging intra-field taken-for-granted views 
Within the international taxation domain, policymakers, regulators, external 
advisors and in-house corporate tax officers have developed conventions and 
cognitive maps to determine when MNEs, in the course of their 
internationalization endeavours, have established a presence in a particular host 
nation-state. Also within the corporate reporting domain, policymakers, 
regulators, external advisors and in-house accounting officers have also 
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developed conventions and cognitive maps to determine how MNEs, should 
report on their internationalized operations, distinguishing between the 
independent requirements of host and home locations.  
My fieldwork provides evidence of the collective efforts made by multiple 
stakeholders to challenge the taken-for-granted orthodoxy in the international tax 
domain. TARC member, RP06-SXT, commented: ‘Going back to the work we're 
doing now, I think that is really being drawn back by things like the reputation, 
the fairness, and the press debates. And it's interesting from an academic point of 
view, is that it's not the hard legal aspects: the law hasn't changed necessarily, it's 
that the interpretation has.’ PAC member, RP16-GEP, explained how the 
committee sought to open deliberative process: 
 
‘We couldn't actually do anything apart from expose what was going on. 
Which needed more pressure. That's why we organized the conference a 
couple of months back in the City, which was sponsored by one of the 
accountancy houses to promote the issue [chuckles]. In fact, it was really a 
fight back by the vested interest but at least the platform was there for 
concern. So I think we have opened a can of worms, and it's up to us now 
to fish out more worms and deal with them.’ 
 
TARC respondents gave examples of how stakeholders were mobilized to 
challenge established conventions. RP06-SXT observed: ‘what it does do is it 
energizes other people. You talk to the students and they know about it… They 
have read something in, hopefully, the Sunday papers that are not the broadsheets, 
the more reflective pieces. They want to talk to you about it…my research 
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colleague…her comment is, “The bloke down at the pub knows about transfer 
pricing,” [laughter] and she's absolutely right.’ RP08-SXT explained how host 
policymakers also encouraged stakeholders to reflect on the sociopolitical 
implications of these new business models: ‘But, if I tell you that Amazon have 
this huge warehouse, all the books are in the warehouse, and they are in receipt 
of your order, not directly but indirectly in receipt of your order, human beings 
pop it in a packet and send it off to you. Don't you think that that should be taxed? 
Or don't you think that that's unfair? Or don't you think that, in some way, that 
should be captured?” Isn't there an element of prompting going on?’ 
Another example of stakeholders challenging international taxation 
conventions is provided by the remark of the OECD head of treaties, RP21-IET: 
‘Look, I think the central issue is, “Where is the economic activity that's 
generating the profits occurring?” Often that will be the place that is seen to be 
the headquarters, but it may not be. But appropriate recognition has to occur of 
where the activity that is generating the profits is actually occurring. I think that 
is the central focus… Unfortunately, the existing rules don't always deliver that 
outcome, and that's why we're here.’ 
Referring to the challenges of the corporate reporting conventions, the PAC 
chair, RQ29-GEP, rhetorically expressed to the Starbucks witness, RW45-OEC: 
‘As I understand it, there were 46 separate conference calls. Let me to take you 
to 2008. You filed losses in the UK company’s accounts of £26 million, yet 
Schultz told analysts that the UK business was so successful that he planned to 
take the lessons learned here and apply them to the USA… That sounds a bit 
odd—on the one hand you were claiming losses in the accounts you were filing 
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in Companies House, but on the other you were promoting profits and promoting 
the individual responsible for the UK business.’ 
The MNE representatives attending the PAC hearings acknowledged the 
failure of their organizations to communicate cogent reasons for their peculiar 
patterns of organizing (Drori, Meyer & Hwang, 2015; Meyer & Bromley, 2013) 
across host locations. The Starbucks representative, RW45-OEC, remarked: ‘I 
appreciate that. That is very unfortunate and we feel terrible about it. We honestly 
feel as though we have not intended to mislead anybody. We are trying to be very 
transparent. I appreciate that the media attention has made it look that way, so we 
need to do a better job of finding a way to communicate.’  
Power of large corporations 
Host locations perceive MNEs’ power as a threat to their sovereignty in as far 
as they restrain their decision-making powers (Agmon, 2003; Nebus & Rufin, 
2010), as well as a threat to the survival of small businesses in the host 
environment. In questioning the HMRC, PAC member, RP16-GEP, rhetorically 
remarked: 
 
But if the government is saying to big corporations, “Come here, we’ll give 
you a happy tax regime and possibly dinner with Dave Hartnett,” they are 
also saying to you, “Go easy on the big boys,” and, ipso facto, “Be tougher 
with the ones who can’t leave and have to pay their taxes here.” That is the 
reality, surely. You are handling the big corporations more gently, more 
delicately, more kindly and more generously than the small and medium-
sized enterprises—British companies that cannot shift their affairs through a 
tax haven. 
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The head of tax policy at the OECD, RP20-IET, explained the concern that 
nation-states have about MNEs’ power over oligopolistic markets: ‘I think the 
notion of the multinational corporation has over time attracted some attention 
from many in the public because of concerns about the power of some of these 
organizations… If I think about when I used to wear my hat as the Minister of the 
Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, there was always a lot of distrust 
about those markets—particularly the big consumer markets—where there were 
often a handful of dominant operators.’ And in the contested power space between 
host nation-states and MNEs, respondent RP20-IET explained that nation-states’ 
sovereign powers are limited by boundaries, whereas the MNE internationalizing 
process is not so constrained: ‘So, even if a corporate group has a presence within 
a jurisdiction there are limits to what you can do to those parts of the corporation 
that don't have a direct presence. And, that is the case, not just in tax policy, but 
in all areas of [public] policy. This is one of the fundamental difficulties that 
nation-states have in regulating multinational entities…essentially limited by the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction.’ 
Competency of host regulators 
Besides the jurisdictional constraints on nation-states, there is inevitably 
stakeholder concern about whether host regulators (Morrell & Tuck, 2014) are 
adequately resourced (Mueller et al., 2015; Whittle et al., 2014)  to cope with the 
power of MNEs. TARC member, RP06-SXT, expressed the general perception 
of the challenges faced by host tax regulators in recruiting and retaining staff: ‘So 
I think they have got a whole bundle of problems: that it's not a particularly well 
paid job, it's not a particularly well respected job. And I think some people would 
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look upon the training as a very useful way of getting into professional firms.’ As 
far as the recruitment and training of competent staff is concerned, RW35-GET 
indicated: ‘I think we are smart enough…we not only recruit the best but train 
them well… We keep many people for the whole of their career…and what I will 
say is that they are often made offers by firms, which they resist. I think that some 
people are still very motivated by the public service ethos.’ 
There is also the issue of balancing transparency and the burden of additional 
mandatory disclosure obligations. RP07-SXT explained: ‘The tax rules and 
everything are just so complex everywhere, and it's almost impossible to distil 
them into anything that would be meaningful to a non-expert, rightly or wrongly. 
So any attempt to force disclosure of things is only ever going to be a superficial 
thing, because you can never get into enough detail.’ 
In order to maintain cohesion in mobilizing stakeholder engagement 
collectively, host regulators strive to re-focus the discourse on the behaviour of 
the foreign-headquartered MNEs. The HMRC executive director, RW35-GET, 
commented: ‘That is one of the reasons why we have pushed the debate with big 
business on having tax in the boardroom. Tax is not something you can just push 
off to your finance people to do in a corner; the main board needs to think about 
where a company is positioning itself. As part of that debate, we have very clear 
discussions with companies about where we see them on our risk profile.’  
Reappraising Accounting and Tax Conventions for Fairness 
The second-order theme of reappraising accounting and tax conventions for 
fairness comprises five first-order codes. These first-order codes that identify the 
critical elements in challenging the intra-field taken-for-granted orthodoxy are: 
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corporate accounts act as a basis to reconcile local tax exposure; locating 
economic activity; convention threshold for recognizing taxable presence; 
strategically avoiding host location taxable nexus; and the risk–reward 
relationship. 
Corporate accounts act as a basis to reconcile local tax exposure 
Corporate accounts that are prepared by foreign-owned subsidiaries provide 
an accepted starting point for regulatory authorities to reconcile those accounts 
with the tax adjustments prepared for host environment regulators (Freedman, 
2008). The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting recognizes that 
besides stockholders, other stakeholders may also seek to rely on these reports. 
In a qualified manner, the framework states: ‘Other parties, such as regulators and 
members of the public other than investors, lenders and other creditors, may also 
find general purpose financial reports useful. However, those reports are not 
primarily directed to these other groups.’ (IASB, 2010, item OB10). Executive 
director of FRC’s Codes and Standards, RP01-GEA, placed in context what the 
minimum corporate disclosure requirements are at the individual entity level: 
‘What we did do when we were developing that regime was look quite hard at 
those areas where we would still require that there was disclosure in full detail of 
the individual entities position, and not rely on the fact that the aggregate had 
been disclosed. And of course, a lot of that was driven around things like 
sufficient information for HMRC’s purposes, because they have a requirement to 
be able to tie everything back to a report on accounts.’ 
The TARC respondent, RP07-SXT, affirmed the reliance that the host 
regulatory authorities place on host individual entity accounts: 
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The practical answer is, where else would you start? To go on, as long as you 
have an understanding of how the items appear and why the items appear in 
the balance sheet and the profit and loss, you can unravel as necessary and 
recreate as necessary. 
 
Addressing the host location adjustments required to move to reportable 
taxable profit, HMT director, RP14-GEP, noted: ‘We do use the accounts as a 
reference point for looking up wider company activities and levels of profit, and 
things like that. From the perspective of actually administering the tax system, 
the key documentation is the tax return.’ 
The ICAEW respondent, RP12-SXA, indicated that individual entity accounts 
at host subsidiary or subunit level are not only required for local tax reconciliation 
purposes but also for assessing the level of available distributable reserves. RP12-
SXA explained: ‘In other words, to make a distribution from an individual entity 
account, which is where distributions are paid, you must have a statutory set of 
true and fair set of accounts to determine “the profit”.’ For the purposes of 
compiling “true and fair” individual entity accounts, RP12-SXA affirmed the 
stockholder primacy perspective that guides corporate disclosure: ‘So the 
standard setters have narrowed the view as to what information is most 
appropriate because they can't serve multiple masters, and that means that when 
the tax authorities come along and look at the individual entity accounts, they 
accept the basic premise of accounting standards but then they adjust things…  
And as long as they understand what the starting point is, they're happy to then 
apply whatever rules they need to do that.’ 
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Locating where economic activity occurs 
According to international tax convention, the host nation-state should have 
taxing power over economic activity that is located within the state or has 
sufficient nexus to the state (Dharmapala, 2014; Evers, Miller & Spengel, 2014; 
Graetz, 2016). The OECD, through the BEPS project, emphasized this nexus 
principal (OECD, 2013, 2015f). At the PAC hearings, the Google’s respondent, 
RW47-OEC, explained that their organization’s European nexus was located in 
Ireland: ‘When we came to Europe—we will have to check on the exact timing 
of the opening of operations in different markets—we set up Dublin as our 
European headquarters pretty rapidly. We set that up because we wanted to be 
able to contract with customers across the whole of Europe, not just in the UK. 
Today, Dublin has 3,000 people, five buildings and two data centres. It is our 
largest operation in Europe. Any advertiser in the UK, Germany, France or any 
European country contracts with Google in Ireland, because that is where they 
have the rights to sell Google advertising.’ Similarly, Amazon’s director for 
public policy, RW46-OEC, indicated that their organization’s European nexus 
was located in Luxembourg: ‘To give the Committee a sense, we have in excess 
of 500 people working there. In fact, we are still recruiting very heavily and we 
expect to add another 100 people to our headquarters in Luxembourg.’ 
In giving evidence for Google, RW47-OEC emphasized the need to locate 
where the value-creating activities were occurring: ‘The first is that 90 percent of 
the spend by British companies with Google is on an auction basis, okay? The 
price is set by the auction in the moment that you do your search…there is no 
ability to negotiate on price or terms in that respect. Secondly, the people in the 
UK don’t have the rights to sell; they only have the ability to promote, because 
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the rights are owned by Google Ireland... Thirdly, as I said earlier, 99 percent of 
the UK companies that spend money with Google spend it without seeing or 
talking to anybody who is in Google UK Ltd, because they do it online.’  
The auditor-general for the National Audit Office, RQ31-GEP, questioned 
whether Google’s prestige client transactions had an economic nexus with the UK 
as distinct from the online auction sales: ‘You have been talking about this vast 
number of sales that are done directly with Ireland. Can we characterize the nature 
of the sales that are not handled there, or which have UK intervention—if I can 
call it that to keep you comfortable about the language? These in fact are the 
larger and more complex buyers of advertising, and your people are involved in 
helping them to develop media plans, in talking to advertising agencies about 
what the appropriate media plans are, and they are getting involved in devising 
the whole strategic approach to promoting the product. That is correct, isn’t it?’ 
Instead of replying to the question on domestic initiated sales, RW47-OEC 
responded: ‘I think this all hinges on selling, and selling has a range of activities 
within it, which is why I am being precise in my language about the activities.’ 
Attributing the location of where value is created can be complex, not only for 
online e-commerce businesses, but also for traditional businesses. It turns on the 
practices of worth that are determined by the MNE. FRC respondent, RP05-GXA, 
gave the following example: 
 
Take Lonmin which is a different example. So Lonmin, it has no clients in 
South Africa because platinum is sold to Mitsubishi in Japan, Johnson 
Matthey in the UK, BASF in Germany… So you get the argument from some 
people that says, “Why is Lonmin in London? Because there's no business in 
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London.” Well, that depends whether you're thinking about producing the 
metal or selling the metal. Again, if you go back to 27,000 employees, there 
are 10 involved in selling it, and the other 26,990-odd digging it up and 
processing it and so on. So it's quite a good argument, that it's really a South 
African company. Now, if you're a shareholder in Lonmin, you may say, 
“Well, I understand all of that, but I'd still rather it was a UK company, 
because it's easier for us to access the capital markets based in London.”  
Convention threshold for recognizing taxable presence 
The initial stages of internationalizing (Andersen, 1993; Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977) by way of exporting or using distributors do not require a foreign-owned 
MNE to establish a physical presence. However, in the latter stages of 
internationalizing, setting up sales subsidiaries or production facilities in host 
locations will create a taxable presence. Since the initiative of the League of 
Nations in 1928 (Graetz, 2016), the convention threshold for recognizing taxable 
presence is based on having a physical presence in the host location or a sufficient 
nexus to the economic activity that is carried on in the host location. This 
convention threshold, although having being challenged from time to time, has 
continued to be the determinative test in granting taxing rights to host locations 
(Dijkman, De Buck & Brouwers, 2011; OECD, 2010). 
The deputy director for HMT, RP14-GEP, explained the problem with the 
nexus principle under the convention of the permanent establishment rules: ‘What 
has really caused the definition to start creaking a little bit is the difficulty of 
applying this in the context of the digital economy, where you have a situation 
where a lot of the functions [that] are not considered to create a PE [permanent 
establishment]. So things like advertising, market research can be done 
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electronically, and you can gather very significant quantities of data, and conduct 
a very high level and a very sophisticated level of activity without the need to 
create a taxable presence; and that's just a result of the development of 
technology. The question, then, is how do you actually ensure that that activity is 
taken into account in the definition of permanent establishment, and that's 
something that's currently being debated within the OECD.’ 
Besides the problem with outdated exceptions or exempted activities to the 
physical presence threshold rules, digital transacting is creating a perceived 
inequity in profit allocation that is not otherwise possible in the physical presence 
context. In explaining the practice view on these threshold rules, RW50-SET 
explained to the PAC members: 
 
The question of whether the transaction is taxable essentially depends upon 
whether that non-resident company has a permanent establishment in the UK. 
As we discussed at the last hearing on this, the law is very clear: when trade 
is conducted through a website that is based outside the UK, and that website 
is owned by a company that can take advantage of a tax treaty with the UK, 
essentially there is no permanent establishment. 
 
The problem with the convention threshold, as noted by the OECD head of 
treaties, RW21-GET, is that: ‘There [are] too many exceptions that allow people 
to have nexus in a country without having to allocate profits arising from the 
permanent establishment threshold.’ In attempting to make sense of the physical 
presence nexus, HMRC respondent, RP22-GET, observed: ‘I don't think it was 
ever a subconscious decision to do that. It was just the way the world was.’ 
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The logic of the convention threshold, in essence, was to promote international 
trade and to avoid or minimize the possibilities of double taxation—that is to say, 
it was intended to mediate the taxing rights over cross-border sales thereby 
avoiding double taxation. However, what has transpired from the PAC hearings 
and the BEPS report is that convention rules have not only mediated the 
avoidance of double taxation, but have also have enabled the avoidance of double 
non-taxation by MNEs inclined to engage in base erosion. 
Strategically avoiding host location taxable nexus 
It is not uncommon for MNEs to include tax haven or quasi-tax haven 
locations within their consolidated group (Maffini, 2009) to coordinate their 
treasury or technology resources (Karkinsky & Riedel, 2009). Furthermore, 
MNEs will elect to internalize overseas markets over non-equity alliance or 
subcontracting arrangements where the benefits outweigh the costs (Buckley, 
1988). Advances in information and communication technologies have supported 
a more timely process in integrating the resultant dispersed group activities 
(Gooris & Peeters, 2015). 
What emerged from the PAC hearings (PAC-UK, 2012, 2013) and the work 
of the OECD (OECD, 2013, 2015c) is that MNEs engaging in base erosion 
practices are more willing to include opaque structures within their corporate 
group in order to maximize their arbitrage opportunities and to use accounting 
and taxation conventions in order to benefit from the avoidance of double non-
taxation than MNEs that do not pursue such aggressive positions. Amazon’s 
director of public policy, RW45-OEC, gave evidence that: ‘Our revenues across 
Europe for 2011 for Amazon EU Sarl were €9.1 billion. Our profit after tax was 
€20 million.’  In reply, PAC member, RQ39-GEP, raised the inquiry: ‘What I am 
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interested in is how you are stripping out the profits in Luxembourg, because that 
is the impression. If it is €9.1 billion going to €20 million that suggests that you 
are stripping out the profit in Luxembourg. Who owns the holding company?’ 
When Amazon’s director of public policy indicated that he did not know the 
parent’s host location, RQ39-GEP responded: ‘It is incredible that you wouldn’t 
know who owns the holding company. It is just not credible.’ 
PAC member, RQ39-GEP, in seeking to penetrate the opaqueness of Google’s 
overseas structures asked: 
 
But then there is the more interesting question about what happens to the 
money from Ireland. As I understand it, that is going to Bermuda, and the 
question in my mind is why is that not being captured from a US tax 
perspective? The phrase that was suggested to me is that there is a way, in 
terms of US filings, that one can get around this, which is referred to as 
“checking the box”, hence my question. 
 
Google’s representative, RW47-OEC, avoided answering the question, 
responding: ‘I am not familiar with the phrase you mention.’ But without further 
evidence forthcoming, PAC member, RP16-GEP, conjectured: ‘Now, the 
interesting question is what that does for the shareholders…it does not benefit 
them—they cannot get their hands on it because 30 percent tax would have to be 
paid for it to be repatriated to America, to the shareholders. It sits there in a cash 
mountain. It makes no contribution to all the research and development—the new 
technologies that you have been telling us about—that is carried on in California; 
it just sits there.’  
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The risk–return reward relationship 
The concept of profit can be considered from the multiple perspectives of its 
becoming and its being (Lukka, 1990). From a traditional accounting viewpoint, 
profit is a socially-constructed net surplus or residue earnings determined by 
deducting expenditure and amortizations from gross revenues derived (Ball, 
Kothari & Robin, 2000; Hines, 1988). From a contemporary accounting 
perspective, profit incorporates the transformational features of financialization 
(Muller, 2014) that impact residue earnings through layering changes that have 
been legitimized by regulators and contemporary accounting practice (Alon & 
Dwyer, 2016; Bengtsson, 2011). 
From an economic perspective, the distributable components of profit 
comprise both functional and non-functional reward components. The functional 
reward components comprise a return on labour and rent from equity capital 
employed; and, in markets with incomplete information, the non-functional 
reward component is the residual return for managing risk and uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921; Weston, 1954). From an organizational perspective, firms are able 
to appropriate or capture value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Pitelis, 2009) 
through commercializing existing inventions, enclosing reward potential from 
future inventions (Ahuja, Lampert & Novelli, 2013) or through benefiting from 
exogenous changes (Weston, 1954).  
In this research project, respondents sought a deeper understanding of the 
profit concept, the practices of valuation and orders of worth (Beckert & Aspers, 
2011; Kornberger, 2017). The PAC member, RW28-GEP, enquired of Starbucks: 
‘My last question, then. Are you saying that essentially the value created is 
created in Switzerland or the Netherlands, and not the UK; so when I buy a cup 
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of coffee in the UK the value for the purposes of tax and tax collection is created 
in Switzerland or the Netherlands, and not when I buy the coffee? That is what, 
essentially, you are saying.’  
On the organizational aspects of managing risk, respondent RP04-SEP 
remarked: ‘Another thing that companies do, that from an economic point of view 
is bizarre, is to try to allocate risk across companies. They allocate risk—I'm not 
really sure how this fits in to contract law—but they allocate risk as a way to 
basically move tax payments. So you could say that I'm the subsidiary, I fully 
own this other subsidiary, but this subsidiary takes on the risk for some project; 
the risk of the financing or the risk of intellectual property, and therefore, they 
earn the profit.’ And in the context of the annual report respondent RP10-GEP 
explained: ‘So what you actually want out of an annual report from our point of 
view, is to understand where the risks from activities are actually seriously taking 
place, to actually make sure the profit is following those risks from activities. So 
that's what I would like to see in an annual report.’ 
The OECD head of treaties, RP021-IET, referred to the challenge of 
distributive fairness in management exercising discretion over organizational 
risks: ‘I think allocation of risk has been identified as one of the key—like 
allocation of intangibles—one of the key issues we need to address…profitability 
of a company comes from assets, risks, and functions. But functions are very 
tangible. You can see the people. Assets are tangible. You can see the buildings. 
But risks are not that tangible. They are very intangible. So understanding risk 
and how risk plays a role in this whole factual substance story is key part of our 
work.’ 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explained how the austerity cuts announcement in late 2010 
in the UK became that sudden intervening or focusing event that placed the base 
erosion problem on the host public policy agenda. Prior to this intervention, the 
base erosion phenomenon and its potential harm to the host economy had not 
been visible to the public, media and SMOs. In analyzing the data, I showed how 
host policymakers opened the public deliberative discourse on the problem. Host 
policymakers made the problem visible by collectively engaging with the public, 
SMOs, IGOs, host government agencies and self-regulatory associations. Not 
only did host policymakers made the problem apparent but they also changed the 
vocabulary used to describe the problem in order to make it more readily 
understood by the broader stakeholder class. The new vocabulary related to the 
differences between MNE citizenship behaviour at home and abroad, the multiple 
stakeholder perspectives of the problem, fairness and reciprocity over procedural 
opportunistic compliance and a questioning of jargon and concepts surrounding 
base erosion. 
In order to obtain legitimacy in the framing of the base erosion problem, host 
policymakers mobilized stakeholders by gaining collective consensus on 
following five aspects: (i) blaming the foreign-owned MNEs; (ii) identifying new 
business models as being ahead of rules and conventions; (iii) the need to 
collectively challenge intra-field taken-for-granted views; (iv) the multilateral 
power of MNEs in arbitraging multiple governance systems; and (v) defending 
the competency of host regulators to cope with MNEs’ multilateral power. 
Finally, in order to reappraise and challenge the accounting and taxation 
conventions and practices of MNEs, host policymakers identified the critical 
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elements for evaluating fairness, comprising: using corporate accounts as a basis 
to reconcile local tax exposure; locating where economic activity occurs; 
examining the convention threshold for recognizing taxable presence; exposing 
strategic avoidance of host location taxable presence; and revisiting the risk–
return reward relationship. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss my analysis and findings on how host 
policymakers shifted the public deliberative process towards making evaluative 
sociopolitical legitimacy judgments. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 8 – Moving Toward Sociopolitical Judgements on Base 
Erosion: Analysis and Findings 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will outline my findings on how host policymakers addressed 
the challenge of shifting entrenched perspectives within the disciplinary domains 
of corporate reporting policy and international taxation policy. I will show how, 
by using a public deliberative process they exposed the unfairness of MNE base 
erosion practices. That is to say, notwithstanding the symbolic and procedural 
conformity of MNEs within each of the disciplinary domains, the distributive 
unfairness that was revealed by host policymakers enabled change to policy 
alternatives that exhibited sociopolitical legitimacy. 
I will show the dexterity with which host policymakers, whilst acknowledging 
the underlying stockholder-primacy logic in corporate reporting policy, exposed 
the distributive unfairness of taxable presence conventions in international tax 
policy. As stakeholders, regulators have an expectation of fairness in the 
distribution of MNEs’ host location economic activities. Where MNEs’ 
internationalizing practices are perceived by stakeholders to be inequitable, this 
will lead to a retaliatory response that, in turn, stimulates intermediary 
intervention. My data analysis (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2) will show how it became 
necessary to mediate a multi-party commitment for dealing with disruptive inter 
nation-state competition.   
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Public Policymaking Deliberative Approach 
The second-order theme of public policymaking deliberative approach 
comprises two first-order codes. These first-order codes are: solution is a public 
policy issue and collective consensus in examining policy options. 
Solution is a public policy issue 
Most respondents indicated that host public policy and regulations needed 
amendment in order to mitigate the harmful effects of the base erosion 
phenomenon. The chair of FRC’s Accounting Council, RP05-GXA, 
acknowledged that corporate reporting was not necessarily giving a fair reflection 
of where MNEs’ actual economic activities were occurring. Respondent RP05-
GXA observed: ‘the public policy issue…is a common sense test…there is a lot 
of economic activity not now reflected in the accounts or around that domain 
name.’ Respondent RP05-GXA explained that the problem for host policymakers 
attempting to design policy change based on formulary apportionment of MNEs’ 
value-creation across host locations is that: ‘you can attribute some value to the 
sales process, and some to the production process, and you could do all of that. 
But the trouble, I think is…you land up with a model, and models are okay except 
that no model works in the tails.’  
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Figure 8.1 – Dataflow of public policymaking dexterity 
Note: Figure 8.1 is based on an extract of the first-order codes that illustrates public policy 
dexterity in shifting the deliberative discourse. 
 
Respondents recognized that there is a public policy tension between the 
compiling of annual reports, which is based on the stockholder-primacy logic, 
and the demand for accounting reports, which meet the informational 
requirements of a broader stakeholder class. The FRC respondent, RP03-GXA, 
commented: ‘You now run into…public policy issues though about whether 
financial reports address situations where special-purpose user can't actually get 
that information. And single-country reporting is a good example of that… So, 
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single-country reporting, in theory, the host country, say in Africa, can get all the 
information it wants to about the operations, the profits, and the tax paid in that 
country…Now, the major countries like the US, the EU...are bringing in single-
country reporting requirements.’    
Chief strategy officer for IIRC, RP25-MSEA, indicated: ‘Well, I think the 
politicians are out of sync with often the reality of how business is done. But the 
businesses are seemingly out of sync with public opinion and that's also 
dangerous for them. I think there is work to do on both sides… I think having a 
more honest dialogue with the public and with regulators and government…about 
the choices that businesses actually face every day about where they locate, about 
how they make these decisions about tax policy, and actually have a more 
informed discussion about them.’ 
Collective consensus in examining policy options 
In framing policy solutions, host policymakers sought collective consensus on 
alternative policy option changes. Many of the alternative policy options, 
although briefly considered, did not feature as a realistic policy alternative. 
Examples included: the European Union applying a consolidated fiscal regime 
and formulaically distributing collected revenues across states in the economic 
region; abolishing corporate taxation in its entirety and substituting other fiscal 
measures; changing the basis of taxation from the nexus of a tax presence to the 
nexus of a customer-located destination, or other radical policy mechanisms. That 
is, although such radical policy mechanisms were briefly considered, they were 
summarily dismissed in order to limit the choice of possible policy alternatives 
available (Kingdon, 2011). 
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In the context of the radical option to abolish corporation tax, a senior IFS 
economist, RP04-SEP, commented: ‘Another one is to just scrap corporate tax 
altogether, forget trying to tax profits, and have some kind of destination-based 
VAT type of tax…basically tax people on consumption.’ RP04-SEP continued, 
‘there's actually evidence that corporate tax isn't actually born by shareholders. 
It's borne by work as in the form of lower wages, or it's borne by the people who 
buy the products.’ Contemporary research supports the respondent’s view that the 
burden of corporate tax is borne by multiple stakeholders in varying proportions 
(Auerbach, 2005). Another radical alternative policy option considered was the 
formulary apportionment approach (Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, 2008). TARC 
respondent, RP07-SXT, however indicated: ‘But just going down that path a little 
bit, my view is that formulary apportionment is wrongheaded because you're then 
replacing one sets of arm's length rules with another set of rules, which are open 
to manipulation and all the rest of it.’  
Regarding the policy option of granting further discretionary powers to 
regulatory authorities, TARC respondent, RP06-SXT, commented that it was 
necessary to maintain a balance of fairness between the rights of the taxpayer and 
the regulator, noting that: ‘country-by-country reporting is just going to be 
another stick to beat us with because it will be another assessment, which it might 
be cheaper just to pay [it], than to go through the process of defending our 
position. So I would say that is the other side of the fairness argument that if you 
give too much power to regulators, then there is an element of “it's not worth the 
arguments, it's not worth the aggravation.”’ Likewise, merely imposing punitive 
sanctions as a signalling response to industry incumbents can, in the longer term, 
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cause more harm than good, as indicated by Braithwaite (2013) using the demise 
of Arthur Andersen as an example.  
The primary focus of host policymakers was in developing a policy response 
to the social construction of value creation and value capture by MNEs engaging 
in FDI across host locations. TARC member, RP07-SXT, observed that: 
 
Economic activity is a construct…that at present might be or is derived from 
activity within the world that is relevant more than 15 years ago. If you want 
to change the construct of economic activity, such that it—economic activity 
in the UK—includes for example, the activity that is generated by the 
warehouse of Amazon in Swansea then that's fine, let government change it. 
 
Where MNEs enter host markets under an accelerated mode of 
internationalization (Autio, Sapienza & Almeida, 2000; Chetty, Martin & Martin, 
2014; Fan & Phan, 2007), there tends to be a greater fragmentation of economic 
activities than for the traditional mode of internationalizing (Andersen, 1993; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 2009)—such as the provision of internalized warehousing, 
internalized delivery services, captive marketing or promotion services, or leasing 
administration. 
In practice, arm’s length valuation rules do not work effectively to counteract 
the effect of increased fragmentation of group activities across host locations. 
OECD head of treaties, RP21-IET, commented: ‘So what does the arm's length 
principle say? It says that parts of the same enterprise that are having transactions 
or having some form of interaction amongst each other, those transactions should 
be priced as if they are third parties. And there seems to be a contradiction in 
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terms when kind of looking at global firms. The way we see it is that what we say 
is, you know, you should take account of the reality of this firm as a whole, in 
kind of looking at what the separate parts do.’ Regarding a holistic group 
perspective for attributing MNE value creation across host locations, HMT senior 
advisor, RP22-GET, observed: ‘If it's value-creation, well, what does that mean? 
That's sort of awkward questions that you're sort of raising on transfer pricing and 
how do you divvy them up in the world? I think this physicality issue kind of 
drops away, except to the extent that it might make those answers a little more 
obvious.’  
Besides examining policy options on value creation by MNEs across host 
locations, there was also a deliberation on the international conventions in place 
to avoid imposition of double taxation on international trade. However, whereas 
public policy provides MNEs with relief from double taxation, it had not 
previously addressed the circumstance of MNEs arbitraging multiple 
jurisdictional governance systems thereby enabling MNEs to avoid liability 
completely—referred to as instances of double non-taxation. Respondent RP20-
IET explained: ‘it has been one of the key facilitators of global economic 
growth…To support all of these things, the avoidance of double taxation has been 
a focus of the approaches that countries have put in place over the years. But, of 
course, the threat of no taxation, or less than appropriate taxation, and the way in 
which the tools and mechanisms that have been used to resolve these issues in the 
past have sometimes been exploited in more recent times by companies to avoid 
paying tax has meant the new approaches being required.’ 
In order to support policy changes dealing with the attribution of value 
creation, host policymakers sought collective consensus on preventing inter-state 
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harmful competitive practices. Respondent RP10-GET noted: ‘A mechanism 
needs to be put into place to actually kill that race to the bottom.’ Intervening in 
the inter-state harmful competition debate (Killian, 2006) requires a careful 
balancing of the sovereign right of nation-states to set their own policy agenda 
with negative setting from other nation-states that destabilizes international 
relations. HMT deputy director, RP14-GEP, commented: 
 
Almost no country, I think, would say that a corporate tax rate below ten 
percent was acceptable. But above that, the general view has been it's quite 
hard to set hard and fast rules without interfering in country sovereignty… 
So there comes a point whereby by cutting the corporate tax rate, you just 
encourage so much tax-motivated incorporation, as we call it, tax arbitrage, 
would be another way of describing it, that you're eroding other tax bases as 
well as just the corporate tax base. 
 
In order to obtain collective consensus on minimum standards in domestic 
policy, OECD respondent, RP20-IET, commented: ‘Countries have come 
together and have been prepared to forego some sovereignty in some areas in 
order to allow for regional decision-making to be taken. That's legitimate and 
shouldn't be questioned, and if countries want to go down that path then it's their 
sovereign right to do that. But if you look at where we are today in the current 
global environment, it doesn't look like it's an immediate, or likely, or probable 
prospect that the international community will come together under some form of 
global government.’  
The policy options considered for addressing harmful inter-state competition 
was in developing transparency and information-sharing mechanisms. 
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Respondent RP14-GEP observed: ‘What I think you're ultimately trying to do 
through BEPS and through some of the other initiatives about transparency and 
information-sharing—and I would say this is the priority for the next decade—
it's to stop the really bad practices and narrow the parameters within which people 
can misbehave.’ Re-stating the need for initiatives for mitigating inter-state 
harmful competition, respondent RP22-GET commented: ‘We don't want to be 
in the same place[s] in a couple of years—a few years’ time—so that whole 
attitude, our whole learning process of having to understand that we do need to 
adapt the cooperation between tax authorities in order to keep in line with the way 
economies develop. That would be a good outcome.’ 
As a means of host policymakers garnering collective consensus for inter-state 
collaboration, the OECD, as IGO mediator, focused on targeting previously 
untaxed MNE income thereby seeking to avoid mere zero-sum game 
compromises. Respondent RP20-IET explained: ‘at the moment there is tax 
revenue that is not being collected by any government in the world. So there's 
economic activity that's generating income where [a] tax [liability], according to 
most people's conception of the ordinary principles of income tax, a liability 
should be arising but no one's collecting any revenue. By fixing some of these 
problems there will be revenue collected that is currently escaping the reach of 
tax administrations all around the world… That means it's not just a contest 
between existing governments fighting over the current tax take.’ Respondent 
RP21-IET explained the policy mechanism: ‘So what we are doing is trying to 
develop linking rules between these domestic tax systems that prevent these gaps 
from turning into Bermuda Triangles of profits being allocated there.’ 
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Maintaining Stockholder-Primacy Logic 
The second-order theme of maintaining stockholder-primacy logic comprises 
three first-order codes. These first-order codes are: businesses are contributors to 
growth, all other taxes that businesses pay, and the endorsement of the 
stockholder-primacy logic. 
Businesses are contributors to growth 
Businesses are contributors to growth in the economy. Thus, it is not surprising 
that host locations encourage FDI. Addressing Starbucks’ representative RW45-
OEC, PAC interrogant, RQ39-GEP, indicated: ‘in your submission to the 
Committee, at paragraph 1, you say that you plan to open 300 new stores up and 
down the country. To which RW45-OEC, replied: ‘Yes…Across the UK today, 
we have about 15,000 employees…we have just announced that we are actually 
hiring an extra 10,000 seasonal employees to help us with Christmas.’ Moving 
onto the interview with Google’s representative, RW47-OEC, PAC interrogant 
RQ41-GEP, observed: ‘Google does a lot of work to help and incubate new 
technology businesses, and that is really partly where we are driving.’ RW47-
OEC replied: ‘You mentioned Campus: we invested in a building in the tech 
city area of London—a seven-storey building full of start-ups... The Committee 
may not be aware of this, but the UK is one of the leading markets in the world 
in terms of e-commerce... One of the big growth opportunities for the UK is the 
Internet economy…’  
In the interview with information intermediary RP18-SEN, who is a an analyst 
for the digital sector, the respondent expressed the important contribution that is 
made to host economies by firms engaged in accelerated modes of 
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internationalizing (Chetty et al., 2014; Fan & Phan, 2007). Respondent RP18-
SEN commented: 
 
my view is, in Amazon in particular, if every company in the world invested 
the way Amazon did, then the world will be in a much more rapid growth 
environment than we are today, because on an aggregate level, Amazon 
doesn't make any profit. They reinvest everything, and I think that is quite a 
positive story really, because what's the problem with the economy? It’s the 
fact that corporates aren’t investing, and they are sitting on a big stock pile, 
really. 
 
In my interview with the Strategy Officer for IIRC, RP25-SEA, he remarked: 
‘Putting that to one side [that companies should pay their fair share of taxes], 
supposing the company decided that it could organize its affairs in a way that 
meant that it didn't have to pay any taxes in the UK and didn't do, it is nevertheless 
building value in other ways. It could be contributing to the economy, it could be 
contributing to society, it is building the human-capital base, or whatever. And 
what integrated reporting would enable that organization to do is demonstrate the 
full range of value that the organization was creating.’ 
In deliberating on the bigger picture of MNEs’ contribution to the growth of 
host economies, FRC respondent, RP02-GXA, indicated:  ‘And what's wrong 
with that...it's all about this broader policy—macro and fiscal considerations as to 
what we're looking at here.’ As regards the suggested public policy practice of 
measuring the multi-faceted contribution that is made by foreign-owned MNEs 
to host locations, HMT director, RP14-GEP, observed: ‘You would like to be able 
to do that, but in practice it's virtually impossible to do. Maybe that is because 
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taxes are the ultimate complex system. So many different things are 
interrelated…you struggle to establish a correlation, because the amount of tax 
paid in other areas depends on so many different factors and individuals, and 
businesses can make a whole different range of choices, that you couldn't develop 
a model that was sophisticated enough to capture all of this.’ 
All other taxes that businesses pay 
Another way of expressing the contribution that foreign-owned MNEs make 
is to highlight all the other taxes that business pay in host locations. This, in a 
sense, is a proxy for their contribution to growth in host economies. Starbucks 
representative, RW45-OEC, explained: ‘Now, we paid $25 million to $30 
million in other taxes that Starbucks pays in this market every year.’ Amazon’s 
respondent RW46-OEC, indicated: ‘The other thing I would also highlight is that 
we have paid in excess of £100 million in payroll taxes in the last five years. 
We have paid tens of millions in business rates in the past five years.’ 
The FRC respondent, RP02-GXA, noted: ‘Quite often the government, on a 
public policy basis, were quite happy to say, “I'm happy not to recover 40p on the 
pound on income, because I'm going to get employment in deprived areas, I'm 
going to get National Insurance contributions from them, I'm going to get 
employment and other add-ons in the community”… When I actually add up the 
total revenue I'm getting 52. So why am I not making this deal.’ The ICAEW 
respondent, RP12-SXA, added:  
 
everybody's focused on corporate tax without actually thinking about all the 
other taxes that businesses pay… So for those companies that employ a lot 
of staff where they pay payroll taxes, but also companies that are subject to 
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other the tax regimes, like the North Sea Oil extractors and things like that, 
who pay a lot of petroleum taxes, but also who pay duty in other ways as 
well. So there's not very much visibility around those, and there's not a lot of 
clarity around what companies do.  
 
Endorsement of the stockholder-primacy logic 
Because of the part played by businesses, both local and foreign, in promoting 
national economic growth, host locations fully endorse the stockholder-primacy 
logic that is made explicit through corporate reporting policy and practice 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Veldman & Willmott, 2016). The executive director 
of the UK’s FRC Codes and Standards, RP01-GEA, explained: 
 
I think we need to get back to what's the purpose of the reporting—and for 
whom is the reporting being done. We feel that the primary audience for these 
reports is the investor; it's the provider of capital… If you start with that 
mindset, what's the relevant information to the investor, that drives you along 
looking at strategy, business model…it's about the agency between auditors 
and investors. 
 
RP03-GEA, the chair of the UK’s FRC’s Accounting Council, re-stated the 
generally accepted view (Barth, 2008) held in the accounting domain: ‘The 
financial reports are largely aimed at investors, because they're regarded as being 
people who have to rely on general-purpose financial reports because they can’t 
get their own information. They're not aimed, particularly, at special-purpose 
users who can get their own information. For example, tax authorities can 
normally get all the information they want out of companies within their domain.’ 
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In defending the intra-field legitimacy of the stockholder-primacy logic, FRC 
respondent, RP01-GEA, observed: ‘Well, I guess it's entrenched because we do 
live in a capitalist society and that means that there have to be providers of risk 
capital. Therefore, because it's that risk, people have wanted transparency and 
trustworthy information before they're prepared to put their capital at risk. I think 
it's a perfectly understandable ideology.’ RP02-GXA, a member of the UK’s 
FRC’s Accounting Council, stated: ‘I am an accountant. To me accountability 
means…accountability to shareholders about what I have done with the money 
they have invested and how I have used the assets that had been entrusted to me. 
That's what accountability means to me.’ Emphasizing how stockholder-primacy 
logic is applied in practice, FRC respondent, RP03-GEA observed: ‘So the basis 
for accounts per IFRS [International Financial Reporting Standards] is—is it 
decision-useful to the investors and lenders? If it's decision-useful, it's a good 
thing… So it's nothing to do with economic value, and all that sort of nonsense 
from an economic value viewpoint.’ 
In the context of the stockholder-primacy logic, the Investment Management 
Association (IMA) respondent, RP15-SEN, explained the classical agency 
problem for corporations with dispersed management (Bratton, 2001; Coffee, 
2001) and the role of blockholders (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar & Lee, 2015; 
Ruiz-Mallorqui & Santana-Martin, 2011), observing that: ‘Going back to 2001, 
we had Myners’ Review of Institutional Investment in the UK…[he] recommend 
to government that it should legislate in relation to institutional investors 
engagement with companies. Because he didn't feel that they were holding the 
management to account.’ In defending the role of the IMA and their members, 
respondent RP15-SEN noted: ‘There have been a number of studies as to whether 
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or not that engagement generates returns. And I think the evidence is somewhat 
mixed. Essentially, it's the actions of management that will generate returns—and 
how it runs the companies. It's not the institutional investors, who are one step 
removed.’ 
Moving Toward Sociopolitical Legitimacy Judgements 
The second-order theme of moving toward sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements comprises three-first-order codes. These first-order codes are: 
stakeholder stewardship encourages long-termism; stakeholders interested in 
distributive fairness; and retaliatory response to perceived unfairness. 
Stakeholder stewardship encourages long-termism  
If policymakers inculcate the stockholder-primacy logic within the corporate 
reporting domain, this does not preclude the voluntary adoption of a broader 
stakeholder engagement by MNEs or by host policymakers in other domains of 
public policy. The UK’s Stewardship Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012 ) 
indicates that stewardship is a shared responsibility, resting primarily with the 
board, but also with investors, particularly the institutional investor class 
(Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; 
Zeitoun & Pamini, 2015). FRC respondent, RP01-GEA, explained: ‘The 
stewardship code…is designed to encourage a long-term view of investment and 
have an engagement process.’ The IMA respondent, RP15-SEN, explained the 
background to the adoption of the stewardship code: ‘We prepared this code…we 
continued to just sort of benchmark the activities of signatories in practice. And 
then we had the FCA in December 2010, ready to regulate a requirement—That 
it's a conduct of business rule, that authorized asset managers—either have a 
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statement as to how they adhere to the stewardship code, or explain their 
alternative business model.’  
In the context of MNEs voluntarily adopting a stakeholder orientation, 
information intermediary, RP13-SXN, explained why this orientation is 
important: ‘I think, [it] is the general public at large, that would include: 
regulators and people who are interested in environmental aspects; people who 
are interested in the employment aspects; [and] people who are, again, interested 
in those corporate strategy, corporate citizenship, aspects of things. Actually, I 
think that the employees and stakeholders—direct stakeholders of the company 
themselves—are an important audience.’ Respondent RP13-SXN explained that 
an MNE’s commitment to a broader stakeholder engagement provided a positive 
signal to of its sensitivity to its environment and longer-term survival: 
 
I don't think that this is do-gooder or tree hugger, or sort of the hippy-dippy 
stuff at all. I think it's a level of transparency and things that give you huge 
insights into…the seriousness and effectiveness with which a management 
addresses these sorts of issues in their strategic report and in their ESG 
[environmental, social and governance] narratives and everything; sheds a lot 
of light on the way they're likely to operate the rest of the business.  
 
Stakeholders interest in distributive fairness  
The self-interests of multiple stakeholders are bounded by norms of fairness 
(Bosse, Phillips & Harrison, 2009; Harrison, Bosse & Phillips, 2010; Parmar et 
al., 2010). Stakeholders question the fairness of outcomes when perceived 
differences exist in comparable circumstances (Adams, 1963). In opening the 
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public hearings, the PAC chair, RQ26-GEP, rhetorically exclaimed to the HMRC 
representative: ‘So you think it’s fair that all these companies can take so much 
of their profits out and put them into jurisdictions where they pay no tax by 
using transfer pricing?’ Also, PAC interrogant, RQ40-GEP, questioned the 
motives of Starbucks: ‘you are manipulating your tax affairs in order to support 
very aggressive anti-competitive behaviour…outbidding Coffee Republic for 
commercial sites. The figures speak for themselves: Coffee Republic now has 
a mere handful of stores compared with Starbucks, which is growing. That leaves 
me in a very uncomfortable position, both as a consumer and as a taxpayer. We 
in Britain are very concerned about fair play.’ 
Reverting to Google, PAC interrogant, RQ26-GEP, remarked: ‘I use Google, 
and all of us round the table use Google. They contribute to your profits but see 
no proper, fair contribution from you to corporation tax. That is the thing that 
bugs us all.’ Then, attempting to trace Google’s flow of funds, PAC interrogant, 
RQ29-GEP, posed this question to its EU director of sales and operations: ‘Let’s 
think about the interests of those shareholders. I am interested in what happens 
to the money that ends up in Bermuda, and how the shareholders can get any 
benefit from that.’ Continuing with this line of enquiry, PAC respondent, RP16-
GEP: remarked: ‘It…goes on to the Netherlands, and then it goes to 
Bermuda…cannot get their hands on it because 30% tax would have to be paid 
for it to be repatriated to America, to the shareholders. It sits there in a cash 
mountain…but what contribution does it actually make?’ Subsequent to the PAC 
hearings, Google wrote a follow-up statement to the PAC on this aspect, 
explaining: ‘During the hearing, several Members suggested that shareholders 
only benefit if Google pays dividends back to shareholders. This is not the case. 
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Google Inc has not paid dividends to shareholders at any point in the past and 
we have no current intention to do so. The funds held can be used to expand 
Google Inc’s business operations outside of the US, which should in turn benefit 
Google’s shareholders.’ 
The PAC hearings concluded that: 
 
The hearings we held showed that international companies are able to exploit 
national and international tax structures to minimize corporation tax on 
the economic activity they conduct in the UK. The outcome is that they do 
not pay their fair share… If companies do not pay their fair share of tax, 
other taxpayers have to pay more.’ (PAC-UK, 2012 p.3). 
 
On the subject of comparative inequity, the PAC hearings concluded that: ‘We are 
concerned that multinationals have an unfair competitive advantage over British 
businesses which have no choice but to pay their corporation tax… Our intention 
in inviting these companies was to provide an illustration of what we perceive to 
be a wider problem…not to single out Amazon, Google and Starbucks as the only 
companies engaging in these practices.’ 
Retaliatory responses to perceived inequity  
As a result of the public deliberative process of making the problem apparent, 
stakeholders began to urge host nation-states and IGOs, like the OECD and the 
EU, to respond to the lack of fairness in trade practices that had seen local firms 
struggling to compete with foreign-owned MNEs. Retaliation to the perceived 
inequity appeared in many forms: in making the VAT rates on e-services 
including e-books higher than those for printed books (Osuna, 2016); in changing 
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the basis for charging VAT rates applicable to EU customers from the source 
country to the destination country (Amand, 2016) thereby remedying selection 
bias in favour of low VAT-rate EU countries; in the UK, by imposing a diverted 
profits tax or a ‘Google-tax’ as an anti-base erosion measure (Santos, 2016; 
Zubeldia, 2016); and through retaliation from the European Commission against 
preferential tax practice rulings granted by member states to foreign-owned 
MNEs that constitute unlawful state aid (Houlder, 2016; Vleggeert, 2016). 
Many of the respondents indicated that retaliatory responses would likely take 
multiple and varied forms. Respondent RP15-SEN commented: ‘they [foreign-
owned MNEs] are effectively gaming things to suit themselves. And I think it 
could come back and bite them.’ At the PAC hearings, PAC interrogant RQ42-
GEP, posed this question to Amazon’s representative, RW46-OEC: ‘How did 
you feel about the EU ruling that said you had to increase it [VAT rate 
chargeable on e-books]?’ RW46-OEC responded: ‘I do not think that we are 
challenging the ruling; Amazon is not a party to these proceedings. What I would 
say is that we firmly believe that a book is a book, regardless.’ In this context, 
HMT’s deputy director, RP14-GEP, observed: ‘It's not as if they [Amazon] have 
a brass plate there. The primary reason that they chose to set up in Luxembourg 
was because Luxembourg levied a low rate of VAT…[but] when we move to a 
place-of-consumption basis, [so] where the sale takes place will become 
irrelevant; whereas it's not irrelevant now…. From the 1st January 2015, the new 
rules [is] around the place of consumption apply—so Amazon will be required to 
levy 20% of VAT on products sold in the UK and remit that to the Exchequer. So 
that solves one problem.’ 
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PAC respondent, RP11-GEP, explained: ‘So I suppose it's how you use all the 
tools in the box, and not all the tools are statutory.’ Information intermediary 
respondent, RES18-SEN, provided an example of the indirect retaliatory 
measures: ‘the biggest issue at the minute for Google, or you know one of the big 
regulatory issues, is it's role in Europe, and the case for it to be split up, and all 
these kind of things.’ TARC respondent, RP07-SXT, commented: ‘I think the 
public pressure and the debates and things have changed the approach of both tax 
professionals and the companies themselves… So even without any regulatory 
change, the corporate behavior in relation to tax and the shifting of profits will 
change anyway because of this public pressure.’ 
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Figure 8.2 – Dataflow of moving toward sociopolitical legitimacy judgements 
Note: Figure 8.2 is based on an extract of the first-order codes that show how: (i) host 
policymakers move to stakeholder-aligned policy changes, and (ii) mitigate harmful inter-
governmental competition. 
Using Commensuration Techniques 
My second-order theme of using commensuration techniques comprises three 
first-order codes. These first-order codes are: the country-by-country reporting 
mechanism; integrative thinking on group value creation; and the risk–return 
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relationship mechanism—attributing the residue reward to non-functional 
component (see Figure 8.2 and Table 8.3). 
My fieldwork indicated that host policymakers used commensuration in the 
public deliberative process to counterbalance the conflict between a stockholder-
primacy logic underlying corporate reporting versus a stakeholder-aligned 
orientation underlying host tax policy. 
Country-by-country reporting mechanism 
The first of the commensuration techniques (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Jeacle 
& Carter, 2011) deliberated on was to link measurement of host performance, by 
way of net profit for both corporate reporting and host taxable purposes, to the 
economic activity indicators that prevailed in the host location. The country-by-
country reporting mechanism was considered a suitable means to establish a 
common metric. 
It is widely accepted that net profit for corporate reporting purposes is socially 
constructed differently from taxable net profit for host taxing purposes 
(Freedman, 2008; Graetz, 2016). Notwithstanding, the differences in computing 
net profit for corporate reporting and host taxing purposes, both outcomes should 
have a realistic and pragmatic correlation to host economic activity. Country-by-
country reporting of key financial and economic indicators has been advocated 
for policymaking purposes (Espeland & Stevens, 2008) to uncover unjustifiable 
correlations with MNE host economic indicators. From a corporate reporting 
perspective, the IFRS undertook a post-implementation review of the Operating 
Segments Standard (PIR IFRS 8, 2013). It concluded that: ‘Some think that 
geographical segmentation should be a separate, additional requirement. Others 
think that existing geographical disclosures may not be useful if they do not 
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distinguish between regions in a way that is useful to investors… Feedback 
received did not identify a clear or consistent problem that we need to address 
and, consequently, we do not think this area warrants any further action at this 
time.’ FRC respondent, RP01-GEA, remarked: ‘it's not necessarily relevant 
information to the investor’.  
Whilst the corporate accounting policy domain was indifferent to geographical 
segmentation, the corporate tax policy domain considered it important. HMT’s 
respondent, RP17-GET, commented: 
 
the main area that we focused on in the BEPS project, which is looking at the 
kind of disclosure-transparency area, is Action 13 on the country-by-country 
reporting piece, which is deliberately designed to…give a snapshot of a 
global business, so a quick and easily understandable [tool]…it doesn't 
necessarily give too much detail. On the face of it, it will show you how much 
profit is made in a country, how much revenue is reported in a country, how 
much tax is being paid in a country…there's some things about tangible assets 
and there's some things about number of employees. They are the economic 
activity indicators that have been agreed for this. 
 
The OECD’s report on Action 13 (OECD, 2015d p.9) stated: ‘The country-by-
country report requires multinational enterprises (MNEs) to report annually and 
for each tax jurisdiction in which they do business, the amount of revenue, profit 
before income tax and income tax paid and accrued. It also requires MNEs to 
report their total employment, capital, retained earnings and tangible assets in 
each tax jurisdiction. Finally, it requires MNEs to identify each entity within the 
group doing business in a particular tax jurisdiction and to provide an indication 
Orlando J. Fernandes         Chapter 8 
 
237 
of the business activities each entity engages in.’ 
The result of the deliberative process is that the commensuration mechanism 
of country-by-country reporting gained sociopolitical legitimacy, unlike 
geographical segmentation, which lacked consensus of investor relevance (IFRS 
8, 2007; PIR IFRS 8, 2013). This is a clear indication of how the deliberative 
process, while recognizing the stockholder-primacy logic in corporate reporting 
policy, was able to accommodate a stakeholder-aligned orientation for host taxing 
policy. In the case of the country-by-country reporting mechanism, the common 
unit of comparative measurement for both accounting and taxable profit now 
become the key-performance-indicators (KPIs) related to the economic activity.  
 
Table 8.3 – Mechanisms of commensuration 
Mechanisms Different concepts Common unit of 
measurement or 
characteristic 
Pragmatic 
comparison of: 
Country-by-
country 
reporting 
‘Net income’ for 
corporate reporting 
purposes as distinct 
from ‘net income’ 
taxable for host 
location purposes. 
Key performance 
indicators for host 
location economic 
activity. 
Financial and 
economic 
performance in 
host location to 
‘net income’ 
attributed for tax 
purposes. 
Integrated 
thinking 
Contract context of 
value creation and 
Valorization 
process mediated 
Valuation 
practices in value 
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recording of value 
capture as distinct 
from their business 
model inter-
connectedness. 
by group inter-
connectedness and 
interdependence. 
capture under 
contract 
independence to 
inter-
connectedness 
within group 
business model. 
Risk-return 
analysis 
Rewarding risk in 
non-specific order 
as distinct from 
rewarding 
separately 
functional and non-
functional risk 
components. 
Entrepreneurial 
risk as a distinctive 
measure of 
residual risk. 
Order of worth in 
value creation 
under assumption 
of functional and 
non-functional 
risk components. 
 
Note: Table 8.3 is constructed from first-order data tagged to the following codes: (i) country-
by-country reporting mechanism, (ii) integrative thinking about MNE value creation; and (iii) 
risk-return relationships. It shows how commensuration techniques are operationalized. 
 
Integrative thinking on group value-creation  
The second of the commensuration techniques suggested in the deliberative 
process was to use an integrative thinking mindset in order to grasp the entirety 
of a firm’s value-creation capabilities. A firm’s value-creation capabilities cannot 
realistically and pragmatically be appraised in a restricted contractual context of 
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fragmented activities or fragmented proprietary interests. Thus, the common unit 
of measurement or valuation practice that has been useful in valorizing 
fragmented activities is to apply an integrative thinking approach. Integrative 
thinking moderates the process of valorization from a restricted contractual 
context to an interconnected and interdependent association of resources and 
valuation frameworks. 
At the PAC hearings, RQ26-GEP, the PAC chair, rhetorically remarked to 
HMRC that: ‘But do you look, for example, with the company we are not 
allowed to mention, at what they have been telling their shareholders about the 
profit rate in the UK?’ In another instance, Amazon’s representative, RW46-
OEC, acknowledged that although the sale may be concluded in Luxembourg, it 
is their warehouses in the UK that print the invoices accompanying the orders 
despatched to customers. In the case of Google, the Comptroller and Auditor-
General, RQ31-GEP, remarked on the relationship between valuation practices 
and group resources: ‘That is not Californian advertising, is it? It is a slightly 
misleading argument, although I understand it. Of course, part of it is generated 
by the technology—that is the medium—but it is also generated by advertising 
and sales, which are specific to territory. So a significant part of the economic 
activity is specific to the territory; not all of it is global, that would not be fair, 
would it?’ 
Value creation and value capture within an MNE group is not produced 
independently by its fragmented business units, but instead arises from 
interconnected and interdependent factors (International Integrated Reporting 
Council, 2013; Pitelis, 2009), such as its strategy and business model, resources, 
technology and innovativeness, capabilities in addressing risk and opportunities 
Orlando J. Fernandes         Chapter 8 
 
240 
and responsiveness to stakeholders’ legitimate needs and interests. FRC 
respondent, RP01-GEA, noted: ‘What the IIRC is basically saying is that there's 
more to business than just financial capital. So, they're basically saying there's a 
whole range of other capitals that you should be reporting on… What they're 
basically encouraging companies to do is to think in an integrated way.’ FRC 
respondent, RP02-GXA, added: ‘It's about business behaviours and the business 
model and that value creation—how I run business day-to-day and how the 
management works, operates, exercises that accountability, runs its governance 
structures—and then reflects that in its report.’ 
In the context of valuation practices applicable to MNE related-party 
transactions, OECD representative, RP21-IET, commented: 
 
For example, if the facts of the case show that, in fact, there is some form of 
collaborative relationship between the two parts of the same entity, you 
should also price the transaction as being on a collaborative basis. You 
shouldn't try to say, “Well, you should be kind of competing with each other”.  
 
Again, referring to the interconnectedness and interdependency that one 
identifiable activity, like warehousing logistics, provides in meeting online 
consumer expectations, RP21-IET noted: ‘Yes. I think maybe the logistics in that 
situation provides value to the whole enterprise, and more value than just a 
marginal return.’ The HMRC senior advisor, RP22-GET, added: ‘With the digital 
economy as well, there's so much more around it. There's that whole multi-sided 
business model. It's far more fluid and there are far more, far deeper questions to 
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be answered around the question of value and the question of what the 
contribution is and what it is that you're actually sharing.’  
The risk–return relationship: managing and rewarding different risk types  
The third commensuration technique identified in my fieldwork was the risk–
return relationship mechanism. Until the occurrence of the austerity-focusing 
event (Birkland, 1998; Callinicos, 2012; Kingdon, 2011), the basis for managing 
risk  and rewarding entrepreneurial effort as distinct from capital was not subject 
to scrutiny. However, the process of public deliberation introduced the notion that 
the valuation practices should distinguish between reward for managing 
functional risk (providing capital and labour) as distinct from the reward for 
managing the non-functional risk component of entrepreneurship (Knight, 1921; 
Lukka, 1990; Weston, 1954). The UK Governance Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2014 p.5) states: ‘The board is responsible for determining the nature 
and extent of the principal risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic 
objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management and internal 
control systems.’ 
In managing and scrutinizing risk types within the MNE group, IFS senior 
economic advisor, RP04-SEP, commented: ‘Another thing that companies do that 
from an economics point of view is bizarre, is to try to allocate risk across 
companies. They allocate risk—I'm not really sure how this fits in to contract 
law—but they allocate risk as a way to basically move tax payments… But as an 
economist, if this company is fully owned by this company, there is no sense in 
which the risk is different. The same company has the risk.’ OECD head of 
treaties, RP21-IET, explained what constitutes routine risk and how routine risk 
should be rewarded: ‘So what we are now saying is that in those situations, where 
Orlando J. Fernandes         Chapter 8 
 
242 
you see an accentuating of the element of risk that you have, that we will use 
special measures…in minimum functional entities that have a lot of capital 
allocated to them…in low tax jurisdictions. We will also develop special 
measures in one way, shape or form, that will say, “Well, in these and these 
situations, the profits that are allocated to this minimum, functional, low-taxed 
entity will be reallocated again.’ 
In distinguishing routine risk and entrepreneurial risk, HMT’s deputy director, 
RP17-GEP, explained: ‘looking more at the economic structures and rationale for 
business decisions rather than the legalistic sort of contract, following the contract 
definitions, I think taking more of an economist's eye on some of these aspects 
will—or may well—actually lead you to a kind of more logical or rational sort of 
conclusion.’  OECD respondent, RP21-IET, added:  
 
So what we are now saying is that when you look at risk, you should first 
identify with specificity what kind of risks a company has taken on… The 
premium returns come from them being able to manage their risks better than 
others. But what we then also say is that companies don't just take on risks, 
they do something with it. They perform activities in order to make sure that 
they are the ones that can mitigate risks optimally compared to other 
competitors. 
 
In summary, for risk-reward assessment purposes the common unit of 
measurement became the discernment of alternative risk-types. As the public 
deliberative process developed, risk-types were no longer perceived as 
homogenous, but instead were capable of being categorized by order of worth. 
For routine functional risk, the view was that it should be rewarded in nominal 
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terms, while the remainder share of profit should be attributable to management 
of the entrepreneurial non-functional risk component. 
Mediating Change in the Tax Policy Domain 
The second-order theme of mediating change in the tax policy domain 
comprises two first-order codes: redefining host taxable presence and revising 
rules and conventions that obfuscate public policy aims. In changing emphasis 
from stockholder-primacy logic to a stakeholder-aligned policy domain, host 
policymakers used techniques of commensuration to mediate change in corporate 
taxation policy.  
Redefining host taxable presence  
The restricted meaning of host taxable presence was made apparent in the PAC 
hearings when a PAC witness, RW50-SET, remarked: ‘let me try, on a theoretical 
basis, to help you with the examination that you are having here… Essentially, 
the situation that we are looking at here is an Irish resident company and the 
question of whether it is trading in the UK. The test that is formulated by the 
Irish-UK treaty says that essentially the Irish company is subject to UK tax on 
its profits if it is trading in the UK through a permanent establishment [PE]…if 
employees of the UK company have the authority to conclude contracts on 
behalf of the Irish company and they habitually exercise that authority.’ RW50-
SET continued: ‘The point that you are grappling with right now is that line 
between liaison, supporting and making sure clients are happy, and actually 
getting so close to the point of sale.’ With the advent of an accelerated mode of 
internationalizing, the PAC witness was implying that the conventions that define 
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taxable presence have failed to effectively align MNE value creation with host 
location economic activity. 
PAC interrogant, RQ41-GEP, posed the question: ‘Do you think that the 
OECD definition of what a branch is should be updated for the Internet world, 
first of all?’ In response, Google’s representative, RW47-OEC, replied: ‘I 
recognize the challenge of a very fast- developing environment with the 
Internet’; and Amazon’s representative, RW46-OEC, similarly concluded: ‘I 
agree with [RW47-OEC] here:  it is a very fast-moving world. I understand in 
fact that the OECD guidelines are currently being consulted upon.’ OECD 
respondent, RP21-IET, explained the proposed changes to the double tax treaty 
convention on host taxable presence: ‘If you look at activities, business activities 
that should be seen as a whole or that are a coherent whole, they can no longer be 
fragmented. So, if part of the operations of the multinational is already taking 
place in the country…you cannot avoid having a PE [permanent establishment] 
via one of the exceptions.’ RP21-IET continued: ‘If you tweak the [taxable 
presence] threshold, for example, on warehouses, you delete the exemption. Then 
you will have a taxable presence in a country earlier on.’ 
Revising rules and conventions that obfuscate public policy aims  
Where corporate behaviour in host locations operates at the limits of policy 
conventions, such as in creating stateless income, then fairness dictates that rules 
and conventions, which obfuscate public policy aims, should be remedied through 
an evaluative sociopolitical legitimacy process. OECD head of tax policy, RP20-
IET, explained: ‘Well look, I think that there are clearly many examples under 
the existing rules where interactions between the tax laws of various countries 
have allowed for structures and arrangements to be put in place, where there is 
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patently no or little connection between places where taxable profits are being 
reported, and where the actual economic activity—the value creation—is going 
on. There are plenty of examples where you could look at how flaws in the 
system, as it currently stands, have given rise to those problems.’ 
In the context of UK policy adopting a patent box incentive regime to promote 
innovation, IFS senior economic advisor, RP04-SEP, commented: ‘But I'm not 
sure you'd have a patent box to sort of achieve that aim. The reason for that is, is 
that the patent box targets the income that you get from an innovation and not the 
underlying innovation itself. Because those things are separated in time, attracting 
one doesn't necessarily mean you'll attract the other.’ That is, as an innovation 
policy, the patent box is not necessarily delivering the intended outcomes, but as 
a blunt policy instrument, it has attracted mobile patent income to the UK. 
However, as RP04-SEP concludes: ‘It does make the UK more competitive, but 
now there are 14 European governments that have a patent box... Of course, if 
everyone has one, then that competitive advantage you thought you were creating 
goes away again.’ 
Adopting appropriate levels of transparency becomes critical as a 
counterbalancing measure to entrepreneurial innovation (Mahmood & Rufin, 
2005; Patriotta & Hirsch, 2015) and opportunism (Farjoun & Starbuck, 2007; 
Nebus & Rufin, 2010) by MNEs. Host policymakers encourage entrepreneurial 
innovation but, in turn, require adequate levels of transparency as a means of 
regulating socially acceptable corporate behaviour (Suchman, 1995; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). HMRC witness, RW35-GET, in responding to questions on 
promoter’s disclosure obligations indicated:  
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I am sorry to say this again, but one of the challenges for us is definitional. 
Tax planning is a good thing that we encourage people to do, and egregious 
tax avoidance is something that we know we do not want. The gap between 
the two is the area where disclosure is important. 
 
The final BEPS reports indicate how the gap in disclosure is being addressed 
(OECD, 2015a p.86): ‘the work on BEPS will increase transparency between 
taxpayers and tax administrations and among tax administrations themselves. 
Risk assessment processes at the level of the competent tax administration will 
be enhanced by measures such as the mandatory disclosure of aggressive tax 
planning arrangements…and other forthcoming outputs of the BEPS Project on 
the tax planning and structuring decisions of multinational enterprise (MNE) 
groups.’ 
Sovereignty of Host Locations 
The aggregate theme of mitigating harmful inter-state competition comprises 
two second-order themes: the sovereignty of host locations and inter-
governmental mediation. The second-order theme of sovereignty of host locations 
comprises the two first-order codes: cost to society of foreign MNEs doing 
business in host locations and taxing power is a sovereign prerogative. 
Cost to society of foreign MNEs doing business in host locations 
Foreign direct inward investment not only brings benefits to the host economy, 
it also increases national costs through the need for subnational support systems 
(Monaghan, Gunnigle & Lavelle, 2014), administrative oversight architecture 
and, where called for, the exercise of sanction mechanisms. Written evidence 
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provided to the PAC by HMRC observed that: ‘The number of companies 
managed by the Large Business Service has increased and it currently has 783 
customers, of which 371 have non-UK parents.’ The statistic indicates that just 
under half of the large business case load that is administered by HMRC is with 
foreign-owned MNEs carrying on business in the UK. That is, foreign-owned 
MNEs carrying on business in host locations comprise a significant part of the 
host economy. 
Concerns relate to not only the increased administrative oversight needed, but 
also to the fact that greater diligence over corporate citizenship of MNEs is 
observed in home-headquartered locations than can be found in host locations 
(Dischinger & Riedel, 2010). For those MNEs that are more inclined to engage 
in base erosion in host locations, TARC respondent, RP07-SXT remarked: 
 
The extent to which they are able to shift the incidence [to taxation across 
host locations] will be subject to different constraints depending on the 
industry or product market and elasticity of demand and all these sort of 
things. So it's a huge, messy, complex thing. I think that's been one of the 
problems with the public debate, is this assumption that somehow you can 
hurt companies or make them pay this tax as if they're coming out of the 
company's pockets somehow, and it's not. It's just dissipated across society. 
 
The HMRC respondent, RP22-GET, explained the motivation behind the 
introduction of the so-called Google tax, which seeks to guide or influence MNE 
behaviour: ‘Our basic strategy is to encourage people to comply. There's always 
the sort of idea that in a really effective taxing administration, tax law shouldn't 
have compliance yield because [laughter] you would have compliant 
Orlando J. Fernandes         Chapter 8 
 
248 
companies...that's a far-away dream [laughter]. Things like diverted profits tax, 
which again is full of anti-avoidance legislation, the idea behind all of that is to 
encourage people not to go there.’ 
Taxing power is a sovereign prerogative  
The sovereign power of host nation-states is constrained by increased 
globalization (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011) and the 
concomitant growth in MNE’s bargaining power (Agmon, 2003; Nebus & Rufin, 
2010). However, nation-states oppose any interference with their constitutional 
powers over taxation. The HMRC witness, RW35-GET, in defending the host 
regulator’s position remarked: ‘No, I do not think we are handling big business 
gently. I can absolutely refute any suggestion that I have been told to go easy on 
big business. I have been given £917 million investment to increase yield, and a 
significant proportion of that comes from big businesses.’ The OECD head of tax 
policy, RP20-IET, explained the hierarchical order of sovereignty over economic 
practicality as: ‘I think that there is a reality that we all have to deal with, and that 
is that nation-states are, have been and continue to be sovereign. National 
sovereignty is one of the fundamental elements of the geo-politico-economic 
landscape within which we all operate...’ 
Recognizing the hybrid structure arrangements that are organized by MNEs 
across host locations (Kahlenberg & Kopec, 2016; OECD, 2015i) to create 
unintended non-taxation for significant components of MNE activities, the OECD 
head of tax treaties, RP21-IET, explained how these gaps were being sensitively 
addressed from a sovereignty perspective: ‘the coherence bit…that's new because 
we have never dealt with linking up domestic tax systems before. It's also not to 
be confused with harmonization. We're not harmonizing. We're just linking the 
Orlando J. Fernandes         Chapter 8 
 
249 
parts that need to be linked.’ In essence, in order to respond to the arbitraging of 
governance systems by MNEs across host locations, the OECD, as inter-
governmental mediator, has had to coherently link differences across host 
locations. The coherent linking of domestic systems has been made possible 
through recognizing the legitimacy of sovereignty of host locations in challenging 
stateless income that should accrue for their benefit. 
On the issue of a possible unilateral response to the base erosion problem, 
respondent RP16-GEP commented: ‘That's our ultimate weapon. We could, 
but…[Government] will want to work by international agreements as far as 
possible. I don't know how far international agreement is possible, [under] a 
system of assessing profits by jurisdiction.’ Pursuing unilateral action, however, 
is likely to be challenged on the grounds of the limitations of those sovereign 
powers over transnational trade. On the question of seeking to impose taxation 
beyond the border of the nation-state, the OECD representative, RP20-IET, 
commented: ‘Now, of course, any country can seek to legislate extra-territorially, 
but double taxation has always been something that we've sought to minimize, or 
to avoid where possible. Because if you support global trade as I do—as the 
OECD always has—because it has been one of the key facilitators of global 
economic growth.’  
Inter-Governmental Mediation 
The second-order theme of inter-governmental mediation comprises two first-
order codes: transparency as a mitigation tool and mutual exchange of 
information mechanism. 
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Transparency as a mitigation tool  
Inter-governmental organizations (Schemeil, 2013), like the OECD and the 
EU, act as the mediators between nation-states by developing an open 
collaborative relationship that is sensitive to any encroachment over sovereignty 
powers. Adopting an open collaborative approach in inter-governmental relations 
builds trust (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Braithwaite, 2013; Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 
2009) and mitigates more extreme levels of inter-state competition. At the PAC 
hearings, the HMRC witness, RW35-GET, observed: ‘we do work very closely 
with colleagues. You have mentioned the US, but this is not an approach which 
is done in isolation…[we] continue to work with other countries to ensure that we 
do stay on top.’ 
Information intermediary respondent, RP19-SEN, remarked: ‘I think in any of 
these situations, co-ordination is absolutely crucial. I think that's probably a view 
that would be shared by a lot of people.’ The deputy director of HMT, RP14-
GET, explained: ‘from the perspective of an individual tax authority, you get the 
best outcome if everybody collaborates in an effective way, because you gather 
and exchange information and then it enables tax authorities to make sure that 
people responsible for gathering and paying tax are doing so… Problems may 
arise if individual tax authorities with jurisdictions start trying to game the system 
to get a better outcome for themselves.’ 
In the event that a breakdown occurs in open collaboration or transparency 
between competing nation-states, countermeasures may be applied, as suggested 
by RP14-GET: 
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Then, the risk from their perspective is that they find people taking 
countermeasures. We'll say, “Fine but we'll just abrogate our tax treaty with 
you.”  And actually, if you're a country that wants to be competitive and 
wants to attract investment and be an economic actor, if you're cut out from 
the tax treaty network, you just can't do that… increasingly you risk 
blacklisting yourself. 
 
That is to say, individual nation-states are able to retaliate by either reducing 
or removing bilateral double-taxation concessions. However, before the point of 
breakdown in open collaboration is reached, there is the opportunity for hard 
negotiation: in agreeing on the mutually-acceptable boundaries of inter-state 
competition (OECD, 2015c); and, specifically, on the mutually-acceptable 
mechanisms for transparency (OECD, 2015g).  
Mutual exchange of information mechanism 
Bilateral tax treaties have always incorporated a mutual exchange of 
information provision to assist nation-states in resolving disputes on double 
taxation. Under a significant initiative mediated by the OECD, there should in 
future be an automatic exchange of information mechanism (OECD, 2015e). The 
HMRC respondent, RP17-GET noted: 
 
That's being sort of agreed at the G20 and OECD level, but there's further 
discussion going on at the moment, and on into 2015 on exactly how the 
information should be reported and how it will be disseminated between tax 
authorities.’ Respondent RP17-GET continued: ‘So there are different routes 
that are being explored at the moment. One is for the parent company to 
report the information to the parent jurisdiction and then the parent tax 
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authority to exchange through some form of treaty route, with all the relevant 
[crosstalk] treaty jurisdictions. 
 
The mechanism for implementing the automatic mutual exchange of 
information across multiple nation-states is for participants to commit to the terms 
and conditions of a multilateral treaty (OECD, 2015e). The HMT respondent, 
RP17-GEP, explained: ‘So the idea being some sort of multi-national instrument 
which countries can sign up to in order to access this information. The principle 
behind it is that the information would only go to tax authorities.’ The OECD 
respondent, RP20-IET, remarked: ‘It will overcome the asymmetry of 
information that currently exists. That's something that sovereign nations need to 
reach agreement on, in terms of how the logistics of sharing that information will 
occur.’ It is the home headquarters of the MNE (Chandler, 1991; Foss, 1997; 
Goold, Campbell & Alexander, 1994) that will assume a significant role in 
furnishing such additional information in order to support the multilateral 
initiative. OECD respondent, RP21-IET, explained: ‘what we will be setting up 
is a government-to-government automatic exchange of information mechanism 
where the information…at the ultimate parent level…will be disseminated…to 
the local jurisdictions’.  
Conclusion 
As articulated by Birkland (2016), public policy is about addressing solutions 
to social problems. The findings from my fieldwork indicate the dexterity of host 
policymakers in using the public deliberative approach in coping with the 
competing public policy objectives firmly embedded within corporate reporting 
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policy and host taxation policy domains. Host public policymakers acknowledged 
the difficulty in challenging stockholder-primacy logic underpinning corporate 
reporting policy and the taken-for-granted orthodoxy of economic growth 
initiatives. Instead, host policymakers used the public deliberative approach to 
challenge the stakeholder-oriented concerns of distributed fairness evident in the 
host corporate tax policy domain.  
Kingdon’s public policy framework (Kingdon, 2011), guided by the earlier 
research of Cohen, March & Olsen (1972), indicates that agenda-setting is about 
recognizing the parallel streams of social problems, policy alternatives and 
politics that move temporally independently of each other. These independent 
parallel streams will, at times, converge as a result of a transforming or focusing 
event (Birkland, 1998), as identified in my fieldwork. Based on my data analysis 
and findings outlined in this and the preceding chapter, I show that host 
policymakers shifted the public deliberative discourse from cognitive legitimacy 
judgements to sociopolitical legitimacy judgements within the corporate tax 
policy domain by exploiting stakeholder interest in distributive fairness and by 
retaliating to perceived unfairness in MNE base erosion practices across host 
locations. Such retaliatory responses took many forms affecting, both directly and 
indirectly, the foreign-owned MNEs operations. 
I have identified two key stages in the process of public policy change. Firstly, 
host policymakers used commensuration techniques to shift acceptance towards 
sociopolitical policy change based on collective stakeholder consensus. My 
fieldwork identified three forms of commensuration techniques applied, namely: 
(i) comparing economic activity indicators to reconfigure MNE intermediate and 
subunit corporate financial performance on a country-by-country geographical 
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basis; (ii) comparing fragmented MNE value-creation and value-capture activities 
to an integrative thinking on valuation practices exercised across borders; and (iii) 
comparing the order of reward to the MNE management of risk-types, 
distinguishing between routine functional reward and residual entrepreneurial 
non-functional reward. Secondly, in order to mitigate harmful inter-governmental 
competition that was being exploited by MNEs, it became necessary for IGOs, 
such as the OECD and the EU, to commit to a level of collaboration that was 
based on transparency and on mutual exchange of information principles. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss my contribution to extant literature by 
providing a thick description of the MNE valuation practices in base erosion, 
taking a resource-based view of the firm, and by augmenting the theory of social 
judgements, through showing the conditions that constrain and the mechanisms 
that enable the bridging of cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 9 – Discussion and Contribution 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will bring together my analysis and research findings 
discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8 and will discuss how they address the gaps in the 
literature. We have seen that extant literature fails to explain how host 
policymakers make sense of the base erosion phenomenon that affects host 
advanced economies, such as the United Kingdom. Such an insight is useful to 
illuminate the phenomenological outcome of a stockholder-primacy logic 
governance system that justifies inquiry about the plurality of perspectives on 
value creation. I will fill this gap by explaining how host policymakers, during 
the course of holding the PAC public hearings in 2012 and 2013, framed this 
phenomenon.                
   I will build on the extant literature for MNE value-creation frameworks as 
illustrated in Table 3.1 about the key concepts of value in strategy, 
internationalization and performance, headquarters and parenting, internal firm 
markets, subsidiary and intermediate units and subnational networks from a firm 
or aggregative perspective—in order to build theory about the public 
stakeholders’ perspective on MNE value-creation and appropriation across host 
locations. The public stakeholder perspective will explicate how host 
policymakers define MNE base erosion as the relative degree of alignment in the 
constituent elements of use value-creation using the mechanisms of exchange 
value that are incrementally captured in the course of MNEs internationalizing.
  My referential context to how host policymakers define the phenomenon is 
guided by the second-order constructs in the theoretical representation of my data 
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(Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012; Herepath, 2014; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011). 
I will also distinguish the broader concept of base erosion from earlier seminal 
perspectives on the organizing views of transfer pricing, and provide an 
organizing view of host location MNE base erosion practices. 
In the context of the response of host policymakers to the base erosion 
problem, I will augment the theory of social judgements (Bitektine, 2011; Golant 
& Sillince, 2007; Harmon, Green & Goodnight, 2015) by explaining the boundary 
conditions and showing how cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy judgments 
may be bridged. Whereas extant theory tells us that inter-field rhetoric is 
associated with institutional change, it fails to explain how cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy judgements may be bridged. I will fill this gap by 
showing how engaging with particular forms of commensuration techniques in a 
public deliberative setting will bridge judgement types inter-field. I will also 
explain the implications for practice of this contribution, and why it is so 
important to host policymakers—namely, in order to maintain their legitimacy 
against challenges presented by MNEs.   
The Emergent Problem of MNE Base Erosion 
Addressing the gap in the literature 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the gap in the extant literature on MNE value-creation 
frameworks—namely, that there has been little research on value creation from a 
public stakeholder level of analysis, other than the trade-off between bankruptcy 
legislative policy and entrepreneurship risk (Lee et al., 2007). The gap in the 
literature is in understanding how host policymakers make sense of value-creation 
and value-capture processes that MNEs engage in beyond the home 
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headquarters—that is, across overseas host locations. In Chapter 3, I summarized 
in Figure 3.1 how the key concepts about value capture and appropriation have 
developed, primarily explicating a firm perspective, but also to a lesser extent, an 
aggregate and individual perspective. 
Understanding the host policymakers’ perspective is important as it provides 
a theoretical lens into how they balance the competing tensions of economic 
growth and societal welfare. The MNE firms that gave evidence before the UK 
House of Commons in 2012 (PAC-UK, 2012) and in 2013 (PAC-UK, 2013) 
included both foreign-headquartered MNEs engaged in traditional forms of 
internationalizing (Starbucks Corporation, 2013) as well as international new 
ventures (Amazon.com, 2013; Google Inc, 2013). Host policymakers recognize 
that value is created through the process of firms internationalizing (Contractor, 
2007; Contractor, Sumit & Chin-Chun, 2003; Glaum & Oesterle, 2007), through 
the decision opportunity choices (Cohen, 1972; Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982) 
that are made by MNEs’ top management on their transfer pricing and profit 
shifting strategies, and the firms’ dynamic capabilities in flexibly and 
responsively organizing their processes, position and pathways (Helfat & Winter, 
2011; Teece, 2014; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997).  
Over the years, host policymakers have viewed the problem of base erosion 
and profit shifting (Congress of the United States, 1961) in different contexts. In 
this instance host policyholders framed their understanding of the emergent 
phenomenon consequent upon the austerity measures (Pimlot & Giles, 2010) 
announced in the UK (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Callinicos, 2012) as a policy 
concern to redress alignment of the MNE value-creation and capture processes 
across host locations. I use my research findings and build on the value creation 
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framework (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Lepak et al., 2007) in the strategy 
literature (Barney, 1991; Becerra, 2008) to explicate the constituent elements 
making up use value and the mechanisms that captures exchange value in this 
process. I fill the gap in the literature by depicting the host policymakers’ 
perspective on how divergence in MNE alignment of their value creation and 
value capture occurs. In doing so, I advance the plurality of perspectives on value 
creation frameworks under the resource-based view. 
Building on the value-creation framework 
In strategy literature, value is often assumed and not explained. Kornberger 
(2017 p.2), inspired by John Deweys’ pragmatic philosophy, indicates that “if 
strategy is concerned with value-creation; and if value is the correlate of valuation 
practices; then it follows that strategy has to be understood in relation to valuation 
practices.” In distinguishing MNEs internalized and externalized economic 
activities, Bowman & Ambrosini explain value by reference to the classical 
economists reference to use value and exchange value. In the context of the 
consumer, ‘Use value refers to the specific qualities of the product perceived by 
customers in relation to their needs’ (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000 p.2) whereas 
‘Exchange value refers to price…the monetary amount realized when the 
exchange of goods takes place’ (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000 p.3).    
   Use value is co-created (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Gronroos, 2008) by 
a firm acquiring use value in goods, services and things and creating new use 
value by working on them (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000), using the firm’s 
existing resource capabilities. A particular application of value-in-use practice 
occurs when firms assess the fair carrying value of their intangible assets, such as 
goodwill (Huikku, Mouritsen & Silvola, 2017). In this thesis, when referring to 
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use value or value-in-use, I refer to the firm’s component of use value co-creation 
as illustrated by Bowman & Ambrosini (2000 p.12). 
 
Figure 9.1 – Host policymakers’ view on value alignment framework 
 
 
Notes to Figure 9.1 
Lines: 
(a) the dotted lines around the three constituent elements in value creation emphasize that 
not all value-created by the MNE is necessarily captured by the group; (b) the solid lines 
around the four mechanisms for value capture indicate the MNE’s attributable share of 
value captured within the group; (c) the oblique lines connecting the constituent elements 
of value creation and connecting the mechanisms of value capture indicate, firstly, the 
interconnectedness of the constituent elements and the mechanisms; and secondly, that 
base erosion in host locations is about the degree of divergence between the MNE group’s 
value-creation and value-capture processes. 
Integers: 
(1) Illustrating the composition of the value-creation process; (2) Illustrating the 
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composition of the value-capture process; (3) Indicating that where divergence in value 
creation and value capture is perceived small, there is considered a lower incidence of base 
erosion; (4) Indicating that where divergence in value creation and value capture is 
perceived large, there is considered a higher incidence of base erosion; and (5) At the 
extreme limits of divergence, MNEs resist challenges from external actors by deploying 
rhetorical strategies attempting to maintain coherence across these processes. 
 
Constituent elements in value creation  
Based on my findings, I build on the value creation framework, to show how 
host policymakers identify the processes of internationalizing, mobilizing, and 
arbitraging by MNEs across host locations as constituent elements for MNEs to 
create use value (see Figure 9.1).  For Andersen (1993 p.210) internationalization 
involves firms exporting or more generally engaging in economic activity ‘across 
country markets’.  In revisiting the Uppsala model, Johanson & Vahlne (2009 
p.1423) remark that ‘Internationalization is seen as the outcome of firm actions 
to strengthen network positions by what is traditionally referred to as improving 
or protecting their position in the market.’ For Contractor (2007 p.458), 
internationalization is more than gaining foreign knowledge ‘I refer here to 
something else – the accumulated and better organizational ability, over time, to 
reproduce in foreign locations…at a lower cost and time.’ 
Synthesizing the literature with my data, I use the policymakers’ view of 
internationalizing as being the organizational ability of the MNE, as conditioned 
by time, pace and space, to engage in economic activity between its home location 
and overseas counterparties, for example, its foreign subsidiaries, its customers, 
and other salient stakeholder classes. In my research, I identify use value as being 
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created through MNE intergroup transfers of goods, services or things, whereas 
exchange value as being realized through the supply of goods, services or things 
to its customers and other salient stakeholders (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; 
MacDonald & Ryall, 2004). Internationalization does not merely commence with 
the realization of exchange value in the export of goods and services to its 
overseas customers. From a host policymakers’ perspective, the process of 
internationalization commences at a much earlier stage. It incorporates all the 
intergroup economic activity undertaken by the firm in positioning the 
organization to create as much use value as possible from the supply of goods, 
services and things to its customers and for consumption by its overseas markets.  
The home headquarters of the MNE group plays an important role in making 
those choice opportunity decisions, such as synchronizing group strategy (Goold, 
Campbell & Alexander, 1994), managing organizational processes (Chandler, 
1991), directing knowledge-flow (Foss, 1997), and in dispersing the locus of their 
activity and investment (Nel & Ambos, 2013). This leads to the second element 
of mobilizing firm resources at intermediate group levels (Chakravarty, Hsieh, 
Schotter & Beamish, 2017; Hoenen, Nell & Ambos, 2014). In Chapter 6 on 
findings, I coined the term ‘mobilizing’ to indicate the policymakers’ view on the 
degree of relative ease with which a particular class or category of firm’s 
resources may be relocated from one nation-state to another. Graetz (2016) 
describes the process of mobilizing in the following manner, ‘Combining labour 
and capital mobility with cross-border trade…allows the location where R&D is 
performed and the location where income is earned to change in response to the 
nature and level of government support…[and] when innovation occurs within 
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the MNE, it is quite possible for the firm to shift the location of the income from 
the innovation.’ 
Intangible and fungible asset classes are inherently more mobile allowing for 
opportunity decision choices to be made, for example, on where either 
internationally or regionally to locate ownership of patents (Evers, Miller & 
Spengel, 2014; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2009), to locate R&D activities and cross 
sharing reimbursement agreements (Arginelli, 2015; Vann, 2010), to locate 
labour (Tregaskis, Edwards, Edwards, Ferner & Marginson, 2010) and modular 
labour-sharing arrangements (Bailey, Leonardi & Barley, 2012; Hirst & 
Humphreys, 2015); where to locate group treasury and financial services 
activities (Polak, Robertson & Lind, 2011) for members of the MNE group; and 
where to position intermediate regional mandate centres (Chakravarty et al., 
2017; Hoenen et al., 2014). Value is created, as indicated by Teece (2014) and 
Pitelis & Teece (2010) through the dynamic capabilities of the multinational firm 
in positioning and re-positioning their resources, both tangibles and intangibles, 
across nation-state boundaries in response to the exigencies of fast-changing 
environments. 
The third value-creating element that host policymakers identified in my 
fieldwork is the organizational ability of MNEs to exploit arbitrage opportunities 
across borders. From a finance perspective, Shleifer & Vishney (1997 p.35) 
observe that arbitrage is ‘defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the 
same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously 
different prices” (Sharpe and Alexander (1990))’. However, from an international 
strategy perspective, Ghemawat (2008 p.198) states that ‘the differences between 
countries can be a source of rather than a constraint on value creation’. In this 
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context, arbitrage from country differences can take many forms, including: 
knowledge, labour, capital and regional as well as tax arbitrage forms (Arregle, 
Miller, Hitt & Beamish, 2013; Ghemawat, 2008).  
There are two organizing means of implementing tax arbitrage – the 
positioning or repositioning of firms’ resources and the other is transfer pricing. 
Colbert & Spicer (1995 p.424) state ‘Spicer (1988) draws on transaction cost 
economics to develop a position theory of the transfer pricing process in which 
the strategic and transactional characteristics of specific transfers are related 
to…the organizational processes used to manage transfers within firms.’ 
Combining the literature with the data, I adopt a policymakers’ strategic view of 
arbitrage. That is, from a policy perspective, it may be concluded that arbitraging 
involves MNEs exercising choice opportunities arising from nation-state 
differences to rationally organize the process of transfers within firms across 
borders. Whereas my research identified these three processes of value creation 
as a second-order interpretation of the policymakers’ perspective, it is possible 
that MNE management implicitly or explicitly apply these three principles when 
formulating their value-creation and tax minimization strategies. However, but 
for the literature on the organizing views on transfer pricing, extant literature has 
not theorized about value-creation framework in this nuanced manner. 
Constituent mechanisms for value capture 
The discussion to date has concentrated on how policymakers view processes 
inside the firm that create use value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Gronroos, 
2008). I will now turn attention to how policymakers view activities of the firm 
in realizing exchange value (see Figure 9.1). Firstly, the initiating mechanism 
identified in my fieldwork is that of fragmenting the MNE’s overseas routines 
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and activities into separate host subunits with clearly defined proprietary 
boundaries. In this thesis, I use the term ‘fragmenting’ to explain the choice 
opportunities that MNEs have in flexibly reconfiguring their internal tasks and 
activities across national boundaries in order to redirect appropriation or value 
capture to their preferred locations.  
For example, in the evidence given by Starbucks at the PAC-UK (2012 Q234) 
hearings, the MNE acknowledged that its UK host operations paid royalties into 
a separate group company located in the Netherlands to provide its UK coffee 
shops with marketing know-how that it developed centrally through ‘research and 
development, product development, category management, store design’ 
undertaken in Amsterdam. In the evidence given by Amazon it was its 
Luxembourg subunit (PAC-UK, 2012 Q337) that was engaged in selling books 
to UK customers, and that paid the UK host operations for the fragmented 
logistics facilities or so-called ‘fulfilment centres’ it operated in the UK. In the 
case of Google, it was its Irish subunit (PAC-UK, 2012 Q466) that was engaged 
in providing advertising services to UK customers, that paid the UK operations 
for the fragmented marketing and intelligence services it operated in the UK.  
Bowman & Ambrosini (2000 p.5) explain that value is captured ‘when the 
newly created use value is sold’. At the point of value capture, profit is determined 
as the difference between the exchange value realized and the sum of use value 
created up to that stage in the supply chain. Pitelis (2009) observes that you need 
the ‘Value capture strategies, as well as the vehicles …[to] allow firms to 
appropriate as much value as possible.’ The mechanism of fragmenting across 
national boundaries therefore enables strategic determination of the level of value 
capture attributable to each vehicle or foreign subsidiary in the firm’s downstream 
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progression to market. In the case of Amazon, it was its booksellers in 
Luxembourg and its fulfilment centres in the UK, for Google it was its advertising 
media providers in Ireland and its promotion and intelligence gatherers in the UK, 
and for Starbucks it was its marketing know-how providers in the Netherlands 
and its coffee shops in the UK. As group fragmentation is an intervening 
mechanism that provides a vehicle for incremental value capture (Garcia-Castro 
& Aguilera, 2015), the firm will only be subject to market elasticity constraints 
on ultimate value appropriation when all the firm’s internally created use value is 
realized under market transactions. 
Secondly, captive insourcing is another vehicle that host policymakers 
identified as an intervening mechanism for internalizing value capture. Captive 
insourcing is a specific form of fragmenting. Whereas fragmenting can occur 
anywhere downstream in the organizational structure, captive insourcing is a 
specific vehicle that internalizes the provision of goods (Leiblein, 2002), services 
(Gooris & Peeters, 2015) or things (Chen, 2005) that are exclusively intergroup 
to other group entities. This would include Google’s promotion and intelligence 
gathering vehicle in the UK, Amazon’s fulfilment support centres in the UK, or, 
more generally, centralized group treasury services, centralized group insurance 
and risk coordination or other shared services (Gospel & Sako, 2010). In the 
context of transaction costs, Chen (2005 p.234) notes that: ‘Where licensing 
contracts become too costly to negotiate and enforce, then, as suggested by 
internalization theory, MNEs can internalize the exploitation of technology by 
investing directly.’ Alternatively, the fragmenting of global business processes 
can provide proprietary information protection (Gooris & Peeters, 2015). Whilst 
Mayer & Salomon (2006 pp. 942-943) observe that: ‘Although contracting 
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hazards…play[s] a key role in governance…they are not the only factors… Firm 
transaction characteristics held constant, firms will outsource transactions when 
technological capabilities are weak and govern transactions when technological 
capabilities are strong.’ From a host policymakers’ perspective, I construe the 
term captive insourcing as referring to decisions made by the firm to internalize 
transactions not only because of contractual hazards and technological 
capabilities, but also to direct value capture to specific entities within the 
fragmented design of the MNE corporate group (Nebus, 2016; Qian & Delios, 
2008). 
Thirdly, host policymakers identified the process of valorization as a 
mechanism of measuring worth whereby MNEs exercise a decision opportunity 
to internalize a progressive level of value capture. Aspers & Beckert (2011 p.4-
5) observe that ‘Value has several interrelated dimensions…such as moral value, 
aesthetic value and economic value…leading to different ways of evaluating 
social events, people, organizations or objects.’ As a mechanism of value capture, 
Pitelis (2009) explains that ‘value created is only realized as value captured – 
[when] ontologically…[it] manifests itself as value captured’. Thus for host 
policymakers the term valorizing may be interpreted as a process whereby firms 
flexibly establish exchange values within global transfer pricing constraints that 
are guided by organizational choice decisions, institutional values and the 
regulatory dictate of home and host locations. Home and host rules on transfer 
pricing (Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008; Lohse & Riedel, 2013) place a 
degree of restraint on MNEs choice opportunities in progressively internalizing 
value capture across borders, but they do not address the more substantive issue 
of attributing profits fairly intra-group across borders (Avi-Yonah, Clausing & 
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Durst, 2008). Valorization, however, only provides a one-dimensional view on 
internalizing value capture. 
The fourth mechanism of value capture identified by host policymakers was 
that of consolidating – bringing together the fragmented parts of the multinational 
firm operationalizes and gives coherent identity to the firm as a whole (Espeland 
& Hirsch, 1990; Miller & Power, 2013). Clarke & Dean (1993 p.247) observe 
that: ‘Nowhere is accounting more intrusive of the law than in respect of 
accounting for related companies. Examining the development of consolidation 
accounting reveals that mercantile practice, reinforced by the legislative, the 
courts and regulatory agencies, has been too greatly influenced by the language 
of and practice of accounting.’ From a critical sociopolitical viewpoint, Maroun 
& Van Zijl (2016 pp.224 & 236) comment that: ‘IFRS10 and IFRS12 are 
introduced in the interest of corporate transparency and accountability…[as] a 
direct response to global financial crisis…and the application of these 
requirements in highly complex social settings [is] characterized by a “logic of 
resistance”.’ From the host policymakers’ perspective, the term ‘consolidating’ 
may be interpreted not only as an act of combining the identifiable fragmented 
parts of the firm, but also the role of the MNE home headquarters in 
communicating to its stockholders and salient stakeholders how it has captured 
value across its permeated vertical architecture (Chandler, 1991; Goold et al., 
1994; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006). 
Contribution to theory and practice – value-creation frameworks 
My contribution to theory (Corley & Gioia, 2011; Davis, 1971) is, by building 
on the value-creation and value-capture framework (Bowman & Ambrosini, 
2000; Gronroos, 2008; Lepak et al., 2007), as embedded in the resource the 
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resource-based view (Becerra, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007), to show how 
UK host policymakers explicated the emergent base erosion: firstly, by 
identifying the constitutive elements of an MNEs’ value-creation process across 
host markets as comprising internationalizing, mobilizing and arbitraging; and 
secondly, by showing the operative mechanisms of an MNEs’ value-capture 
process as comprising fragmenting, captive insourcing, valorizing and 
consolidating.  
I label my contribution as an advance toward a theory of pluralistic cross-
national value creation—that explains a pluralist actor perspective about 
organizations constructing orders of worth across host locations. My fieldwork 
also illustrates how at the limits of divergence of the value-creating and value-
capture framework, MNEs deployed rhetorical strategies to maintain external 
cohesion between these processes. Examples of the rhetorical strategies employed 
by MNEs, included: defending legitimacy of action by diligently adopting 
process controls in exercise of procedural fairness (Cropanzana, Bowen & 
Gilliland, 2007; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), and by challenging the 
interpretative scope and motives of host regulators (James, 2010; Riaz, Buchanan 
& Ruebottom, 2016). Host locations used this value-creation perspective to frame 
the emergent problem of MNE base erosion, determining the avenues for policy 
response initially proposed by the OECD (OECD, 2014c, 2015f), and 
subsequently by the UK host regulatory authorities (Santos, 2016). 
In addition, whereas Swieringa & Waterhouse (1982) in their seminal paper 
used four organizational models providing a behavioural (Cyert & March, 1992), 
a decision choice (Cohen, 1972), an enacted (Weick, 1979) and a hierarchical 
(Williamson, 1975) organizing perspective, my contribution augments these 
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organizational views by linking transfer pricing to the broader concept of base 
erosion through MNEs internationalizing (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Welch et 
al., 2016), explicating that it is not only about the process of valorizing but is also 
about the processes involved in relative alignment of the value-creation and 
value-capture framework (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Gronroos, 2008; Lepak 
et al., 2007) through MNEs operating across borders.  
This broader conceptualized process involves positioning or re-positioning of 
resources and using dynamic capabilities in making strategic choice decisions in 
internationalizing their business models (Teece, 2014). For example, taking 
Swieringa & Waterhouse’s (1982) application of the decision choice or ‘garbage 
can’ model, as an organizing view, whereas the process is continual, seizing 
opportunities to match solutions to problems that are affected by the variability 
in the firm’s environment, there are perspectives to problems that go beyond the 
scope of the firm’s decision-making boundaries. The base erosion phenomenon 
is not only a firm’s organizing view on its inter-group valorization problem, it is 
also society’s response to the broader fairness in the decision choices made by 
firms in host locations (Bosse, Phillips & Harrison, 2009; Parmar et al., 2010).  
My contribution to practice (Bartunek & Rynes, 2010) is to show that 
redressing the policy concern regarding the varying degrees of alignment of value 
creation and value capture across host markets, requires the development of 
policy responses and administrative tools that act on the constitutive elements of 
use value-creation and mechanisms of exchange value-capture re-establishing 
and maintaining such alignment for both traditional and accelerated forms of 
internationalizing. MNEs have demonstrated their capabilities in adapting and co-
opting (Luyckx & Janssens, 2016) policy principles of aligning host location 
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economic activity with the value-creation framework. Host policymakers in turn 
are required to respond appropriately in order to maintain their own legitimacy 
(Scott, 1994) and restore principles of distributive fairness in revising 
stakeholder-oriented host public policy (Harmon et al., 2015; Harrison, Bosse & 
Phillips, 2010).  
The Host Policymakers’ Response 
Addressing the gap in the literature 
In Chapters 1 and 4, I observed that a ‘shift in use from intra-field rhetoric to 
inter-field rhetoric relates to an increase in the effectiveness of delegitimation 
efforts and a decrease in institutional stability’ (Harmon et al., 2015 p.87). 
However, there is little research on the sociopolitical conditions for and the means 
of challenging inter-field taken-for-granted orthodoxy to redress the perceived 
harm caused by the MNE base erosion phenomenon. Recognizing this gap in the 
literature is important as it shifts the theoretical inquiry about social judgements 
from the passive categorization to the active modality involved in disrupting 
stable fields responsive to evaluative deliberative democracy. 
In Chapters 7 and 8, I outlined the findings on how UK host policymakers 
developed policy responses to the base erosion problem. I show how particular 
commensuration techniques (see Table 8.3 – Mechanisms of commensuration) 
were used as a means of shifting the public deliberative discourse towards 
stakeholder-oriented policies that are more responsive to evaluative analysis 
(refer to Figure 9.2 – Model for bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements). 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 9 
 
271 
I show how particular commensuration techniques were used as a means of 
shifting the public deliberative discourse towards stakeholder-oriented policies 
that are more responsive to evaluative analysis. Policy change has evolved in host 
locations post 2015 to improve fairness in economic activity alignment (HMRC, 
2015; OECD, 2015f), but has yet to deal more effectively with the complex hybrid 
mismatch arbitrage arrangements across host borders (Kahlenberg & Kopec, 
2016). A continued emphasis in applying such commensuration techniques will 
assist host location policymakers in monitoring and maintaining visibility over 
the performativity in corrective measures implemented (Farazmand, 2009; Olsen, 
2005). 
Cognitive legitimacy maintaining intra-field stability 
A fundamental assumption underlying corporate disclosure policy preferences 
(Zhang & Andrew, 2014) is the taken-for-granted beliefs and cultural values 
associated with the stockholder primacy paradigm (Veldman & Willmott, 2016). 
A stockholder primacy logic is evident in corporate governance practices 
(Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2013; Westphal & Zajac, 2013) and in host 
location behavioural codes of conduct (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Veldman 
& Willmott, 2016). Providing decision-relevant information to stockholders 
(Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther, 2010; Pelger, 2016; Young, 2006) is considered 
paramount, as distinct from indulging a broader stakeholder audience (Mitchell, 
Weaver, Agle, Bailey & Carlson, 2016). Any changes to corporate disclosure 
policy that fail to meet the test of providing decision-relevant information to 
stockholders are likely to be resisted by intra-field actors.  
Attempting to challenge corporate reporting disclosure of related-party cross-
border transactions, from host location through MNE group entities to the MNE 
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home-headquarters reporting can be complex and futile (Hakansson & Lind, 
2004; Killian, 2010). Attempting to trace related-party transactions is complex 
because there may be multiple reasons for insourcing particular activities within 
group entities. Furthermore, it may be futile to attempt to trace related-party 
transactions because international accounting convention requires that related-
party transactions be eliminated on group consolidation (IAS 24, 2009). Whilst 
related-party disclosure is required in the consolidated and the separate accounts 
of the parent and its subunits, the purpose of such disclosure is to alert the user to 
its impact on reported earnings and commitments assumed in those separate 
accounts, and is not necessarily intended to assist with tracing.  
Although host government agencies may query whether corporate disclosures 
made by foreign-headquartered MNEs are representative, there is less willingness 
to challenge the broader taken-for-granted assumptions inscribed into 
international accounting conventions. The stockholder primacy logic, or 
stockholder wealth maximization, supports the broader initiative on economic 
advancement in host locations. Any attempt by a nation-state to challenge those 
fundamental assumptions may impact its own legitimacy (Meyer, Boli & 
Thomas, 1994). My contribution shows that challenges to neoliberal ideology in 
liberal market economies appear in many guises—in this instance, the threshold 
test of the necessity to provide decision-relevant information to stockholders 
becomes the reified field defence. 
Circumstances responsive to change 
Whereas stockholder-oriented corporate disclosure policy is resistant to 
change that fails to meet the stockholder relevance assumption, host corporate tax 
policy is more responsive to change. It is more responsive because corporate tax 
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policy is stakeholder oriented. I develop a model to describe the required 
conditions or circumstances responsive to change and explicate the means for 
bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy (see model in Figure 9.2).  
 
Figure 9.2 – Model bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements 
 
Note: Figure 9.2 shows the interrelationship of the concepts relevant to 
operationalizing sociopolitical legitimacy change.  
 
The organizing process to tax planning infers a stakeholder perspective 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Tax planning involves not only taking into account 
all costs and all taxes, both explicit and implicit (Mills, Erickson & Maydew, 
1998; Scholes et al., 2016), it also in recognizes the salient interests of all parties 
connected with an MNE transaction, activity or restructuring arrangement 
(Mulligan & Oats, 2016; Shackleford & Shevlin, 2001). The more contentious 
issue is how the salient interests of all parties may be accommodated (Doyle, 
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Hughes & Summers, 2013; Ylonen & Laine, 2015), or should be accommodated 
(Dowling, 2014; Friedman, 2007; Lanis & Richardson, 2015). 
Liability to host taxation is ordinarily understood by MNEs as being based on 
a strict literal interpretation (Boden, Killian, Mulligan & Oats, 2010; Freedman, 
2008; Norton, 2012) of domestic law as varied by the bilateral double tax treaties. 
James (2010) and Norton (2012) indicate that in recent decades nation-states have 
shifted emphasis to a purposive interpretative approach as a means of challenging 
aggressive tax planning (Freedman, Loomer & Vella, 2009) or tax avoidance 
practices (Shackleford & Shevlin, 2001). Cognitive legitimacy is evident in intra-
field actors seeking to maintain stability in host location corporate taxation policy. 
Pertinently, private intra-field actors demand an equitable balancing a state’s 
taxation powers with corporate taxpayers’ rights, if confidence and certainty is to 
be maintained in host corporate tax policy (James, 2010). Public intra-field actors, 
such as corporate tax regulators and the judiciary, administer this equity 
assumption to protect broader stakeholder rights through competing perspectives 
of legitimacy (Doyle et al., 2013; Norton, 2012). It is these stakeholder-oriented 
assumptions underlying host corporate tax policy that condition circumstances 
that are responsive to change, which stockholder-oriented corporate tax 
disclosure policy does not. 
Extending Bitektine’s theory of social judgements 
From a sociopolitical legitimacy perspective, where the public policy field is 
stakeholder oriented, as in corporate tax policy, stakeholders are not merely 
concerned with procedural fairness (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; McFarlin & 
Sweeney, 1992), but also are concerned with distributive fairness (Harrison et al., 
2010). That is, stakeholders are not merely concerned with process legitimacy 
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(Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, 2003), but are also concerned with how managerial 
discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Shen & Cho, 2005) is exercised in 
meeting the need for distributive fairness (Blair & Stout, 1999; Harrison et al., 
2010).  
In circumstances where stakeholders perceive a failure in distributive fairness 
coupled with both low interactional and low procedural fairness, there is a high 
likelihood that affected stakeholders will retaliate (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). 
Host regulators, as stakeholders in MNE host location activities, despite 
welcoming the benefits of foreign direct investment, will seek to punish those 
blamed for both unfair processes and unfair outcomes, where perceived (Skarlicki 
& Folger, 1997). Where the unfair outcomes are sufficiently egregious, then 
irrespective of the costs or likelihood of future recoveries, host regulators may 
seek to impose harsh treatment (Fehr & Gachter, 2000) on those MNEs pursuing 
aggressive corporate tax strategies. I extend Bitektine’s theory of social 
judgements by showing that the evaluative stakeholder orientation embodies 
values of fairness, equity and reciprocity, whilst perceived injustice will provoke 
retaliatory responses—with the propensity to punish injustice being greater than 
the propensity to reward fair reciprocal behaviour (Fehr & Gachter, 2000). 
Commensuration techniques acting as the bridge 
My research identified the means used by the UK host policymakers to bridge 
cognitive and sociopolitical judgements affecting the corporate tax policy field—
namely, the effective use of commensuration techniques (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007; Jeacle & Carter, 2011) in three identifiable instances.  
The first instance involved linking host MNE performance as reported for 
book and tax purposes to economic indicators prevailing in the host location. The 
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second instance involved applying an integrated thinking mindset to grasp the 
entirety of a firm’s value-creation capabilities. The third instance involved linking 
the nature of risk assumption by the MNE and its host subunits to the 
entrepreneurial reward that should attach to non-functional risk as distinct from 
routine reward for the provision of capital and labour—that is to say, functional 
risk is rewarded on the basis of the cost of capital and labour, whilst non-
functional risk is rewarded on the basis of the whole of the residue (Hafkenscheid, 
2017; Knight, 1921; Lukka, 1990; Weston, 1954).  
These forms of commensuration techniques were repeatedly used throughout 
the open, public deliberative process to the point where the movement towards 
the threshold that judgement on the phenomenon inter-field had sufficiently 
shifted from the cognitive to the sociopolitical legitimacy judgement modality. 
The change process thereafter gained legitimacy and cooptation (Bauer, Koedijk 
& Otten, 2005; Luyckx & Janssens, 2016) from MNEs as a commensurate 
response to the base erosion phenomenon. 
In the first instance, the UK host policymakers, in collaboration with the 
OECD, used country-by-country key performance indicators as an effective 
means of linking reported book and tax profits to host economic activity indicia. 
It is generally accepted that net profit for corporate reporting purposes is socially 
constructed differently from taxable net profit for host taxing purposes 
(Freedman, 2008; Graetz, 2016). Notwithstanding the differences between 
computing net profit for corporate reporting and host taxing purposes, both 
outcomes should have a realistic and pragmatic correlation to host economic 
activity (Suzuki, 2003). Country-by-country reporting of key financial and 
economic indicators has been advocated for policymaking purposes (Espeland & 
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Stevens, 2008) in order to uncover disparate correlations with MNE host 
economic indicators.              
   Whereas attempts to introduce a more nuanced disclosure of geographical 
segmentation for IFRS purposes failed (PIR IFRS 8, 2013), it succeeded in the 
alternative form of country-by-country reporting for corporate tax policy reform 
under the OECD proposals (OECD, 2015d). An example from my empirical data 
of host policymakers’ pursuit in tracing the MNE’s economic activity include 
Amazon’s RW46-OEC evidence at the PAC Hearings that ‘Unfortunately, we 
have never broken out revenue figures on a country or website basis… We operate 
a pan-European business. Those are the only figures we have ever broken out’ 
and the PAC Chair RQ26-GEP challenging Amazon’s account: ‘What we are 
getting at in these conversations is that your entire economic activity is here in 
the UK. I even pay in pounds—it never comes off my bank account in euros. 
Your entire activity is here’ (PAC-UK, 2012). 
In the second instance, host policymakers adopted an integrative thinking 
mindset to a firm’s international business model in order to make comparable the 
constitutive elements of a firm’s cross-border value-creation processes with their 
mechanisms of value capture. A firm’s value-creation and value-capture 
capabilities cannot realistically and pragmatically be appraised in the restricted 
contractual context of fragmented activities or fragmented proprietary interests. 
Instead, a common unit of measurement or device that may be useful in valorizing 
fragmented activities may be obtained through integrative mindset visualizing 
and by verbalizing the interconnected and interdependent factors.    
   This common unit moderates the valorization process from a restricted 
contractual context to an interconnected and interdependent association 
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(International Integrated Reporting Council, 2013; Pitelis, 2009) of a firm’s 
processes, position and paths (Teece, 2014; Teece et al., 1997). An example from 
my empirical data on adopting an integrative mindset is FRC’s respondent RP01-
GEA’s comment: ‘What they [IIRC] are basically encouraging companies to do 
us to think in an integrated way. Not just to report about the financial, but to report 
about all those other matters to the extent that they are relevant to 
investors…Now, actually…the UK Framework has already taken that integrative 
thinking… There was a piece of legislation in the Autumn of last year called the 
Strategic Report… that basically says that as well’. 
Integrative thinking has remained a challenge under IFRS assumptions on 
corporate reporting policy (Beattie & Smith, 2013; Nielsen & Roslender, 2015). 
Integrative thinking has had to re-orientate its focus to providing information that 
is decision-relevant to its users (De Villiers, Rinaldi & Unerman, 2014; Van 
Bommel, 2014; Young, 2006) in order to maintain legitimacy in corporate 
reporting policy. On the other hand, the common unit of integrative mindset has 
been embraced in corporate policy discourse on MNE valorization processes, 
particularly as regards its implications to related-party transactions.    
    For inter-group transactions, the value-creation and value-capture framework 
provides insights on the interdependency of a firm’s processes, position and paths 
taken (Teece, 2014). Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) explain that ‘It is an 
accounting convenience to assume that the prices of inputs are aggregated in some 
way and passed onto customers.’  Instead, ‘value creation depends on the relative 
amount of value that is subjectively realized by the target user (or buyer) who is 
the focus of the value creation – whether individual, organization or society’ 
(Lepak et al., 2007 p.182). Integrative thinking on the value-creation framework 
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 9 
 
279 
introduces a sociopolitical legitimate discourse on how exchange value-capture 
should be attributed across its interdependent processes that created and re-
created its inter-group use value.  
In the third instance, host policymakers used the functionality of risk-return 
paradigms as a means of making comparable returns on alternative positions of 
risk assumption. The public deliberation process introduced the notion of 
distinguishing routine reward for assuming functional risk (providing capital and 
labour) from the more significant residual reward for assuming non-functional 
risk that is attributable to entrepreneurial ventures (Knight, 1921; Lukka, 1990; 
Weston, 1954). As an example from my empirical data, OECD head of treaties, 
RP21-IET, defined routine risk as: ‘So what we are now saying is that in those 
situations, where you see an accentuating element of the risk that you have, that 
we will use special measures…in minimum functional entities that have a lot of 
capital allocated to them…in low tax jurisdictions. We will also develop special 
measures…the profits that are allocated to this minimum, functional, low-taxed 
entity will be reallocated again.’            
   Thus, instead of valorizing the reward for risk assumption on a neutral arm’s 
length basis, host policymakers used commensuration to rhetorically adjudicate 
risk valorizing within an MNE cross-border context according to risk categories, 
such that functional risk should be rewarded simply on the basis of the cost of 
labour or capital employed, whereas non-functional risk involving the assumption 
of entrepreneurial risks should be rewarded on the basis of the whole of residual 
profit component (Hafkenscheid, 2017; Knight, 1921; Weston, 1954), applying 
the principles of distributive fairness.  
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Finally, in order to secure sociopolitically mediated change to host location 
public policies, the UK had to negotiate concessions with its OECD trading 
partners to mitigate harmful inter nation-state competition (Dowling, 2014; 
Killian, 2006). Whereas taxing rights are a sovereign prerogative, in a competitive 
world it does become necessary for host nation-states to negotiate and agree on 
those corporate tax policies that may be considered as socially unfair or harmful. 
Collaboration and transparency between nation-states is a necessity in order to 
engender trust and reduce information asymmetry between regulators and MNEs. 
As a mediated concessionary mechanism, the OECD negotiated Action Plan 5 
(OECD, 2015c), requiring that preferential regimes reflect substantial economic 
activity and that member states commit to an exchange of information to support 
an ongoing commitment to cross-border transparency.  
Contribution to theory and practice – moving sociopolitical legitimacy 
judgements for change 
My contribution to the theory of social judgements is to explicate the means 
for bridging cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy judgements—occurring in 
two distinct phases. The literature does passively refer to the signaling of the start 
of a delegitimation process, when intra-field rhetoric shifts towards inter-field 
rhetoric (Harmon et al., 2015). The novelty and utility of my contribution 
(Bartunek, Rynes & Ireland, 2006; Corley & Gioia, 2011) is that, in an active 
context, it explicates these two distinct phases as: (i) the constitutive 
embeddedness of cognitive legitimacy judgements prevalent intra-field rhetoric, 
and (ii) the means for shifting such intra-field rhetoric towards inter-field rhetoric 
that engages sociopolitical analytical evaluation.  
Orlando J. Fernandes   Chapter 9 
 
281 
Firstly, it requires that intra-field taken-for-granted beliefs are identified and 
recognized, together with the assumptions that underlie those cognitive positions. 
In the context of the emergent base erosion problem that was framed by host 
policymakers as the relative degree of alignment between the value-creation and 
value-capture processes implemented by MNEs across host locations, the 
immediate public policy fields affected were corporate reporting policy and 
corporate taxation policy. As the assumptions underlying corporate reporting in 
the host location are based on stockholder wealth orientation and information that 
meets decision-usefulness test for stockholders, they are resilient to any form of 
regulatory change proposals that fail to conform to those assumptions. On the 
other hand, the assumptions underlying corporate tax policy are based on 
stakeholder-oriented principles and thus corporate tax policy is more responsive 
to policy intervention that seeks to redress perceived failures in distributive 
fairness amongst salient stakeholders, including host location policymakers and 
regulators. 
Secondly, having identified which public policy field is responsive to change 
to redress the social problem as defined, I contribute to the theory by explaining 
the means by which sociopolitical legitimacy judgements are enacted. Three 
specific instances of commensuration techniques were used in the open 
deliberative process that together enabled the bridging of cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy judgements affecting corporate tax policy. 
Benchmarking country-by-country economic KPIs against host location book and 
tax profits enables stakeholders to assess and compare the distributive fairness in 
attributing MNE profits referable to host location economic activities. Applying 
an integrative thinking mindset to a firm’s international business model enables 
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stakeholders to visualize and compare the interconnectedness of the firm’s 
constituent elements of use value-creation to its mechanisms of exchange value 
capture. And distinguishing between the alternative risk return paradigms enables 
stakeholders to evaluate and compare the appropriateness of valorizing returns 
for assuming functional and non-functional risk-types. 
My contribution to practice (Bartunek & Rynes, 2010) is in making host 
policymakers and regulators aware of the interrelationship between the open 
public deliberative process and the assumptions that underlie particular public 
policy fields. Intra-field social actors will resist public policy changes that may 
threaten a policy field’s taken-for-granted beliefs.  Institutional change is more 
likely to succeed as a result of challenges emanating from inter-field rhetoric, 
particularly in the context where the discourse is about distributive fairness 
affecting salient stakeholders. In these circumstances, using commensuration 
techniques in a recursive manner enables the bridging of cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy judgements. 
Conclusion 
In Chapters 1 and 3, I identified the gap in the value-creation frameworks 
literature—that is to say, in understanding how host policymakers make sense of 
value-creation and value-capture processes that MNEs engage in beyond the 
home headquarters. Based on my analysis and findings in Chapter 6 and the 
discussion in this chapter, my contribution to theory involved: 
(i) advancing the value-creation frameworks literature to incorporate a public 
stakeholders’ perspective; 
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(ii) identifying the constituent elements of MNEs’ value-creation process and 
operative mechanisms of the value-capture process across host markets; and 
(iii) providing a model of the interconnected concepts that illustrates how at 
the limits of divergence of creation/appropriation, MNEs deployed rhetorical 
strategies to maintain field stability. 
My contribution to practice about value-creation frameworks was in 
explaining that the framing of policy and administrative tools has to address both 
firm value creation and appropriation processes jointly in order to develop an 
effective public policy response. 
In Chapters 1 and 4, I identified the gap the social judgements literature— that 
is to say, that there is little research on the sociopolitical conditions for and the 
means of challenging inter-field taken-for-granted orthodoxy to redress the 
perceived harm caused by the MNE base erosion phenomenon. Based on my 
analysis and findings in Chapters 7 and 8 and discussion in this chapter, my 
contribution to theory involved: 
(i) identifying the intra-field taken-for-granted beliefs held within the 
corporate reporting and international taxation policy domains; 
(ii) recognizing that stakeholder-oriented policy is more responsive to 
evaluative sociopolitical legitimacy challenge than stockholder-primacy logic 
policy;  
(iii) providing a model that traces the convergence of problems, policies and 
politics for host locations challenging base erosion; and  
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(iv) explicating how commensuration techniques are be deployed to 
destabilize and facilitate sociopolitical change.  
My contribution to practice for advancing sociopolitical legitimacy challenges 
was in highlighting the need for host policymakers to reflect on assumptions that 
subsist within particular public policy domains. Also of practical relevance to 
MNEs and top management was in highlighting the need for organizations to 
address not only of procedural justice considerations, but also the complementary 
effects of distributive and interactional justice measures. 
In the next chapter, I will, firstly, provide a summary of the thesis, secondly, 
indicate the contextual limitations to my contribution and, thirdly, identify future 
research opportunities, that link to the limitations identified— such as: examining 
alternative dimensions of host location perspective; undertaking quantitative 
modeling of variability in value-alignment across diverse host locations; 
performing a discursive analysis on intra-field cognitive belief of the ubiquity in 
information technology applications across new and traditional business models; 
and examining bridging mechanisms in other public policy domains. The 
identification of these future research directions, in turn, constitutes a further 
contribution. 
______________________________________________________________ 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
Introduction 
This final chapter has three objectives: firstly, to provide a summary of thesis 
and its theoretical contribution, secondly, to indicate its limitations and possible 
future research directions, and thirdly, explain its utility and implications for 
practice. 
Summary of Thesis and its Theoretical Contribution 
The research question and knowledge gap 
In Chapter 1, I posed the research question, ‘How do host policymakers make 
sense of the MNE base erosion phenomenon?’ I indicated why this research 
question was important—namely, because MNE base erosion tax avoidance 
strategies lead to a loss in corporate tax revenues, unfair competition between 
domestic enterprises and MNEs, and a challenge to the legitimacy and power of 
host nation-states. 
I also identified the gap in extant knowledge: firstly, that there is no critical 
qualitative analysis examining why MNE base erosion practices are associated 
with contract-like corporate governance logics; secondly, that there is little 
research on value creation from a public stakeholder level of analysis, other than 
the trade-off between bankruptcy legislative policy and entrepreneurship risk 
(Lee et al., 2007); and thirdly, that there is little research on the sociopolitical 
conditions for and the means of challenging inter-field taken-for-granted 
orthodoxy to redress the perceived harm caused by the MNE base erosion 
phenomenon. 
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Informed by the literature 
In Chapter 2, I observed that from the 1980s onwards, for liberal market 
economies such as the UK and the USA (Hall & Gingerich, 2009; Lubatkin et al., 
2005) stockholder-primacy logics replaced the earlier managerial logics 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2013). I also 
explained why such dyadic contract-like corporate governance logics fail to 
detect or mitigate MNE base erosion practices. In Chapter 3, I discussed how base 
erosion is implicitly bound up in the process of internationalization and value 
creation. I showed that literature has predominantly focused on a firm level of 
analysis of value creation and appropriation framework and, to a lesser extent, on 
an aggregate and an individual level of analysis—but little from a public 
stakeholder level of analysis. 
In Chapter 4, I discussed how intra-field members, through defensive rhetoric 
(Bitektine, 2011) on the taken-for-granted orthodoxy—expressed through 
cognitive legitimacy judgements—maintain field stability in corporate reporting 
and international taxation domains. I commented on how policymakers use public 
deliberation (Lee & Romano, 2013) as a political process to mobilize social 
judgements across interconnected public policy domains. I explained that the 
literature theorizes about field destabilization occurring from a shift in intra-field 
rhetoric to inter-field rhetoric—but, does not articulate the mechanisms or 
features involved in attending to such shift. 
Methodology and analysis of the findings 
In Chapter 5, I outlined my data set and explained my inductive qualitative 
methodology—essentially based on the Shepherd and Sutcliffe (2011) top-down 
inductive framework. In Chapter 6 on the analysis of the findings, I explicated 
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the host policymakers’ perspective on MNE value-creation frameworks—that 
identifies the constitutive elements in the value-creation process, the mechanisms 
in the value capture process and the guiding principles that MNEs implement in 
managing their base erosion practices. Following thereon, in Chapters 7 and 8, I 
explicated how host policymakers challenged the distributive fairness and 
sociopolitical legitimacy of MNE base erosion practices. 
Contribution 
In Chapter 9, I make a contribution to theory by advancing the value-creation 
frameworks literature by: (i) by developing, from the data, a public stakeholders’ 
perspective; (ii) identifying the constituent elements of MNEs’ value-creation 
process and operative mechanisms of the value-capture process across host 
markets; and (iii) providing a model of the interconnected concepts that illustrates 
how at the limits of divergence of creation/appropriation, MNEs deployed 
rhetorical strategies to maintain field stability. I make a contribution to practice 
by indicating that policymakers and regulators need to develop policy responses 
and administrative tools that act on both value creation and capture/appropriation. 
In addition, I make a contribution to theory by augmenting the social 
judgement literature by: (i) identifying the intra-field taken-for-granted beliefs 
held within the corporate reporting and international taxation policy domains; (ii) 
recognizing that stakeholder-oriented policy is more responsive to evaluative 
sociopolitical legitimacy challenge than stockholder-primacy logic policy; (iii) 
providing a model that traces the convergence of problems, policies and politics 
for host locations challenging base erosion; and (iv) explicating how 
commensuration  techniques are be deployed to destabilize and facilitate 
sociopolitical change. I make a contribution to practice by indicating that 
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policymakers and regulators need to be more reflective and reflexive on the 
assumptions that underlie particular policy fields. 
In the next section, I discuss the limitations and future research directions: (i) 
the contextualized problematization of base erosion beyond advanced economies 
embedded a regional political-economic unit; (ii) the association of related-party 
corporate disclosure conventions and internalization theory; (iii) 
methodologically, a discursive analysis of talk and text on coping with aggressive 
questioning; (iv) the intra-field rhetorical defence for non-discriminatory 
treatment of e-commerce business-type models; and, (v) an historically-informed 
analysis (Luyckx & Janssens, 2016; Ocasio, Mauskapf, & Steele, 2016) of the 
international taxation logics shifting from a one-directional logic of avoidance of 
double taxation in international trade to a multi-directional logic of prevention of 
non-taxation based in multilateral collaboration. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Context 
The choice of empirical research setting (Johns, 2000, 2006) places limitations 
on the research findings and contribution. My contribution to the value-creation 
framework in internationalizing and in extending the theory of social judgements 
is based on an advanced economy (Chan, Makino & Isobe, 2010; Grant, 1991; 
Makino, Isobe & Chan, 2004) host policymakers’ response to the MNE base 
erosion problem as situated in the corporate reporting and corporate tax policy 
fields. Not only is the host policymaker located in an advanced economy, it is 
also presently part of a regional politico-economic unit, the European Union, that 
allows for the free movement of people, goods and things between its member 
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nation-states. Depending on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations (Cumming & 
Zahra, 2016; Jensen & Snaith, 2016), the association between the UK and the EU 
will in time devolve into a different economic and regional interdependent 
relationship. 
Future research may wish to consider the alternative dimensions of host 
location perspective: for example, one which is based on an advanced economy 
that is not embedded in a regional politico-economic unit (Richardson, Taylor & 
Lanis, 2013), or on an emerging developing economy that is independent 
(Gokalp, Lee & Peng, 2017) or affiliated with a regional economic unit (Crivelli, 
De Mooij & Keen, 2016; Jones & Temouri, 2016), or a South-South shift in 
economic engagement (Horner, 2016; Luyckx & Janssens, 2016). Another 
alternative dimension of host location perspective is to explicate the different 
motives for MNEs establishing intermediate units within the group (Chakravarty, 
Hsieh, Schotter & Beamish, 2017; Hoenen, Nell & Ambos, 2014). Furthermore, 
although both traditional staged internationalization and international new 
ventures are addressed in the empirical setting of the UK PAC public hearings, it 
would be a valuable exercise to undertake quantitative modelling of the degrees 
of variability in alignment of MNEs’ value-creation and value-capture processes 
relative to a firm’s inclination to engage in base erosion practices. 
Internalization theory 
Internalization theory has been used to explain the strategy of firms in: making 
decisions on whether to outsource or internalize their production or process 
activities (Chen, 2005; Leiblein, 2002; Williamson, 1999); addressing contractual 
hazards by encourage internalization of economic activity within MNE group 
(Buckley & Casson, 2009; Coase, 1937; Mayer & Salomon, 2006); alternatively, 
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keeping contractual hazards constant, associating increased internalization with 
stronger firm technological capabilities (Hoetker, 2005; Mayer & Salomon, 
2006); distinguishing the modes of entry into new overseas markets (Agarwal, 
1992; Hennart, 1986); creating internal treasury and capital market funding 
facilities for entities within the MNE group (Rugman, 2006c) and coordinating 
regional management mandates for MNEs across host locations (Chakravarty et 
al., 2017). 
Notwithstanding the significant contribution of internalization theory to 
explaining modalities of governance, contracting, coordination, and optimizing 
decision-choices, there is very little research on the nature, scope and motives 
guiding related-party corporate disclosures, as mandated under IAS 24 (2009). 
As has been shown in this thesis, the phenomenon of base erosion is integrally 
associated with economic and coordination activities performed within MNE 
groups. Yet academic literature has given little attention to the central role that is 
commanded by related-party corporate activity. Those limited instances relate to 
literature on corporate failures arising from the manipulation in related-party 
activities (Baker & Hayes, 2004; Benston & Hartgraves, 2002; Moerman & van 
der Laan, 2015) and from the advantages in network coordination capabilities 
(Hakansson & Lind, 2004). Further research is necessary to question why such a 
central concept of internalization has received little attention in the corporate 
disclosure and organizational accountability literature. 
Methodology 
In my thesis, I have used the technique of bidirectional contextualized 
reasoning (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Mantere & Ketokivi, 2013) and a top-down 
inductive approach (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011) in order to undertake an 
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expansive enquiry into how host location policymakers make sense of  the base 
erosion phenomenon, based on the extensive data set. The bidirectional reasoning 
has enabled: on the one hand, the linking of second-order themes with the relevant 
bodies of literature and the development of a so-called sensory representation of 
such data (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011)—identifying aspects of similarity, 
incompleteness, oppositions and tensions; whilst on the other hand, linking of the 
aggregate themes to a conceptual representation of thematic relationships—
enabling abductive reasoning (Paavola, 2004; Richardson & Kramer, 2006) to 
give contextualized meaning to the relationships, conditions and explanations of 
the phenomenon under research (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). 
There are limitations to the bidirectional inductive methodology that I have 
used in this research. In moving from first-order codes to second-order themes I 
face the problem of the double hermeneutic—as the lead researcher, I interpret 
the participants’ interpretations and ‘trace processes that are themselves the traces 
of others sensemaking’ (Hatch & Yanow, 2008 p.37). There are, however, at least 
two legitimate defences to this implication. Firstly, provided the researcher 
explains the prescriptive rules of reasoning and applies them consistently 
throughout the exercise, methodological rigour is preserved (Ketokivi & Mantere, 
2010).                 
    Secondly, the scholarly community that judges theoretical contributions only 
acknowledges novelty and utility of contributions that fill a gap in extant literature 
(Bansal & Corley, 2012; Corley & Gioia, 2011; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997). 
In this research, it is the empirical data and the phenomenon-driven research 
question that has directed the choice of literature and maintained focus on the 
gaps (Corley & Schinoff, 2017; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011). That is to say, the 
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second defence concerns the academic community that gives legitimacy to 
acceptable hermeneutic practices in the social construction of theory about 
incompleteness, inadequacy or incommensurability of extant literature (Alvesson 
& Sandberg, 2011; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997). 
There is also the future research opportunity, with this extensive data set, to 
use a discursive analytical lens—as a qualitative research method—to delve 
deeper into the related set of talk and texts. Language, texts and actions construct 
organizational reality (Phillips & Oswick, 2012), identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 
2002; Sveningsson & Alvesson, 2003), power (Molotch & Boden, 1985; Mumby 
& Stohl, 1991), logics (Ocasio, Lowenstein & Nigam, 2015), resistance and 
change (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), rather than simply reflecting on these key 
concepts. Not only do the various methods of discourse analysis inform us of 
socially constructed reality but also of organizational and institutional phenomena 
(Grant, Keenoy & Oswick, 2001) that is of interest to organizational scholars, for 
example, as in deinstitutionalizing the commercial use of the insecticide DDT 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2009) or in transforming and normalizing otherwise contested 
public policy over biotechnology and GM science (Motion & Leitch, 2009). 
There are a number of opportunities that may be identified as suitable to apply 
discourse analysis in the base erosion phenomenon inquiry. It would be 
interesting to examine whether there has been a shift (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; 
Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Ocasio et al., 2015) in international taxation logics from 
a singular logic for the avoidance of double taxation in the advancement of 
international trade to a multiple competing logics (Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009; Sauermann & Stephan, 2013) for the avoidance of both double 
taxation and double non-taxation—thereby, not only promoting international 
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trade, but also encouraging inter-nation-state collaboration to reduce the leakage 
of host corporate taxation revenues arising from the so-called stateless income 
eventualities (Kleinbard, 2012, 2013; OECD, 2015c). 
There is also the interesting question as to how respondent witnesses coped 
with the aggressive questioning sessions (Campbell, Follender & Shane, 1998; 
Heracleous & Klaering, 2014; Luyckx & Janssens, 2016) at the PAC-UK (2012) 
and PAC-UK (2013). A discursive analysis of the talk and text between 
respondent interrogees and the MNE respondent witnesses at the UK Public 
Hearings will be give insight into the communicative competencies in responding 
(Campbell et al., 1998), and the strategies and the actions (Gao, Yu & Cannella, 
2017) engaged by MNEs in handling hostile questions in times of crisis. 
Communicative competencies involve leaders having the capabilities of 
deploying different rhetorical styles to different situations (Heracleous & 
Klaering, 2014), whilst strategic responses that address the corrective action and 
the desirability of solutions to problem solving in times of crisis sends positive 
messages diffusing hostility, that blaming human agency has the opposite effect 
(Campbell et al., 1998). 
Beyond the scope of the data set used in this thesis, is the interesting question 
how Silicon Valley and industry representatives for new e-commerce business 
models (Amit & Zott, 2001; Beattie & Smith, 2013; Zott, Amit & Massa, 2011) 
lobbied host policymakers and inter-governmental mediators that the new e-
commerce business models were ubiquitous technologically advances that have 
diffused into all types of business processes, practices and business forms and are 
not unique to new e-commerce business models alone. By applying rhetorical 
theory (Hartelius & Browning, 2008; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Ocasio et al., 2015) 
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to these nonmarket strategies (Bonardi, Hillman & Keim, 2005; Funk & 
Hirschman, 2017) will provide a deeper insight into the rhetorical competencies 
of MNEs and their industry representative associations in shaping public policy. 
In the original OECD (2014a) report, it reviewed a number of options how public 
policy may address various new e-commerce models. However, following many 
submissions received from MNEs and their industry representative bodies 
(OECD, 2014b), all policy options that sought only to address the new e-
commerce business models were entirely withdrawn (OECD, 2015a). 
Policy fields 
The question arises as to whether, and to what extent, it may be possible to 
replicate the shifting of the sociopolitical deliberative process in other public 
policy domains. In this thesis, I showed how host policymakers deployed 
particular techniques of commensuration in order to destabilize and facilitate 
sociopolitical change in an interconnected public policy domain—that is, to 
advance change to international taxation policies and practices. 
Other public policy domains that could be considered for further research 
include the time frame for recognizing firm failures (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Farjoun & Starbuck, 2007). It would be useful to compare the cognitive 
legitimacy judgements that are made by insolvency practitioners, turnaround 
management consultants and top management of firms that have gone into 
voluntary administration or liquidation on the one hand, and the demand from the 
broader stakeholder class on the other, for policy responses that provide for more 
timely recognition of impending firm failures and corporate collapses under the 
prevailing corporate disclosure regulations for going concerns. 
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A similar question relates to the corporate responsibility of firms in providing 
and reporting on employee benefits and pension plans (Barringer & Milkovich, 
1998; Graham, 2008). On the one hand, corporate disclosure policy is determined 
by the criterion of stockholder decision-relevant information, whilst, on the other 
hand, the broader stakeholder class demands socio-political legitimacy 
judgements that are more responsive to pension plan shortfalls and attempts of to 
place corporate assets beyond the reach of regulators. Transforming events, such 
as the spectacular failures of financial institutions considered ‘too big to fail’, or 
those firms that were allowed to fail, like Lehman Brothers, Enron and more 
recently BHS, call for policy responses that challenge the taken-for-granted views 
held intra-field (Boje, Rosile, Durrant & Luhman, 2004).  
Implications for Practice 
In considering implications for practice (Bartunek & Rynes, 2010), there are 
the matters of comprehensibility of policy response, the feasibility of policy 
implementation (Kingdon, 2011), the ideology of unstated cognitive orthodoxy 
(Veldman & Willmott, 2016) and the relational interaction of policy subsystems 
and  policy entrepreneurs (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010). Framing the base erosion 
phenomenon as a theoretical construct of relative diverging alignment in a firm’s 
value-creation and value-capture processes across host locations indicates that 
host public policies, such as particular preferential regimes aimed at attracting 
foreign-HQ MNEs that merely target value-creation economic activity, bear the 
risk of failing to target the mechanisms of value capture or appropriation. Host 
policymakers and host regulators have to address both the constitutive elements 
of value creation as well as the mechanisms of value capture conjointly when 
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formulating public policy to attract the economic engagement of foreign-HQ 
MNEs. In this way, the projected impact of new host policies can be assessed and 
measured in terms of their effectiveness in preventing or minimizing the relative 
divergence in foreign-headquartered MNEs’ value strategies across host 
locations. 
Host public policy also needs to recognize, particularly where it is embedded 
in a liberal market ideology, that stockholder-primacy logic is primarily 
concerned with aggregated group value creation and value capture for the MNEs’ 
home HQs, and not necessarily with granular attribution or distributive fairness 
across those foreign subunits and intermediate group units (Chakravarty et al., 
2017; Hoenen et al., 2014). In this instance, the use of commensuration 
techniques (Espeland & Lom, 2015; Espeland & Stevens, 1998;  Jeacle & Carter, 
2011), as deployed in the public deliberative process in the UK, provides a 
powerful tool for making visible the relative degree of alignment in MNE value-
based strategies across host locations that would otherwise be invisible to the 
broader stakeholder class. 
More specifically, host policymakers and regulators should, in the course of 
developing legislation and administrative procedure manuals, make use of the 
commensuration techniques that evolved from the UK PAC hearings. These three 
commensuration techniques are: applying country-by-country economic KPI 
benchmarking; using a cognitive mindset that recognizes the integrative identity 
of values within an MNE group; and appreciating the ontological reification of 
profit that seeks to reward cost of the capital and labour as a purely functional 
component whilst rewarding the assumption of entrepreneurial risk/uncertainty 
as the residue or non-functional component of equitable profit distribution. 
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Finally, whereas the host location perspective has been driven primarily from 
a Northern hemisphere focus (Vahlne & Ivarsson, 2014), there is a growing 
indication of a shift in global trade patterns towards South-South trade (Horner, 
2016) and interest by Southern hemisphere host policymakers and regulators.   
  ________________________________________________________________
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